

I. BERKHIN

**SOCIALISM
WAS BUILT
LIKE THIS**

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PROFESSOR, DOCTOR OF HISTORY

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И. БЕРХИН
Социализм строился так
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I. Berkin wrote a number of chapters for the 10-volume *World History* (1961-65) and 12-volume *History of the USSR* to be published by the History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the author of major chapters of a school textbook on the history of Soviet society (1964) awarded a prize at the textbook contest. In 1966 another book by him—this time the textbook on the history of Soviet society for higher schools—was published.

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The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A boundless country, stretching for almost ten thousand kilometres from East to West, from the Pacific coast to the Carpathians, and for five thousand kilometres from North to South, from the Arctic to the Black Sea. The USSR has an area of 22.4 million square kilometres; as of January 1965, it has 1,802 towns, 3,591 townships, and 700,000 villages. The population of the Soviet Union is 232 million and there are more than one hundred nationalities inhabiting it.

The USSR is a big industrial power, with more than 200,000 industrial enterprises producing goods of all kinds for the benefit of man. The USSR is second in the world for volume of industrial production.

The Soviet Union is a country of large-scale socialist agriculture. There are 37,000 collective farms, in which 15,400,000 peasant households have voluntarily united, and more than 11,500 state agricultural enterprises known as state farms. At the beginning of 1965, the collective and state farms had more than 3,000,000 tractors, 858,000 grain, silage beet, potatoes combine-harvesters, 982,000 lorries and millions of other agricultural machines and implements at their disposal.

The Soviet Union is the country of one-hundred-per-cent literacy, and of advanced culture, science and technology. It was in the USSR that the first atomic power station in the world was built and the atomic icebreaker *Lenin* launched. The Soviet people were the first to put artificial satellites into orbit round the Earth, to launch the first artificial planet of the Sun, the first rocket to the Moon, which delivered the Soviet pennant there and the first Moon satellite. Yuri Gagarin, a Soviet citizen, made a flight into space and was the first man on Earth to do so. Alexei Leonov, also a Soviet citizen, was the first man in the world to leave the spaceship and walk into space.

It took the Soviet Union half a century to achieve all this. The Socialist Revolution of October 1917 marked the beginning of Russia's transformation into an advanced socialist power. Socialism was built like this...

I. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION—BEGINNING OF THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA

WHAT WAS PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA LIKE?

Though pre-revolutionary Russia possessed rather developed industry, it was an agrarian country, which had only a quarter as much up-to-date machinery as Britain, one-fifth as much as Germany and one-tenth as much as the United States of America. In 1913 Russia was fifth for volume of industrial production in the world and fourth in Europe. The total industrial output of the USA was 14.5 times as much as that of Russia and 21.4 times as much reckoned per head of population.

Agriculture was especially backward in Russia. "The most backward system of landtenure and the most ignorant peasantry," Lenin wrote of old pre-revolutionary Russia. The bulk of the land belonged to the big land-owners, the tsar's family, the monasteries and the *kulaks*¹—in all they owned 580 million acres or 63 per cent of all the cultivated land. Peasants had small plots of land which could scarcely produce enough to feed them. A total of 65 per cent of the peasants were poor people owning tiny scraps of land. More than 30 per cent of them

¹ *Kulak*—a well-to-do Russian peasant.

had neither horses nor implements to cultivate the soil, or had only primitive ones. According to the 1910 census there were 28 million wooden ploughs and harrows. Crop yields were extremely low.

The peasants led a terrible life, oppressed by the big landowners and the *kulaks*. Every year they spent 700 million gold roubles on the purchase and renting of land from the big landowners. The peasants' debt to the Land Bank amounted to more than three thousand million roubles.

The working class of Russia was mercilessly exploited both by Russian and foreign capitalists who owned industrial enterprises in Russia.

Foreign capital was responsible for more than 50 per cent of the investments in the mining and metal-working industries, 70 per cent of those in coal-mining in the Donbass, the chief coalfield in the country, 75 per cent in electrical engineering, 87.5 per cent of those in ore-mining in the Krivoi Rog area, the main iron ore area of the country, and 50 per cent in oil extraction.

As regards Russia's political system, she was an absolute monarchy. The Emperor of All Russia, Tsar Nicholas II, of the Romanov dynasty, had unlimited power. Formally there existed a kind of parliament in Russia—the so-called State Duma established by Nicholas II during the thunderous years of the First Russian Revolution (1905-07). But the members of the Duma were not really elected—they were virtually appointed from among the landowners, bourgeoisie and clergy. As far as the workers and peasants were concerned, they had only a few representatives in the Duma. For instance, there were only six deputies from among the workers, elected by indirect suffrage.

Furthermore the Duma's powers were limited. Laws

passed by it did not come into force until they were approved by the Emperor. The government was responsible to the tsar, and not to the Duma, etc.

The working people of Russia had none of the elementary political freedoms—freedom of speech, of assembly, organization, conscience, etc. Working-class organizations were hounded. The Communist Party had to do underground work, trade unions were banned, and no workers' newspapers were published. Tsarism stifled any manifestation of freedom.

The Russian Empire was a multi-national state, with more than one hundred nationalities, many of them living in compact communities in a particular area. There were the Ukrainians, the Poles, the Byelorussians, the Lithuanians, the Letts, the Estonians, the Georgians, the Armenians, the Azerbaijanians, the peoples of Central Asia, the Tatars, the Bashkirs and many other peoples. Non-Russians accounted for more than 60 per cent of Russia's population. The majority of the people living in the national areas were doomed to economic and cultural backwardness. In fact, these areas were colonies of tsarist Russia.

Many non-Russian peoples suffered from humiliating national oppression just as the non-white peoples in the USA or the South African Republic do now.

Government officials in the non-Russian areas were exclusively Russian, and they blatantly plundered the local population. Only Russian was recognized as the state language. There was only a limited number of deputies to the State Duma from the non-Russian areas, and the peoples of Central Asia and Yakutia had no right at all to elect deputies to the Duma. The so-called Jewish pale prevented Jews from living beyond a certain boundary. Educational establishments admitted a strictly limited proportion

of Jews. The religions of the non-Russian peoples were persecuted. Persons who did not belong to the Russian Orthodox Church could not occupy state posts, live outside the areas set aside for them, study in educational establishments for Russians, etc. The national areas virtually had no educational establishments. In the schools, of which there were very few, Russian was the sole language of instruction. There was 98-99 per cent illiteracy among the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, etc.

Things were very hard for the working people of Russia, but their position deteriorated even more with the outbreak of World War I, which was unleashed in 1914 by the imperialists of the major capitalist states for the redivision of the world. In the interests of the Russian capitalists and landowners the tsarist government plunged Russia into this criminal war which was being fought for aims that were by no means to the benefit of the people. The war meant infinite suffering for the country and its working people and unheard-of profits for the capitalists. The war undermined the country's already weak economy, and Russia found herself on the brink of national disaster and economic crisis. During the war the capitalists and landowners intensified the oppression and exploitation of the working people who could finally stand no more.

VICTORY OF THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

In February 1917, the Petrograd workers and soldiers revolted and overthrew the tsarist monarchy. Revolutionary Petrograd was joined by the whole of Russia, and the workers and soldiers all over the country began to set up their own revolutionary bodies of power—Soviets of

Workers and Soldiers' Deputies. Deputies to the Soviets were elected by the workers at particular factories, by soldiers in army units and by ships' crews. The Soviets were born of the revolutionary activity of the masses, and there were no official laws to govern their existence and activities. They themselves determined their rights and duties. Their strength depended on the level of organization and revolutionary determination of those who elected them, on the policy of the parties whose representatives headed the Soviets. The Soviets headed by Communists became real bodies of revolutionary power: without waiting for anyone's permission they introduced an eight-hour working day, established workers' control over production, and campaigned against speculation in foodstuffs and manufactured goods, etc. The Soviets were supported to the hilt by the workers and soldiers. They could have taken power into their hands in the centre and in the provinces and established their own government. But unfortunately this did not happen for the following reasons.

The Russian bourgeoisie were mortally afraid of the revolution and did everything to prevent it. In particular, they were preparing a palace coup with a view to forcing the abdication of Nicholas II, who was extremely unpopular in the country, and putting his brother Mikhail on the throne, their ultimate goal being to preserve the monarchy and the entire tsarist system. When the bourgeoisie failed to prevent the people carrying through the revolution they decided to snatch victory from the people's hands and to forestall the transition of power to the working people. On March 2, 1917, the bourgeois parties of the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) and Octyabrists (Union of October 17), formed a Provisional Bourgeois Government headed by Prince Lvov, a big landowner. At that time the Provisional Government had no real power

and its fate depended completely on the position of the Soviets, above all the Petrograd Soviet, which in fact was the central Soviet of the country. Had the Petrograd Soviet and the Soviets of other towns refused to place confidence in the Provisional Government it could not have existed for as long as two days.

However, in the Petrograd Soviet, and also in the majority of Soviets in other towns, the deputies from petty-bourgeois parties, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, were in the majority, and their representatives were at the head of these Soviets. They thought that since the revolution that had taken place in Russia was a bourgeois one, power must go to the bourgeoisie. They did not believe that the bourgeoisie was a counter-revolutionary class, and consequently they not only failed to prevent the bourgeois parties from forming their government, but agreed to hand over power to that government, retaining for the Soviets the right of "control" over its activities.

As a result of the revolution the working people won political freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of organization, assembly and demonstration. Overcome by this success, they placed full confidence in the Provisional Government. They hoped it would withdraw from the imperialist war, turn over the landowners' estates to the peasants, proclaim an eight-hour working day, take measures to make good the economic devastation, relieve hunger and put an end to national oppression.

The Provisional Government, however, did not justify their hopes, and in fact continued the old tsarist policy that was against the interests of the people but to the benefit of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. It continued the criminal imperialist war and in an effort to deceive the people called it "revolutionary," i.e. a war for the de-

fence of the revolution. The land remained the property of the landowners, and the Provisional Government did everything it possibly could to frustrate the peasants' attempts to take it over. This was only to be expected, of course, for the capitalists and bankers who had seized power were interested in preserving the private ownership of land by the big estate owners because they owned big estates themselves. In addition, 60 per cent of all land belonging to the landowners was heavily mortgaged, and the confiscation of the land would have involved big losses for the bankers. Finally, the confiscation of the landowners' estates would have meant a blow to the principle of private ownership, which was the cornerstone of the entire capitalist system. This was something the bourgeoisie could not tolerate.

The Provisional Government did not intend to satisfy the workers' demand for an eight-hour day. It took no measures to prevent the cost of living rising and speculation increasing, although both things were causing great hardship to the working people. The oppression of the non-Russian peoples was not abolished. The measures were reduced to the liquidation of the Jewish pale and the religious restrictions.

The policy of the Provisional Government clashed with the working people's interests. The continuation of the war increased Russia's dependence on her military allies, aggravated the devastation of the economy, made the position of the people still worse and increased the threat of the economic ruin and national disaster.

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION INEVITABLE

There was only one way out—to carry the revolution further, and transfer power to the workers and peasants, as represented by the Soviets.

Only people's power could put an end to the war, confiscate land from the landowners and turn it over to the peasants; only people's power could make the factories the property of the entire people and so overcome the economic devastation. Only by this means could the centuries-old economic backwardness of the country be overcome, and an end put to national oppression, to inequality and hostility among peoples.

There was only one political party in Russia—the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) that understood this historical necessity. After the February Revolution the Party emerged into the open—it having been driven underground by the tsarist government. Leading members came back from exile and emigration. Early in April Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, organizer and leader of the Party, arrived in Russia from abroad. The Party was growing rapidly: by April 1917, it had 80,000 members as against 45,000 at the beginning of March. These people were the cream of the working class and the finest representatives of Russia's intelligentsia.

At the All-Russia Conference which took place in April 1917 the Communist Party drew up a programme to save Russia from the threat of economic ruin and national disaster. This programme was based on Lenin's slogan "All power to the Soviets!" It meant the peaceful transfer of all power in the country to the working people's representatives, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, democratically elected by the working people.

In the spring of 1917, a peaceful transition of power to the Soviets, i.e., without an armed uprising, was quite possible. The Soviets enjoyed the full support of the workers and the many millions of peasants and armed soldiers. The Provisional Government would not have been in a

position to put up serious resistance to the transfer of power to the Soviets, and Lenin therefore advanced the slogan of the peaceful development of the revolution, the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets.

Having taken power, the Soviets, according to Lenin's plan, had to propose an immediate and democratic peace to all the belligerent countries, to carry out urgent revolutionary changes in the economy, and to establish control over social production and the distribution of products on a countrywide scale, to take over the banks—key points in the economy, nationalize the most important industries, confiscate all the landlords' estates and hand them over to the peasants, introduce an eight-hour working day, abolish all national privileges and proclaim the equality of nations.

This was Lenin's plan for saving and rehabilitating Russia. In order to carry it out the Communists had to win an understanding of the Communist Party's policy and support for it from the working class and the entire working people of Russia. It was impossible to carry out the proletarian revolution without winning over the broad masses of the people to the side of the Communists and without the people's support for the revolutionary programme for Russia's transformation.

The working people of Russia, however, did not support the Communists immediately. During the first few months after the February Revolution the petty-bourgeois Menshevik Party enjoyed great popularity among the workers, posing as a socialist party, the champion of working-class interests. Another petty-bourgeois party—the Socialist-Revolutionaries (S.R.'s) which in words stood for the confiscation of the landowners' estates and their division among the peasants on an equal basis, had the greatest influence among the peasantry. This dominating influence

of the Mensheviks and the S.R.'s among the people was reflected in the decisions of the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets held in June, 1917, the bulk of the delegates being Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. They succeeded in carrying a resolution endorsing the Provisional Government's policy and approving the planned offensive by Russian troops at the front, which had been demanded by Russia's European allies. The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee in which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had a majority.

However, the policy of the Provisional Government, which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries entered in May 1917, soon disappointed the masses. The anti-popular policy of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties opened the people's eyes and awakened them to political consciousness. The people's illusions were collapsing to the ground one after another, their faith in the Provisional Government was evaporating, and they were losing confidence in the petty-bourgeois parties. They began to listen more and more to the Communists, rallying round the Leninist Party and uniting their forces for the struggle against bourgeois power.

THE BOURGEOISIE WERE LEADING THE COUNTRY TO DISASTER

The growing discontent of the masses caused government crises, and during the eight months between the October Socialist Revolution and the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution the government changed four times. The petty-bourgeois parties took part in three governments side by side with bourgeois parties and even had a majority in the fourth government. The governments changed, but their anti-popular policy remained the same.

The country's position was deteriorating day by day, the economic devastation becoming more and more serious. The capitalists started to engage in economic sabotage, deliberately closing down factories with a view to cowing the workers by means of hunger. Transport facilities were disorganized and a financial crisis was impending. Speculation in consumer goods attained a fabulous scale, and famine was inexorably approaching. The position of the people could hardly have been worse.

The Provisional Government, frightened by its own people, intensified its repressive measures within the country and planned national betrayal—the intention was to open the front to the German troops and give them the main centres of the country. A. Verkhovsky, Russia's War Minister, put it quite frankly: "If we do not find the strength and the opportunity to establish order within the country, this order will be established with the help of German bayonets."

John Reed, a progressive American journalist who was in Russia at the time, gives the following description of Russia's position in his book *Ten Days That Shook The World*. He wrote: "Winter was coming on... On the freezing front miserable armies continued to starve and die, without enthusiasm. The railways were breaking down, —food lessening, factories closing. The desperate masses cried out that the bourgeoisie was sabotaging the life of the people, causing defeat on the Front. Riga had been surrendered just after General Kornilov said publicly, 'Must we pay with Riga the price of bringing the country to a sense of its duty?... The secretary of the Petrograd branch of the Cadet party told me that the break-down of the country's economic life was part of a campaign to discredit the Revolution... I know of certain coal-mines near Kharkov which were fired and flooded by their own-

ers, of textile factories at Moscow whose engineers put the machinery out of order when they left, of railroad officials caught by the workers in the act of crippling locomotives. . . . A large section of the propertied classes preferred the Germans to the Revolution—even to the Provisional Government—and didn't hesitate to say so."

THE REVOLUTION COMES TO A HEAD

This criminal policy of the government of the bourgeoisie and landowners was jeopardizing the very existence of Russia as national state, and the working people realized the danger. They turned away from the parties that were responsible for the situation, from those parties that did not want to carry out radical measures to prevent catastrophe.

More and more workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectuals were coming over to the side of the Communist Party headed by Lenin. The Leninist Party not only showed the people the sole way to save the country, it waged a determined struggle to prevent the impending national catastrophe.

In the autumn of 1917 revolutionary feeling in the country rose to a climax. The working class, which was in the vanguard, engaged in a powerful strike movement, which developed into open revolutionary struggle. The workers seized factories, removed the old administration and took the management of production into their own hands. At meetings the workers voted for resolutions demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets.

The overwhelming majority of Russia's workers came over to the side of the Communist Party. In the spring of 1917 the bulk of city Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies consisted of Communists or their followers. The

Communist Party gained the leadership of the city Soviets.

The peasant movement developed with unheard-of rapidity. Peasants seized the landowners' land. The national-liberation movement of the non-Russian peoples against the colonialist policy of the bourgeois government spread all over Russia. Soldiers and sailors expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the criminal war and openly refused to obey military commands. The front was disintegrating. At their meetings the soldiers adopted resolutions of no-confidence in the Provisional Government and demanded that all power be handed over to the Soviets. The influence of the Communist Party among the peasants and soldiers was also growing.

The revolutionary crisis in the country had come to a head. When everything possible had been done to secure the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets, when it became known that the Provisional Government was preparing to cede Petrograd to German troops in exchange for assistance in strangling the revolutionary people's movement, the Communist Party called on the workers and soldiers to overthrow the bourgeois Provisional Government by force of arms and to proclaim the power of the Soviets.

RUSSIA PROCLAIMED A SOVIET REPUBLIC

October 25 (November 7 according to the European calendar) is a great day in the history of Russia and humanity as a whole. On this day the victorious people's uprising overthrew the bourgeois Provisional Government.

In the evening of October 25 the Second Congress of Soviets opened, the majority of delegates to which were Communists elected by the local Soviets. The Left So-

cialist-Revolutionaries, who had broken away from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, comprised 25 per cent of the delegates, and they, too, were in favour of the transfer of power to the Soviets. The Congress proclaimed Russia a Soviet Republic, and all power was handed over to the Soviets of People's Deputies.

The Congress adopted the programme of Soviet power: an immediate and democratic peace to be proposed to all peoples; the estates of the landowners and monasteries to be handed over to the peasants without compensation; workers' control over production to be established; the army to be reorganized on democratic lines, and all nations of Russia to be granted the genuine right of self-determination. The Congress elected the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and formed the Soviet Government—the Council of People's Commissars. This was how the first state of workers and peasants in the world came into being.

BUILDING THE SOVIET STATE

The new state could not use the old state machine to carry out its historic mission—of building socialist society—for this apparatus served the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landowners.

The All-Russia Congress of Soviets, to which delegates were elected by Local Soviets, became the supreme body of state power. In between sessions of the Congress supreme legislative power was exercised by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, elected at the Congress of the Soviets.

Yakov Sverdlov, an outstanding revolutionary and a prominent Communist Party leader, was elected the Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. After

Sverdlov's death in 1919, Mikhail Kalinin, a Petrograd worker and the son of a peasant, was elected Chairman. They were the first presidents of the Soviet state.

The Council of People's Commissars was the central executive and administrative body of the Soviet state. It was headed by Lenin for six years, until his death in 1924. Lenin was a brilliant theoretician, organizer and leader of the communist movement, and a great statesman. He was born in Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk) in 1870, and at the turn of the century he threw himself into the revolutionary struggle. Having studied and analyzed Marx's teaching he developed and applied it to conditions in Russia. His whole life was linked with the cause of the liberation of the working class.

Lenin did really prodigious work to organize, consolidate and politically educate the working class and form the Party of the proletarian revolution. It was Lenin's persistent efforts that made possible the formation of such a Party in 1903, and Lenin was the constant leader and organizer of this Party, which headed the struggle of the masses in three revolutions: in 1905-07, in February 1917 and in October 1917. The October Revolution was triumphant, and has gone down in history as the Great Socialist Revolution. In all these revolutions Lenin was the great strategist of the party.

Lenin combined many qualities—he was a great scientist and revolutionary, an unparalleled organizer, and a brilliant statesman. He had a complete and thorough grasp of the laws of revolutionary development; he was aware of the people's needs and had close links with the workers and peasants. "I remember vividly Vladimir Ilyich's characteristic posture," N. Gorbunov, Lenin's secretary, writes in his memoirs. "He sat so near the peasant he was speaking to that their knees touched; he bent for-

ward as if it helped him to hear better and to miss nothing; with a friendly smile he asked questions and gave instructions in a very business-like manner. The peasants left him delighted, muttering: 'Now, that's power, that's our real peasant power!'

The Council of People's Commissars consisted of 15 People's Commissars who were in charge of the People's Commissariats set up to replace the old ministries (Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Education, Finance, Army and Navy, etc.). A special Committee on National Affairs was set up within the Soviet Government to carry through the policy of equality and friendship among the peoples proclaimed by Soviet power. The Supreme Council of National Economy was established to give planned leadership in the development of the national economy and the management of socialized enterprises. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (*Cheka*) was formed to combat counter-revolutionary activities, and for work in *Cheka* bodies the Party selected workers, soldiers and sailors who were infinitely devoted to the people, were incorruptible and staunch revolutionaries, "people with fiery hearts, cool heads and clean hands," as Felix Dzerzhinsky, who was the head of the *Cheka*, used to say.

In the place of the old judicial institutions a new Soviet judicial system was established: local courts and revolutionary tribunals, elected by the Soviets (at gubernia and city level). They had the task of upholding revolutionary law, and defending the people's interests. The Soviet workers and peasants' militia was formed to protect social order. To defend the revolution from external danger and to suppress counter-revolutionary resistance within the country the workers and peasants' Red Army was formed—at first on a purely voluntary basis, only the most politically conscious representatives of the working

class being accepted into its ranks. Representatives of non-working classes were not admitted to the army. The people did not trust them and consequently did not want to give them arms, and they were found jobs in the rear.

The new state was built in the course of a bitter struggle against the classes that had been overthrown. The majority of bourgeois officials of the old ministries who did not want to collaborate with Soviet power became saboteurs, cherishing plans of counter-revolution and trying to disorganize the country's administration. The bourgeoisie believed that the proletariat would be unable to organize the administration of the state because it had no qualified administrative personnel.

Not long before the socialist revolution triumphed the bourgeois newspaper *New Times* wrote mockingly: "Let us assume for a moment that the Bolsheviks will win. Who will govern then: perhaps the cooks, the experts in rissoles and steak? Or the firemen? The stablemen, the stokers? Or perhaps nursemaids will rush off to a session of the State Council in between washing the babies' napkins? Who will? Who are these statesmen? Perhaps the locksmiths will deal with the theatre, the plumbers with diplomacy, and the carpenters with the post and telegraph? Are you sure they will? History will give the Bolsheviks an answer to this crazy question."

The bourgeois newspaper was echoed by the "solid, respectable" organ of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party. The day after the victory of the October Revolution it commented in connection with the sabotage started by bourgeois officials: "Only twenty-four hours have passed since the day of the Bolsheviks' victory and already history has begun taking revenge upon them... They simply cannot assume state power. It slips out of their hands, for there is a vacuum around them they them-

selves created, for they are isolated from everyone, for the entire official and technical apparatus refuses to work for them."

But history has made a laughing stock of these "clairvoyants." On the eve of the revolution Lenin wrote: "We have a 'magic way' to enlarge our state apparatus tenfold at once, at one stroke, a way which no capitalist state ever possessed or could possess. This magic way is to draw the working people, to draw the poor, into the daily work of state administration."

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government made use of this "wonderful means." They called on workers, soldiers and sailors to work in the state apparatus. For instance, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was formed with the active participation of the workers at the biggest industrial enterprise in Petrograd, the Putilov Works. The workers at the Siemens-Schuckert Plant and the Baltic Fleet sailors took part in the organization of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. N. Markin, a Baltic sailor, was appointed business manager of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and railwaymen sent their best representatives to work in the People's Commissariat for Transport and Communications. This was how a new state machine was formed in the centre of the country.

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE IN THE FORMATION OF THE STATE MACHINE

The local bodies of power were set up on the same basis. On November 5, 1917, Lenin made the following appeal to the working people of Russia: "Comrades toilers! Remember that now you yourselves are at the helm of the state. No one will help you if you yourselves do not unite

and take into your hands all affairs of the state. Your Soviets from now on are the organs of state authority, working bodies with full powers.

"Rally around your Soviets. Strengthen them. Get on with the job yourselves; begin right at the bottom, do not wait for anyone."

There was a broad response to Lenin's appeal. The working people reviewed the composition of the Soviets; they recalled deputies who did not justify the electors' confidence, and elected more suitable people in their places.

An active part in the building of the new state was played by the Party and the trade unions. When the revolution began the trade unions were the biggest organizations of the working people, with more than two and a half million members. At the First All-Russia Congress in January 1918 the trade unions expressed unconditional support for Soviet power, and sent their best representatives to work in the state apparatus and in local bodies of power. They provided the state with many workers to take an active part in the administration of nationalized enterprises. They exercised workers' control over the production and distribution of products, which had been laid down by the Soviet state in November 1917. The trade unions became a school for organization, a school for teaching the people how to manage state affairs and production.

The Russian Young Communist League—Komsomol—was formed in 1918 and it became the organizer, leader and teacher of the youth. Through the Soviets, the trade unions, and the Komsomol many millions of the working people were drawn into the running of the state and production.

The Communist Party played a leading role in the Soviet state from the very first. The first Soviet Government was formed by the Communist Party, but although the Party believed that the leadership of society in a workers' and peasants' state must be exercised by the Communist Party, it admitted the possibility of representatives of other parties taking part in the government provided their attitude was recognition of Soviet power and the leading role of the Communist Party. On these conditions an agreement was concluded in November 1917 between the Communist Party and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party whose representatives entered the Soviet Government. In March 1918, they left it in protest against the Brest peace with Germany. After that the Soviet Government consisted solely of representatives of the Communist Party.

The Communist Party played a leading part in the Soviets. The petty-bourgeois parties were also allowed to participate in the Soviets on condition that they recognized Soviet power and did not carry on a counter-revolutionary struggle against the Soviet state. The petty-bourgeois parties of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries took part in the elections to all bodies of Soviet power and were represented on them.

The leadership of the petty-bourgeois parties, however, took the line of opposing the measures adopted by Soviet power and later—in the years of foreign military intervention and Civil War—of open armed struggle against the Soviet state.

All this resulted in the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries losing the people's support and in a constant drop in their representation on the Soviets. Finally the workers and peasants refused to trust them, and these parties died as political organizations back at the time of

the Civil War (1918-20); at the beginning of the twenties they were disbanded.

On the other hand, the influence and authority of the Communist Party among the masses grew year by year.

After the disintegration and collapse of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties the Communist Party emerged as the single Party in the country, having united all the working people around itself.

As the leading, most conscious and active detachment of the working class and the working people as a whole, the Communist Party works out the policy of the Soviet state. The Party's congresses and conferences and the plenary meetings of the Central Committee discuss all important questions of the home and foreign policy of the state. The Party consults the people on all the major questions of building socialist and communist society.

The Party explains its policy widely to the people and mobilizes them to carry it out. The Party organizes the people and fosters in them a respect for labour discipline and for socialist property, and develops their communist consciousness. The Party demands that they be a model of behaviour to all people, in work, in public and family life.

Through its representatives the Communist Party gives leadership to all mass organizations of the working people—the trade unions, the Komsomol, the cooperatives, sports societies, etc.

II. CREATIVE ACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET STATE

PEACE FOR THE PEOPLE!

On its very first day of existence the Soviet state embarked on activity to satisfy the urgent needs of the people, save the country from impending economic disaster and from the military threat of German imperialism, with a view to carrying through the socialist transformation of Russia.

The key question on which the destiny of the revolution and the country depended was that of peace. The imperialist war had exhausted the country's economy and was threatening Russia's economic independence. End the war—this was the unanimous demand of the people.

Expressing the people's will, the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets on October 26, 1917, adopted the historic *Decree on Peace* proposed by Lenin on behalf of the Communist Party. Soviet power proposed to all belligerents and their governments the immediate opening of negotiations on the conclusion of a just, democratic peace, a peace without annexations or indemnities. In the Decree the most important principle of the foreign policy of the

Soviet state was proclaimed—peaceful coexistence of all states, irrespective of their social and political systems. This Leninist principle remains the general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in our day.

The Soviet Government began to make persistent efforts to conclude a universal and democratic peace. But Russia's allies—Britain, France and the USA—did not even reply to the peace proposal made by the Soviet state. They were anxious to carry the war through to a victorious conclusion in order to attain their imperialist aims. They were confident that if Russia continued the war against Germany it would result in the strangling of Soviet power.

A bitter struggle began inside the Communist Party around the question of peace with Germany. Trotsky, who was People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and quite a few other leading Party members headed by Bukharin, who called themselves "Left Communists," opposed the idea. They claimed that the conclusion of peace was in contradiction to the principles of proletarian internationalism and meant a betrayal of world revolution. They denied the possibility of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and believed that any compromise or agreement between the Soviet state and imperialist countries was in principle impermissible.

Trotsky and the "Left Communists" considered that socialism could be built in Russia only after the triumph of the world revolution. They wanted, therefore, to give the world socialist revolution "a push," to hasten its beginning by means of the "revolutionary war," they claimed Soviet Russia should wage against the imperialist states.

These were the reasons for their flat denial of the possibility of concluding peace with Germany and for their repeated calls for a "revolutionary war."

This adventurist policy endangered the very existence of the Soviet state and all the gains of the Socialist Revolution in Russia.

Worn out by four years of imperialist war the workers and peasants of Russia could not and did not want to continue the war. The old army was disintegrating, and the new one had hardly begun to be formed. In these conditions the continuation of war would have meant the inevitable destruction of Soviet power under the blows of German imperialism. And the defeat of the first state of the workers and peasants in the world would have been a terrible blow to the international labour movement, to the national-liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples all over the world.

Lenin roundly criticized the deeply erroneous and fallacious position of Trotsky and the "Left Communists." Rejecting their lack of faith in the possibility of socialism triumphing in a single country and their preaching of world revolution by means of war, Lenin wrote that "such a 'theory' was completely at variance with Marxism, which has always been opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender them. Such a theory would be tantamount to the view that armed uprising is a form of struggle which is obligatory always and under all conditions."

Lenin showed the untenability of the "Left Communists" assertion that peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state and capitalist states is impossible.

"A Socialist Republic surrounded by imperialist powers could not, from this point of view, conclude any economic treaties, and could not exist at all, without flying to the moon," Lenin wrote.

Criticizing the deeply incorrect view of the "Left Com-

munists" that the conclusion of peace with Germany would mean a betrayal of the world revolution, Lenin wrote that the conclusion of peace would preserve the Soviet state and that this was of paramount importance for the fate of the world revolution.

Lenin also severely criticized the thesis of the "Left Communists" that compromises and agreements with the capitalist countries were impermissible in principle. "To reject compromises 'on principle,' to reject the admissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which it is difficult even to take seriously," Lenin wrote. Compromises were not only admissible, they were at times absolutely indispensable—it all depended on the nature of the compromise. "There are compromises and compromises," Lenin pointed out. "One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. The kind of compromise that was not admissible was one directed against the people's interests, against the cause of peace, democracy and socialism. Compromises that strengthened the cause of peace, democracy and socialism, that served the interests of the masses, the liberation of the oppressed and the gains of the working people in the socialist revolution were admissible and necessary."

The conclusion of peace treaty with Germany was an example of a compromise with the imperialists that was in complete accordance with the interests of the people of Russia and of safeguarding the first state of workers and peasants. Those who opposed peace with Germany did not understand this. "It had seemed to them," Lenin wrote of the "Left Communists," "that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was a compromise with the imperialists inadmissible on principle and harmful to the Party of the revolutionary proletariat. It was indeed a compromise with the

imperialists, but it was a compromise which, under the circumstances, *had to be made*."

Having overcome the resistance of the Trotskyites, the "Left Communists" and others who were against the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany, the Soviet Government decided to sign the peace treaty. Inasmuch as Russia's allies flatly refused to participate in peace negotiations the Soviet state was compelled to conclude a separate peace with Germany and her allies. The peace treaty was signed on March 3, 1918, in Brest.

The peace terms were extremely onerous. The German imperialists imposed extortionate conditions: Soviet Russia was to give up considerable territory in the West; she had to demobilize the army and navy, pay enormous war reparations, etc.

Notwithstanding the severe terms of the peace treaty, the conclusion of it was a wise and far-sighted measure of the Soviet Government. "We did not sacrifice our vital interests, then," Lenin said, "we gave up our secondary interests and preserved our vital interests." The conclusion of peace treaty gave the country a breathing-space to consolidate Soviet power, form the Red Army and start socialist construction. Russia was saved from national disaster and economic ruin.

In November 1918, when Germany capitulated, having been defeated in the World War, the All-Russia Executive Committee annulled the Brest peace treaty and declared its terms invalid.

LAND FOR THE PEASANTS!

Land was a centuries-old dream of the Russian peasants. They had revolted many times against the landowners, but these uprisings had been brutally put down by

the tsarist government. Only the Socialist Revolution, accomplished by the working class in alliance with the village poor, and Soviet power born of the revolution could give the peasants land.

On October 26, 1917, the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets adopted the famous *Decree on Land* signed by Lenin. This proclaimed the confiscation of the estates of the landowners and monasteries and the nationalization of all land. The land became the property of the people and the state. At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 Soviet power, with the active participation of the peasants, carried through the confiscation of the landowners' estates, except for those in the outlying areas (Central Asia, Kazakhstan, etc.). Together with the land, all the landowners' farm implements and draught animals were confiscated. Some of the estates were turned into state farms (*sovkhoz*), and museums were opened in mansions where famous Russian artists, writers, composers, etc., had lived and created their masterpieces.

The landowners' estates and farm implements were handed over to the peasants for use without payment, the peasants receiving more than 405 million acres of land in this way. They were also freed from the payment of debts to the Land Bank (more than 3,000 million roubles). The peasants were given all the farm implements that had belonged to the landowners, their total value being estimated at more than 300 million roubles.

In conformity with the peasants' wishes the land was divided among them on an equal basis, according to the number of members in the family or the number of those capable of working the land. The peasants demanded that the renting of land be forbidden.

A fierce struggle flared up between the *kulaks* and the village poor in the course of the division of the land. The

poor people demanded the general redivision of all land, without exception—including that which the peasants had owned before the revolution—according to the number of members in the family or able-bodied members. The *kulaks* were against such a redivision because in this event their land would also be redivided. The *kulaks* suggested that only the landowners' estates be divided and that it should be allocated according to the number of cattle a peasant possessed. The *kulaks*, of course, had many times more cattle than the poor peasants.

In most gubernias Soviet power divided the land in the interests of the poor. However, in many places, where the representatives of petty-bourgeois parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries) headed the land committees the landowners' estates went to the *kulaks*. The poorest peasants appealed for assistance to the workers. "Comrade Bolsheviks," one of the peasants' letters ran, "send some people down here who know your programme and who are strong enough to fight the *kulaks*. Send them as soon as possible, we want to start a new life but have *kulaks* in almost all the organizations here."

The working class responded to this appeal. Many workers' detachments were sent to the countryside to help the poor peasants to ensure the just distribution of the land, and the Soviet Government took some measures to organize and unite the poor peasants. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a decree that "Committees of Poor Peasants" be set up in the countryside. By the combined efforts of the Committees of Poor Peasants and workers' detachments the *kulaks* were held in check and the land and farm implements they had seized were confiscated. The just redistribution of the land resulted in more than half the land (more than 135 million acres) the *kulaks* had possessed before the revolution being ta-

ken away from them, along with part of their farm implements. All this was put at the disposal of the poor peasants. Having received the land, farm implements and horses, many millions of poor peasants became able not only to feed their own families, but to produce for the market as well. To use the expression of that time the poor peasants became middle peasants.

WORKERS' DEMANDS SATISFIED

The Soviet state immediately satisfied demands for which the workers had been fighting for decades. On the fourth day of its existence the Soviet state issued a decree establishing an eight-hour working day and a six-hour day for teenagers (up to the age of 18). Child labour (up to the age of 14) was strictly forbidden. It was also forbidden for women and teenagers to do night work.

In December 1917, decrees instituting state insurance at the expense of the state and employers for the unemployed and temporarily disabled were promulgated. These decrees provided for the payment of benefits in the event of unemployment, sickness, and childbirth, and also a free medical service.

ELIMINATION OF NATIONAL OPPRESSION

In the very early days of its existence the Soviet state declared an end to national oppression of the peoples of Russia. On November 2, 1917, the historic *Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia* was published. The Declaration proclaimed the liquidation of the shameful system of inequality of nationalities and the formation of the "voluntary and honest union of the peoples of Rus-

sia." The main principles of the policy of Soviet power on the national question were laid down in the Declaration: equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; their right to self-determination, including secession and the formation of an independent state; the abolition of all national and religious privileges and restrictions; the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.

In conformity with the Declaration the Soviet Government recognized the Ukraine and Finland as independent states and acknowledged the right of Turkish Armenia to self-determination.

It annulled all unequal treaties concluded by the tsarist government with Turkey, Iran, China, and other countries.

SURVIVALS OF THE ESTATE SYSTEM ELIMINATED

Within a short time Soviet power put an end to the division of citizens into social categories and abolished all privileges and restrictions, all estate organizations and institutions emanating from the existence of these categories and did away with all ranks in the civil service and all titles. All ranks (gentry, merchants, petty bourgeoisie, peasants, etc.) and titles (prince, count, etc.), all ranks in civil service (councillor of state, titular councillor, etc.) were abolished. All members of society in Russia were to be known as citizens of the Russian Republic. Lenin wrote in this connection: "We left not a stone of that ancient edifice standing, the social-estate system (even the most advanced countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, have not completely eliminated the survivals of this system to this day!)"

DISESTABLISHMENT OF CHURCH FROM STATE

In pre-revolutionary Russia the religious organizations, in particular the dominant religion—the Orthodox Church—were a powerful instrument for keeping the exploited classes in subjection.

The Orthodox Church was part of the bureaucratic machinery of state. The church preached the idea of the divine origin of tsarist power and regarded non-submission to this idea as a sin. The church preached the inviolability of private property, the divine origin of poverty and urged toleration of the privations of “hell on Earth for the sake of the heavenly paradise.”

Tsarist power, in its turn, did everything to support the Orthodox Church, which was recognized officially as the most important and dominant church. Any anti-clerical activity was considered a terrible crime. Those who abandoned the Orthodox Church were persecuted by the authorities as if they were wicked criminals. The observance of religious rites was sacrosanct, and the state allocated large sums for the needs of the Orthodox Church. The church possessed big landed estates and industrial enterprises which brought it enormous profits.

The church and the clergy controlled the ideological education of the population. Religious teaching was compulsory in all schools, and anti-scientific and reactionary dogmas were instilled into the pupils' minds. The church encouraged obedience and non-resistance to violence; it nurtured wild chauvinism, and hatred of people professing other religions.

Russian progressives had been demanding the separation of the church from the state and the school from

the church long before the revolution. But only Soviet power could satisfy this demand. The decree of the Soviet Government issued on January 20, 1918, separated the church from the state.

Freedom of conscience was proclaimed. Each citizen was free to profess any religion he desired, or no religion at all. All privileges and restrictions connected with particular religions were abolished.

Citizens were not expected to indicate adherence to a particular religion in any official form. Religious oaths were also abolished. The state guaranteed the free performance of religious rites provided they did not violate public order and did not infringe upon the citizens' rights and the interests of the Soviet Republic. Births, marriages, divorces and deaths were to be registered by the civil authorities—the Soviets.

The decree proclaimed the separation of the school from the church. Religious instruction was banned in all state, public and private schools, but there was nothing to stop parents instructing their children in any religion they liked.

All church and religious bodies were to be governed by the regulations relating to private societies and unions. They were divested of their privileges, and subsidies granted by the state and local authorities were stopped. The church was not considered a juridical person; it could not levy any taxes or compulsorily collect money for its needs, nor could it use any means of compulsion or punishment. All the property of the church and religious bodies was declared the property of the people. At the same time buildings and objects designed specially for religious purposes were handed over to the appropriate religious bodies for free use.

EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

Of all the infamous features of tsarist Russia the most glaring was the humiliating position of women. The women had no political or other rights. For their work they were paid far less than men, and they were not admitted to higher educational establishments.

The Soviet state emancipated the women and put them on an equal footing with men in all fields of state, social, economic and cultural affairs. All spheres of endeavour, and all educational establishments were opened to them. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" irrespective of sex was proclaimed. The Soviet state devoted much attention to drawing the women workers and peasants into public and political life. Women were entitled to equal civil rights including the right to elect and to be elected to Soviets. To protect the interests of women and their children the Soviet state accorded equal rights to children born in and out of wedlock. A start was made to build nurseries and nursery schools to make things easier for the working women. "Not a single state, not a single democratic body of law has done for the women half of what Soviet power has done during the very first few months of its existence," said Lenin.

THE BEGINNING OF SOCIALIST CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY

One of the main tasks that faced the Soviet state was the creation of a socialist economy. There was only one way to achieve this—to replace bourgeois ownership of the means of production by social state ownership. This also meant the abolition of exploitation of man by man.

Soviet power took over the State Bank. Before long all private banks were nationalized and then amalgamated

with the State Bank to form a single National Bank. Banking was declared a state monopoly.

The Soviet state annulled all foreign and internal loans received by the tsarist government and the bourgeois government (more than 41,000 million roubles). This was a telling blow at Russian and international imperialism—Russia no longer had to pay out 400 million roubles a year in interest alone.

The first step to the nationalization of industry was the establishment in November 1917 of workers' control at all enterprises employing hired labour. The exercise of control was entrusted to elected bodies—factory committees. They kept a check on whether orders were being fulfilled correctly and promptly, on the use of labour power, on the finances of the enterprise, etc. Putting a stop to sabotage and disorganizing activities on the part of the owners, workers' control fought for production to be put in order, for labour discipline to be strengthened and labour productivity raised.

Many manufacturers and capitalists put up furious resistance to workers' control and started to engage in sabotage. The Soviet state nationalized the enterprises owned by capitalist saboteurs, a government decree of November 17, 1917, for example, on the nationalization of the Likhino Textile Mills, stating: "The Council of People's Commissars, considering it impossible to close down the Likhino Textile Mills owned by A. V. Smirnov and Co. which works on orders for the army and produces goods for very poor consumers, and in view of the fact that an investigation at the mills has revealed the evil intentions of the employer, who is apparently trying to lock out the workers and disorganize production, and that it is in the interests of the national economy, the vast mass of consumers and the Mills' 4,000 workers and their families

that is should function, decrees:

"1. That the Likino Textile Mill of A. V. Smirnov and Co., in the viilage of Likino, Vladimir Gubernia, be the property of the Russian Republic, with all its finished goods, raw materials, etc.

"2. That the organization of its management be entrusted to the People's Commissar for Labour.

"3. That this regulation comes into force on the day it is signed.

Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars
V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin)."

At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 hundreds of enterprises whose owners disorganized production were nationalized. To use Lenin's expression, this was an "attack by the Red Guards on capital."

Before the revolution 75 per cent of the railways in the country belonged to the state. Soviet power declared all of them state property. In January 1918 the merchant marine and inland water transport were nationalized. In April 1918 a state monopoly of foreign trade was proclaimed, and private individuals were forbidden to trade with foreign countries.

All these measures seriously undermined the capitalist economic system and led to the formation of a socialist sector in the economy, although it was not the only sector and by no means the biggest one. There were several types of economy in the country: socialist, capitalist, and small-commodity peasant and artisan production. The latter predominated. The Soviet state had a fundamental task—to get over the difficulty represented by this diversity and to make the socialist system the only one. To achieve this it was necessary to oust the capitalist elements

completely and to unite individual peasant farms into large-scale collective production.

These were complex and difficult tasks, and it took considerable time to carry them out.

LENIN'S PLAN FOR SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

In the spring of 1918, after the Soviet state had concluded peace treaty with Germany and had withdrawn from the World War, after it had suppressed the chief centres of counter-revolution in the country and crushed the sabotaging activity of the bourgeoisie, Lenin elaborated a programme for launching socialist construction in his famous work *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*. In this programme stress was laid on the organization of production at nationalized enterprises, on measures to strengthen labour discipline, and raise labour productivity, and the organization of accounting and control over the production and distribution of products.

Lenin attached great importance to increasing the productivity of social labour. Just as capitalism had triumphed over feudalism because it created a productivity of labour unknown under feudalism, he said, socialism could utterly defeat capitalism if it increased the productivity of social labour to a far higher level than under capitalism and so ensured higher living standards for the working people.

Lenin considered the following factors to be of prime importance in increasing labour productivity:

first, the priority development of heavy industry, the electrification of production on a big scale, and constant technical progress;

second, a steady rise in the cultural standards and technical qualifications of the workers;

third, the establishment of strictly observed state discipline and labour discipline at enterprises, both by means of educational measures and measures of compulsion with regard to those violating such discipline;

fourth, observance of the principle of material incentives for the workers so that they have an interest in increasing labour productivity based on the correct organization of the wages system: payment for work according to the quantity and quality of the labour put in and the goods produced;

fifth, a moral stimulus to work, in particular socialist emulation among the workers.

Lenin wrote that socialism was the first system in the history of mankind that had given millions of working people the possibility to display the abilities and talents which were so plentiful among the people and had been stifled and trampled by capitalism. He wrote that capitalist competition, with each capitalist striving to ruin his rival, must be replaced under socialism by socialist emulation when all who participated in production had common interests and everyone was ready to help those who lagged behind.

Lenin believed that the further nationalization of capitalist enterprises should be gradual, and that to ensure economic advance maximum use should be made of various forms of state capitalism as a transition measure to socialization of the means of production.

During the first few months of its existence the Soviet state made use of various forms of state control over private capitalist enterprises. It gave the capitalists orders for the manufacture of certain goods, not infrequently advancing money for these orders, and thus was in a position to exercise a degree of control over their activities. It purchased the produce of private enterprises beforehand

and this also meant a certain control over those enterprises. The state supplied the private capitalist enterprises with raw materials, fuel and the employers in their turn undertook to deliver the finished goods to the state. The National Bank gave the factory owners state credits and supervised the use to which they were put, etc.

At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 the Soviet Government conducted negotiations with certain groups of capitalists on the setting up of mixed state-private enterprises and associations. These were fruitless since the capitalists demanded more than 50 per cent of the shares in order to avoid state control over their activities.

THE BEGINNING OF PLANNING

When the state socialist sector of the economy began to develop, it had to be placed on a planned footing. Lenin considered the possibility of developing the economy on the basis of a unified plan to be one of the main advantages of the socialist system of economy over the capitalist system. As early as in October 1917 Lenin wrote: "When the proletariat is victorious it will do the following: it will set economists, engineers, agronomists, and so forth, to work *under the control* of the workers' organizations on drawing up a 'plan,' on verifying it, on devising labour-saving methods by centralization... We are in favour of centralism and of a 'plan,' but of the centralism and plan of the *proletarian* state, of proletarian regulation of production and distribution in the interests of the poor, of the working people, of the exploited, *against* the exploiters."

On the instructions of the Soviet Government work started in the spring of 1918 to draw up a long-term plan for the country's economic development—the plan for the

electrification of Russia. The Supreme Council of National Economy began to work out production plans for various industries and for individual regions, and a unified economic plan for the whole year was drawn up.

After the Brest Peace Treaty was concluded a start was made on a planned basis to regear industry from military to peaceful production. Work was begun to build several power stations and construction work was resumed on a number of plants whose construction was suspended during the war years.

The Communist Party worked stubbornly to increase production, raise labour productivity and strengthen labour discipline. The labour productivity at many nationalized enterprises showed a remarkable growth. For instance, the nationalized Lugansk Locomotive Plant began to build 12 locomotives a month instead of the three it had been manufacturing up to October 1917. The first nationalized enterprise, the Likino Textile Mill, earned more than 10 million roubles of profit in 1918.

The Soviet state nationalized more and more enterprises as Soviet economic bodies gained strength and the numbers of economists coming from the ranks of the workers grew.

From nationalizing individual enterprises the Soviet state went over to nationalizing whole branches of industry. In May 1918, the sugar industry was nationalized; in June the oil industry, and also the biggest enterprises in all branches of industry and private railways. The socialist sector of the country's economy expanded. Soviet power gained a solid economic foundation.

THE FIRST SOVIET CONSTITUTION

The Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets held in July 1918 adopted the first Soviet Constitution, which was

drawn up under the direct leadership of Lenin. The Constitution gave legislative confirmation to the great achievements of the Socialist Revolution: Soviet power, the federal structure of the Republic, democratic freedoms—freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and organization, and guarantees of their implementation. The Constitution declared work to be the duty of all citizens of the Republic: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." Compulsory military service was introduced to ensure the defence of the Republic. Arms, however, were given only to the working classes.

The right to elect and to be elected to Soviets was granted to all adult working people, irrespective of their nationality, race, sex, level of education, or creed. Electors were entitled to recall their deputy at any time if he did not justify their hopes.

The Constitution disenfranchised the exploiters and other elements hostile to Soviet power. This was a forced measure because the representatives of the deposed exploiting classes did not recognize the Soviets and put up fierce armed resistance to Soviet power. Nevertheless the first Soviet Constitution was the most democratic constitution in comparison with all bourgeois constitutions. "All hitherto existing constitutions defended the interests of the ruling classes," Lenin wrote. "And only the Soviet Constitution serves the working people, and will continue to do so, and is a mighty weapon in the fight for socialism."

III. INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR

IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

Soviet Russia had not succeeded in clearing up the terrible consequences of World War I when a new destructive and bloody war—the Civil War—started, continuing for nearly three years, followed by foreign intervention. The foreign imperialists joined forces with the internal counter-revolutionaries, supplied them with armaments and incited them to struggle against Soviet power. And it was only because of foreign military aid and intervention that the counter-revolutionaries managed to rise in armed struggle against the people. It was only because the interventionists and the internal counter-revolutionaries joined forces that the Civil War in Russia went on for such a long time—it continued to the end of 1920, and in the outlying parts of the country even to the end of 1922.

The imperialists organized military intervention against Soviet Russia because they were afraid that the workers and peasants in the other countries would follow the example of the peoples of Russia and start fighting against the exploiters. They wanted to regain their factories, which had been nationalized by Soviet power. The

imperialists also wanted to get back the loans they had extended to the tsarist government—these had been repudiated by people's power—and to get the opportunity to continue plundering the people of Russia. They wanted to overthrow Soviet power and to restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landowners in Russia.

More than that, the imperialists wanted to destroy Russia as a major independent state. At the beginning of 1918 US President Wilson put forward a plan for dismembering the Soviet land into five parts—five small “independent” states, which were to become colonies and semicolonies of the USA and other imperialist states. In 1919 the US State Department published a map of Russia, the territory of which covered only the central regions of the country—all the rest of it was taken up by the territories of the “independent” states which were to be set up. An appendix to the map said: “All of Russia should be divided into large natural regions, each one of which would lead a separate economic life of its own. At the same time, none of the regions must be independent enough to form a mighty state.”

At the end of 1917, the imperialist states agreed on military aggression against Soviet Russia and divided her territory into zones of intervention. Bourgeois-landlord Rumania, backed up by France, occupied Bessarabia in December 1917. British, French and US troops landed in Murmansk in March 1918. In August British and American troops landed in Arkhangelsk, and the local counter-revolutionaries organized an anti-Soviet revolt in the city. Soviet power in Arkhangelsk was overthrown by the joint efforts of the interventionists and the rebels. The interventionists instituted a grim occupation regime, flung over 50,000 people into jail and shot more than 4,000. The invaders began to plunder the riches of Russia's North.

At the same time intervention started in the Far East. Japanese agents killed two Japanese people in Vladivostok on the night of April 4, 1918, and the next day Japanese troops landed in the city under the pretext of "defending the life and property of foreign subjects." On the same day British troops landed in Vladivostok, and in August the US Expeditionary Force arrived there. The interventionists and the counter-revolutionary forces which had joined up with them destroyed Soviet power in the whole of the Far East by autumn 1918.

The British imperialists despatched their troops into Central Asia. With their help the bourgeois nationalists overthrew Soviet power there and established a counter-revolutionary government. In August British troops had invaded Baku and destroyed the Baku Commune, the local body of people's power. The 26 leaders of the Commune—the Baku Commissars—were brutally shot by the British.

The imperialists also used the 40,000-strong Czechoslovak Corps to combat the power of the Soviets. This was composed of former soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Army who had been taken prisoner by the Russians during World War I. After Russia had withdrawn from the war, the Soviet Government allowed the Czechoslovaks to return to Europe via Vladivostok. In May 1918 Noulau, the French Ambassador in Russia, ordered an officer of the French mission attached to the Czechoslovak Corps to inform the command of the Corps "that the Allies have decided to start the intervention... and regard the Czech army, together with the French mission attached to it, as the vanguard of the allied troops." The agents of the imperialists bribed the command of the Corps, and with its help incited the men to rise in an anti-Soviet revolt. This started on May 25, and it soon spread over a huge area

from Penza to Vladivostok, on which the trains carrying the soldiers of the Corps were strung out. The USA was supplying the rebels with arms and ammunition.

The revolt of the Czechoslovak Corps served as a signal for counter-revolutionary uprisings on the Volga, in the Urals and in Siberia. Soviet power was overthrown over the whole of the area between the Volga and Vladivostok.

Taking advantage of the intervention and the counter-revolutionary uprising the German imperialists also decided to snatch a piece of Russia. In the spring of 1918 German troops occupied all the Baltic states, a large part of Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the Don Region, and the Crimea. In all these regions the bourgeoisie and the landowners regained their power. The interventionists introduced a rigorous occupation regime, shooting Communists, and plundering the population and the riches of the occupied territories.

In November 1918, when World War I was over imperialist intervention assumed an even wider scale. Troops of the French interventionists landed in the south of Russia, in the Crimea, and fresh contingents of foreign troops arrived in the North of Russia and the Far East. More than 300,000 foreign soldiers and officers took part in the criminal war against the Soviet people. Altogether 14 states participated in the crusade against revolutionary Russia in 1919.

The Soviet Republic was encircled by fronts which cut it off from the main areas of food, raw materials and fuel resources. The proletarian revolution was in mortal danger.

On top of the military intervention of the imperialists there was a complete economic blockade of the Soviet state.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET COUNTRY INTO A UNITED MILITARY CAMP

Following the appeal issued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the workers and peasants of Russia rose to revolutionary liberating struggle. The working people displayed tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm, and expressed hatred for the interventionists and the internal counter-revolutionists who had betrayed their Motherland.

The Soviet Government declared that the socialist Motherland was in danger, and before long the country became a united military camp. The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was set up, with Lenin at its head, and it supervised all the affairs connected with the organization of the Republic's defence. The mobilization of the workers and peasants to the Red Army was carried out in the briefest possible time, hundreds of thousands of people volunteering. Despite the heavy casualties of the war years, the number of the Red Army increased steadily, and in 1920 it had more than five million men. Workers and Communists formed the core of the army, even though there were greater numbers of peasants. In alliance with the workers, the working peasantry of Russia was with arms in hand defending the Soviet power which had delivered it from the oppression of the land-owners and given it political freedom and land.

Numerous military courses were instituted to train officers from the workers and peasants for the Red Army. Hundreds of thousands of extremely talented commanders of battalions, regiments, divisions and armies came to the fore from among the masses of the people: Vassily Blukher, a worker and a Communist; Vassily Chapayev, who came from a poor peasant family; Nikolai Shchors,

son of an engine-driver; the Cossack Semyon Budyony, and many others became famous commanders and people's heroes during the Civil War. Communist Mikhail Frunze, who started his military career in 1918 as a commander of a workers' detachment, was in 1919 the commander of a whole front.

Progressively-minded officers from the old army were drawn into the work of organizing the Red Army and training its commanding personnel. Most of the old officers were honestly serving Soviet power, because they realized the justice of the revolutionary cause. The Party entrusted them with high posts in the Red Army, and they played an important role in organizing the rout of the interventionists and the White Guards. Sergei Kamenev, a former colonel of the tsarist army, became Commander of the Eastern Front in 1918, and in 1919 he was Supreme Commander of all the Armed Forces of the Republic. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a former tsarist officer was the commander of an army in 1918 and in 1920 was Commander of the Western Front.

However, among the former officers of the tsarist army there were quite a few traitors, too. The Commissars—the finest representatives of the working class, staunch Communists and irreproachable revolutionaries—exercised political control over the actions of the military commanders. The commissars were the heart and soul of the Red Army. Dmitry Furmanov, a Communist writer, served in the Civil War as commissar of the famous 25th Division commanded by Vassily Chapayev, a legendary hero of our people. Furmanov wrote of the commissars: "They would dress as simply as ordinary Red Army men, they would eat the same food as they, and bear all the hardships of military life with them, but in battle they would always be the first to lay down their lives." In their work the

commissars were supported by the Communist Party organizations that existed in all military units.

The front and the rear formed a single entity. The whole of life in the rear was subjected to the Communist Party slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for victory." Industry was engaged in producing arms, ammunition and equipment for the army. Despite the scarcity of raw materials, food and fuel, the industry managed to supply, in the main, everything the army needed. This was the result of the mass labour heroism displayed by the working people—one of the most vivid expressions of which was the Communist subbotniks. The subbotniks were begun in spring 1919 by Moscow railwaymen. They remained on their jobs on Saturdays to work overtime without pay, in order to repair locomotives, to deliver to the front more arms, ammunition and equipment as fast as possible. Workers all over the country followed suit. Voluntary, unpaid overtime on Saturdays, and on Sundays, too, became an unwritten law during the Civil War. The workers, who were poorly clothed and shod, who were underfed and did not get enough sleep, did not leave their jobs for 10-12 hours and more at a stretch, so that orders for the front might be fulfilled. The heroism of the workers in the rear was no less than the heroism displayed by the Red Army men at the front.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY

The war compelled the Soviet state to change its economic policies. It had to abandon the policy of gradually replacing bourgeois ownership of the means of production by national socialist ownership. Lenin wrote about this: "This question of our very existence confronted us who had proposed to the capitalists: 'Obey the governmental

regulations, submit to the state power, and instead of the complete abolition of the conditions conforming to the old interests, habits and the opinions of the population, you will have all that changed gradually, by means of governmental regulation.' The tactics adopted by the capitalist class are to push us into a desperate and merciless struggle, which compels us to break down the old relations to an immeasurably greater degree than we had intended to."

The Soviet state embarked on a resolute offensive against the capitalist elements, with the aim of completely squeezing them out and suppressing them, in order to undermine the economic power of the bourgeoisie and to mobilize all the country's resources for victory. The Soviet state radically speeded up the nationalization of industry, taking over not only heavy industry but medium and small-scale industry, too. At the same time an emergency revolutionary tax of about 10,000 million roubles was levied on the bourgeoisie. Apartment houses and mansions were confiscated from the bourgeoisie, and workers' families from the slums were moved into them. Bourgeois elements were compelled to work.

Industrial management was strictly centralized. Industrial enterprises had to hand over all the goods they produced to the appropriate Chief Administrations and centres of the All-Russia Council of National Economy. Labour conscription was introduced and labour mobilizations were held in order to provide the manpower needed for industry.

In the years of the Civil War, the Soviet Government could not obtain the necessary amount of grain by purchasing it from the peasants for money or in exchange for manufactured goods, because paper money was devalued, and very few goods were being manufactured. In

order to supply the army and the urban population with grain, the Soviet state was compelled to adopt emergency measures: it had to introduce the surplus food requisitioning system in January 1919. Essentially speaking, the new measure meant that deliveries of grain and certain other agricultural products were divided among the *gubernias*; a definite quota for compulsory deliveries to the state was established for each *gubernia*. The *gubernia* established a definite quota for every *uezd*; the *uezd* established quotas for the *volosts*, and the *volosts* for the villages. The villages laid them down for individuals. The *kulak* and well-to-do strata of the village population bore the main brunt of the new system. In exchange for their agricultural produce the state gave the peasants manufactured goods which could repay the cost of the produce only in part. It was a direct but not equal goods exchange between city and village.

This surplus requisitioning system was undoubtedly a difficult measure, but it was a vitally important one, for it would have been impossible to supply the Red Army and the working class with grain without it. The working peasantry supported the system, because it understood that the Red Army could not fight without food, and so would not be able to defend Soviet power, which had given land to the peasants.

The Soviet Government took over the distribution of manufactured goods and foodstuffs. This was necessary in order to undermine the economic positions of the bourgeoisie in the sphere of distribution and more expediently use the mineral resources of the country. The state distributed the foodstuffs among the population according to class distinctions: the workers got more, and the non-working elements were supplied with food only if they submitted to labour conscription. It was the implementation

of the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

As a result of inflation money became absolutely de-valued. Because of that the state started to pay wages to industrial and office workers in kind—they received food rations free of charge, and also manufactured goods; they did not have to pay rent for communal services, transport facilities, newspapers, etc. Wages in kind were paid on an equal basis—all who were working received just the minimum necessary to survive.

During the Civil War, therefore, the Soviet state conducted a special, extraordinary economic policy, which was characterized by the following main features: liquidation of the capitalist elements in the economy and their almost complete suppression; the introduction of the surplus requisitioning system and the direct exchange of goods between the town and the village; the suspension of trade and the substitution for it of the distribution of commodities by the state according to class distinctions; universal labour conscription; the payment of wages in kind and the wage-levelling system of remuneration of labour.

This policy, which became known as *War Communism* was the only possible and correct one in the conditions of the Civil War. The historical significance of *War Communism* was that it provided opportunities to mobilize all the country's resources to defeat foreign military intervention and internal counter-revolution, which was a matter of decisive importance for the future of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the future of socialism in our country. That was why Lenin many times stressed the inevitability and efficacy of this policy in time of emergency. At the same time Lenin also emphasized the forced nature and the shortcomings of such a policy.

The fact is that the surplus requisitioning system which deprived the peasants of the right to keep surplus agricultural produce, did not provide any material incentives for them to increase production. So the peasants started to sow less grain and the overall volume of agricultural production dropped. The peasant economy could not develop normally without free commodity exchange. In the years of the Civil War the Soviet state had been compelled to abolish trade and go in for rationed distribution of scarce foodstuffs and commodities on a levelling basis. The economic policy of *War Communism* did not lead to a broad economic alliance between town and village, between industry and agriculture, and this slowed down progress in both of them.

It is impossible to consider *War Communism* to be the normal economic policy of the Soviet state. It was a forced measure under the conditions of the foreign intervention and the Civil War. It was of a forced and temporary character, and the Soviet state abolished it at the end of the Civil War.

VICTORY OVER THE INTERVENTIONISTS AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

A tense struggle raged for three years on many fronts. It was a difficult and bloody war. More than once the interventionists and counter-revolutionaries managed to create an extremely dangerous and critical situation for the Soviet Republic. That was the position in spring 1919, when the imperialists managed to launch a large combined military venture, attacking the Republic from six directions simultaneously, the main force being that of Kolchak, moving from the East. That was the position in autumn 1919, when another combined attack was launched

and the task force of that attack—the counter-revolutionary army of General Denikin—managed to penetrate vitally important centres of the country and get within 200 kilometres of Moscow. That, again, was the position in spring and summer 1920 when the imperialists despatched the army of bourgeois-landlord Poland against Soviet Russia, and the army of General Wrangel started an offensive from the Crimea.

Soviet soldiers displayed unprecedented heroism. Here, for example, is what Mikhail Frunze, the CO of the Southern Front, reported to Lenin, in a despatch about the battles against General Wrangel: "Am witness to supreme gallantry displayed by heroic infantry in storming Sivash and Perekop. Units went through narrow opening in the barbed wire entanglements of the enemy under murderous fire. Our casualties extraordinarily heavy. Some divisions lost three-quarters of their men. Total killed and wounded in storm of two isthemuses at least 10,000. Armies of the front did their duty to the revolution. Last nest of Russian counter-revolution destroyed, the Crimea again Soviet." And that is what happened on all the other fronts of the battle against the interventionists and counter-revolutionaries.

Under the blows dealt them by the Red Army and under the influence of the Bolshevik propaganda the Communists conducted among the troops of the interventionists, demoralization set in among the foreign soldiers, and they refused to fight against the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia. The seamen on the French warships *Jean Bart* and *France*, which took part in the intervention in the South of Russia, mutinied and hoisted the red banners of solidarity with the Russian Revolution. The interventionists were driven out of the South of Russia as early as spring 1919. And in summer 1919 they were ousted

from Central Asia and Transcaucasia, too.

The USA were compelled to remove their troops from the Far East and the Soviet North by the beginning of 1920. "This victory we have scored by compelling the withdrawal of the British and French troops," Lenin said, "was our most important victory over the Entente. We deprived it of its soldiers. We replied to its infinite military and technical superiority, by snatching away that superiority with the aid of the working people's solidarity against the imperialistic governments."

By the end of 1920 the Civil War was ended, in the main, with the rout of the interventionists and internal co-counterrevolution. The troops of the Japanese interventionists were ousted from the Soviet Far East in 1922.

The historic victory scored by the Soviet people in the three-year war against the interventionists and the counter-revolutionary armies showed what a liberated people who have taken the destiny of their own country into their own hands are capable of achieving. This victory was possible because the workers and the working peasantry of Russia were defending their right to a free and independent life, defending the Socialist Revolution and the Soviet power. They won because they had united into a firm alliance under the guidance of the Party of Communists, led by Lenin.

But that victory was won at the cost of tremendous numbers of human lives and material losses. Russia emerged from the war in ruins and ashes.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESULTS OF THE CIVIL WAR

From the point of view of the political and socio-economic development of the country, the Civil War period was a continuation of the Great October Socialist Revo-

lution. The historic transformations started in all spheres of life by the Socialist Revolution in October 1917 were continued with even greater energy during this period. So, what were its main political and socio-economic results?

The first and the most important result was that the Soviet people, by routing the interventionists, and the internal counter-revolutionaries, defended Soviet power and established it more firmly, which was a decisive condition for economic rehabilitation and the rejuvenation of the country. The Soviet system survived this severe ordeal by war. The peoples of Russia voted for Soviet power with arms in hand.

Secondly, the period of the October Revolution and the Civil War was a turning point in the historic destinies of the social classes and political parties in Russia. The parasitical class of landowners which had been oppressing the peasantry for centuries, vanished once and for all. The big bourgeoisie, which had taken to armed struggle against the people, was liquidated. By the end of the Civil War nearly all industry and transport was concentrated in the hands of the state. The rural bourgeoisie(the *kulaks*), who took the side of counter-revolution, were also partially expropriated. The number of *kulaks* in the countryside dropped by two-thirds.

The position of the proletariat was fundamentally changed. From a class deprived of political rights, economically oppressed and severely exploited, it became a class which was politically free, was administering society through the state and was free from capitalist exploitation. The revolution had liberated the great creative powers of the working class, whose members were working selflessly in mines, and at industrial enterprises, having fought with selfless courage on the fronts of the Civil War. It was the proletariat that had provided the finest units

for the Red Army, and had welded together all the troops of the Republic. The working class had suffered tremendous losses in the name of the people, and had shouldered the main burden of the struggle against the interventionists and counter-revolutionaries. During the Civil War, the working class had rallied around itself the working peasantry and the working people of the many nationalities living in Russia, who recognized the working class as their leader.

The lives of the peasants had changed, too. They had been freed from oppression by the landowners, and received land and farming implements from the Soviet state. Millions of poor peasants had risen to the level of middle peasants. In the Civil War the working peasantry had gone completely over to the side of Soviet power. Whereas at the outset of the war the peasants had been vacillating in a number of areas (Siberia, the Volga Regions and the Ukraine), after they had sampled life under the interventionists and counter-revolutionaries, who had been restoring the power of the landowners and taking the land away from the peasants, the peasantry sided firmly with Soviet power.

The profound changes in the class structure of society determined the fate of political parties. The bourgeois-landlord parties of the Constitutional Democrats, the Octyabrists, etc., went out of existence in the course of the October Revolution. The social basis for the existence of these parties had vanished with the liquidation of the landowning and capitalist classes. The petty-bourgeois parties of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Anarchists, Nationalists, etc., had joined the camp of interventionists and counter-revolutionaries during the Civil War. These parties had organized anti-Soviet revolts, terroristic actions against Soviet states-

men (for example, on August 30, 1918, Fanny Kaplan, a Socialist-Revolutionary, seriously wounded Lenin with two poisoned bullets), tried to cause panic among the population, and invited the workers to strike and the peasants to revolt against Soviet power. They had exposed themselves completely to the working people as stooges of the capitalists, landowners and foreign interventionists, and this had led to the complete isolation of the petty-bourgeois parties from the people, and to their political demise.

The Communist Party, on the other hand, had during the Civil War shown itself to be the most active and well-organized political force, one that spared no effort and no means to defend the people's interests and the state independence of the country. More than half of the membership of the Communist Party (300,000 Communists) had fought in the Red Army's ranks. Communists had fought in the foremost ranks of the soldiers at the most dangerous parts of the front, displaying courage, fearlessness and self-sacrifice. About 50,000 Communists had given their lives in the struggle for the people's cause. And in the rear of the White Guard armies, working underground, the Communists had led the partisan movement and aroused the workers and peasants to revolt against the interventionists and White Guard.

The influence of the Communist Party on the people, and its authority among them increased considerably during the Civil War. By the end of 1920, the Party had a membership of over 600,000 and had tremendous experience of leading the workers and peasants in building the new life and defending it from its enemies. "No unprejudiced Russian can help concede," wrote Kliment Timiryazev, the famous Russian scientist in 1920, "that in Russia's thousand years of existence it was impossible to find among the members of any of its previous governments so much

honesty, intellect, knowledge, talent and faithfulness to their own people as can be found in the ranks of Bolsheviks."

The prerequisites necessary for the rehabilitation and rejuvenation of the country on a socialist basis were created as a result of the October Revolution and the Civil War. The change over from bourgeois ownership of the means of production to social ownership made production subordinate to the interests of satisfying the people's needs and not to the acquisition of profits by individual capitalists. It became possible to run the economy on a planned basis. The abolition of exploitation engendered tremendous creative energy among the working people and gave them a big incentive to increase labour productivity and to make constant efforts to develop the national economy. The abolition of oppression by the landowners created conditions for speeding up the development of the peasants' farmsteads and for improving the material position of the peasantry.

All this opened up prospects for the rapid advancement of the country. However, it was not possible to take advantage of these opportunities immediately. It required several years to heal the wounds inflicted on the country by World War I, intervention and the Civil War, and to rehabilitate the ravaged national economy. The advantages of the new social system were already clearly evident by the time those problems had been solved.

IV. THE SOVIET COUNTRY RISES FROM THE RUINS

POST-WAR DEVASTATION

Russia in the Shadows was the name H. G. Wells, the prominent British novelist, gave his book, in which he had described his trip to Soviet Russia in the autumn of 1920. He wrote, that for an American or English reader it would be difficult even to imagine how Russia was ruined and impoverished. And that was the bitter truth. The population decreased by more than 20 million during World War I and the Civil War. In 1920 output of heavy industry was one-seventh of what it had been in 1913. In the production of cotton fabrics Russia was back to the mid-19th century level, and in pig-iron production to two centuries earlier. The transport system was in ruins. Agricultural production was half what it had been before the war. The population was in the direst need of absolute necessities.

International imperialism and the internal counter-revolution were to blame for the monstrous devastation and ruin of the country. H. G. Wells did not share the views of Communists, but he was an honest man and could not

help speaking the truth. To his readers, he wrote: "And this spectacle of misery and ebbing energy is, you will say, the result of Bolshevik rule! I do not believe it is. . . . It was not communism that plunged this huge, creaking, bankrupt Empire into six years of exhausting war. It was European imperialism. Nor is it communism that has pestered this suffering and perhaps dying Russia with a series of subsidized raids, invasions, and insurrections, and inflicted upon it an atrocious blockade. The vindictive French creditor, the journalistic British oaf, are far more responsible for these deathbed miseries than any Communist."

Political difficulties were added to the economic difficulties. When the Civil War had ended and the danger of the landowners' returning had passed, the peasants started to express open dissatisfaction with the surplus requisitioning system, which left them without any surplus of agricultural produce. They began to demand that the system be abolished. They wanted to dispose freely of their surplus produce, and to sell it on the market using the money they received for it to buy manufactured goods. The Socialist-Revolutionaries utilized the peasants' dissatisfaction and in several areas engineered *kulak* revolts which were supported by considerable groups of the middle peasants.

The difficulties engendered by the war also caused discontent among a section of the workers, and the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries exploited these feelings of dissatisfaction to incite the workers to strike. An extremely dangerous process was going on—the dissolution of the working class—because the majority of the industrial enterprises were not operating, many workers were leaving for the villages or were taking up handicrafts in order to make a living.

In this extremely difficult and complex situation, the

Soviet people started on the rehabilitation and rebuilding of their country. Wells wrote: "And in the face of gigantic difficulties they are trying to rebuild a new Russia among the ruins..." And further on "... but it is no good pretending that there is no creative effort in Russia at the present time... The only possible government that can stave off such a final collapse of Russia now is the present Bolshevik Government..."

ECONOMIC REHABILITATION PLAN

By the end of the Civil War, the Soviet state already had a plan for the economic rehabilitation of the country on the basis of electrification. It had been compiled in 1920 at Lenin's request by a special commission composed of prominent power-engineering experts, economists and other specialists. Gleb Krzhizhanovsky, a well-known engineer, a veteran Communist and a friend of Lenin, was at the head of the commission.

The plan for electrification, which was endorsed by the 8th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920, envisaged the building of 30 big power stations with an aggregate capacity of 1,500,000 kw over a period of 10-15 years. The plan also envisaged the rehabilitation of industry, which lay in ruins, the retooling of old industrial enterprises and the further development of industry—especially of branches producing the means of production, such as the iron and steel industry, heavy engineering, and so on.

The great scale—for those times—on which the plan had been worked out astounded world public opinion. H. G. Wells, for instance, wrote: "Can one imagine a more courageous project in a vast flat land of forests and illiterate peasants, with no water power, with no technical skill available, and with trade and industry at the last

gasp?" Wells called Lenin "The Dreamer in the Kremlin" and said, that his electrification plans were Utopia. But Wells was mistaken. Lenin's electrification plan was fulfilled ahead of time.

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP)

The main task facing the Soviet state in the period of peaceful construction was the establishment of correct economic relations between town and countryside. A new economic policy was needed which would make it possible to carry out this important task. The basis of this policy was laid out by Lenin and approved by the 10th Congress of the Communist Party and the All-Union Central Executive Committee. Work started on its implementation in spring 1921.

The first step taken under the *New Economic Policy* (NEP) was to go over from the surplus requisitioning system, which had deprived the peasant of all surplus produce, to a firmly fixed tax in kind. This tax was levied on a property basis—a poor peasant paid nothing; middle peasants paid a moderate tax; and the *kulaks* paid much more. The total tax was just over half what the surplus requisitioning quotas had been. This gave the peasants an opportunity to sell their surplus produce freely on the market after they had paid their tax, and to buy manufactured goods. Trade became the main form of economic contact between town and countryside. Private trade was allowed. State and cooperative trade had also started to develop.

All this gave the peasants the material incentives to increase output of agricultural produce, and this was profitable both to the peasants and to the whole of society.

With the transition to NEP the Communist Party started to encourage the development of all forms of cooperation in the countryside. Lenin looked upon the development of the cooperative movement not only as the most important means of achieving an economic alliance between town and countryside, not only a means of developing the productive forces of peasant farming, but also as a means for uniting the small peasant farms into a large-scale collective economy. Lenin wrote, "The cooperative policy, if successful, will result in raising small economy and in facilitating its transition, within an indefinite period, to large-scale production on the basis of voluntary association."

In order to rehabilitate industry as soon as possible and increase the production of commodities for the population, the state concentrated all its efforts and means on the rehabilitation of heavy industry. The state leased many small enterprises to cooperative societies or private individuals. Foreign capitalists were given concessions to operate large and medium-sized industrial enterprises. Private individuals were allowed to build small industrial enterprises.

The management of state-owned industry was reorganized. Excessive centralization was abolished and greater rights were given to local economic bodies. The industrial enterprises were to some degree given a free hand in the acquisition of raw materials and fuel and the sale of their goods. Many industrial enterprises, which had previously been completely supported by the state, were put on a cost-accounting system—they had to cover their expenditures in full by the income they derived. The procedure for supplying industrial enterprises with manpower was also changed: universal labour conscription and the labour mobilizations which had been the practice during the Civil

War, were abolished. The enterprises hired workers through the labour exchanges, which kept track of all the unemployed and provided them with jobs according to the applications filled by industrial enterprises and offices.

The wages system was based on the socialist principle—payment was in accordance with the quality and quantity of the labour performed. During the Civil War the wage-levelling system was used—there was approximately the same remuneration for qualified and unqualified work. As Lenin noted, the striving to supply everyone as equally as possible, to try to feed and support everyone before it became possible to start rehabilitating production was quite justified in those times. But with the transition to peaceful construction the wage-levelling principle in remuneration of labour began to slow down the development of production. The new wages system introduced personal material incentives for the workers to improve their qualifications and to raise labour productivity. It helped strengthen discipline at industrial enterprises.

The existence of free private trade, the granting of concessions to foreign capitalists, and the leasing of state enterprises to private individuals—all led to a certain growth of capitalist elements in the country's economy. A struggle for supremacy started between the capitalist and the socialist elements. But the key positions in the economy (heavy and medium-scale industry, transport, land, and the foreign trade monopoly) remained in the hands of the Soviet state, which was doing all it could to strengthen and develop the socialist sector and carrying out a policy of limitation and gradual elimination of the capitalist elements in the economy. So socialism had to take the upper hand in that battle.

The *New Economic Policy* ensured a firm economic alliance between the working class and the peasantry,

strengthened the Soviet state, and helped develop the country's productive forces on socialist lines, i.e. it ensured the victory of socialism.

REHABILITATION OF AGRICULTURE

The peasants welcomed the *New Economic Policy*, and in spring 1921 they considerably increased the crop area. But the main grain-growing areas—the Volga Regions, the Ukraine, and Northern Caucasus—were hit by a terrible drought.

The Soviet Government took energetic steps to save the starving people. Millions of tons of grain were sent to the areas stricken by drought. Public works schemes were instituted, rations being issued to the workers, and public catering was organized, priority being given to the children. Medical measures were taken to prevent the outbreak of epidemics. A movement started all over the country under the slogan: "Ten full men can feed one hungry one."

The International Workers' Aid Committee (*Mezhrabpom*) was set up abroad. It was headed by Klara Zetkin, a German Communist and a wonderful leader of the international communist movement. The money collected by the workers in the capitalist countries was used to purchase foodstuffs and medicine for the famished people of Russia. A number of orphanages were opened in famine-stricken gubernias with the *Mezhrabpom* funds. The representatives of the progressive intelligentsia in the West—such as Frederick Nansen, the famous Norwegian Arctic explorer, the prominent French writers Henri Barbusse Anatole France and others—did a great deal to organize help.

Thanks to all those measures millions of people were

saved. The grain given to the peasants by the state, the international solidarity of the working people and the bumper harvests of 1922 and 1923 helped to overcome the consequences of the 1921 drought, enabled the country to be supplied with grain and the well-being of the people to be improved.

With the aim of increasing the output of agricultural produce as fast as possible the state allowed the renting of land and the use of hired labour to till the land.

After the revolution Soviet power had, at the request of the peasants, forbidden the renting out of land and the use of hired labour to till it. However, both these things were in fact being done in the countryside. The village poor and the not very well-to-do middle peasants had received large plots of land from Soviet power; they did not have sufficient equipment and sometimes did not even possess a horse to cultivate this land. So they started to rent it out from the well-to-do peasants, who imposed unfavourable terms on them, taking advantage of the fact that it all had to be done in a clandestine way. On the other hand, not being able to get the minimum means of existence from their own farmsteads, because they either did not have sufficient equipment to cope with the large plot of land they had received or had leased it to the *kulaks*, the poor peasants were obliged, despite the fact that this was forbidden, to work for the very same *kulaks*. Because of the illegality of the practice the *kulaks* imposed onerous conditions of labour on the poor peasants and farm hands.

In view of the real state of affairs in the countryside the Soviet state decided to make it legal to rent land and hire labour in order to protect the interests of the poor peasants and the farm hands, and to limit the predatory activities of the *kulaks*. At the same time this measure

was then in the interests of the state, too, because it led to an increase in the crop area and to the growth of agricultural output.

The number of agricultural machines and implements used on the peasant farmsteads diminished greatly during World War I and the Civil War. The implements that were left were almost completely worn out. The countryside had to be supplied with new agricultural machines and implements as quickly as possible. The Soviet Government took measures for the accelerated rehabilitation of the agricultural machinery and implement industry. In 1924 Leningrad and Kharkov started producing tractors. The Soviet Government purchased large consignments of tractors and agricultural machinery abroad and sold it to the peasants on favourable terms.

The Central Agricultural Bank, which was set up in 1924, and which had a wide network of local branches, granted the peasants cheap credits.

In 1923 the peasantry found it difficult to sell agricultural produce because the internal market was not able to consume all the marketable grain, and export was not yet organized. The price of grain slumped. At the same time the prices of manufactured goods went up, because their output was still inadequate. This caused discontent among the peasants.

The Soviet state took steps to close the gap between prices. The prices of manufactured goods were lowered, and the state purchasing prices of grain and other agricultural produce were raised. The currency reform of 1924, which resulted in the creation of a stable currency, helped to stabilize prices, too.

Export of grain also started. All these measures facilitated the rehabilitation of agriculture, and in 1925 this process was, in the main, successfully completed.

ADVANCE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

The industrial enterprises, mines and power stations rose from the ashes, at first slowly and then faster and faster. In 1923 the state-owned industrial enterprises turned out three times more than in 1920.

The rehabilitation of industry, which was in the hands of the state, was carried out on a planned basis. The largest and the most important enterprises were rehabilitated first of all. As production got going at these enterprises, more and more other enterprises which were in a good state of preservation were put into operation again.

Piece-rates were introduced at state-owned enterprises—there was higher pay for more qualified and more productive labour than for the less skilled and less productive labour. For exemplary work people received cash bonuses and were awarded the honorable title of Hero of Labour and the Order of the Red Banner of Labour which had been especially instituted for this purpose.

Understanding that the well-being of all depended on the efforts of every individual, the most advanced workers found ways and means to increase industrial output. The production meetings which were instituted in 1923 helped to stimulate the initiative of the workers. At these meetings the advanced workers discussed with engineers problems of improving production, submitted rationalizing proposals which were aimed at improving the organization of production, increasing labour productivity, improving the quality of manufactured goods, etc.

The movement for higher labour productivity in industry was also born in 1924-25. On their own initiative the leading workers increased their own output quotas, began to work on several machines simultaneously, tried

to cut down the time when plants stood idle, and campaigned against violations of labour discipline. In November 1924, for example, 1,500 workers at the First Tula Plant volunteered to have their output quotas raised. The workers' collective of the agricultural machine-building plant near Tula voluntarily raised their own output quotas by 50 per cent, and the lead was followed by workers at industrial enterprises in many other towns. Here is a characteristic letter written by a group of Moscow workers: "Wishing to raise labour productivity, we workers in one of the shops of the Krasnaya Roza Mill voluntarily ask for our output quota to be increased by 20 per cent. We appeal to the workers in our shop and others to follow our example."

Thanks to the enthusiasm displayed by the working class, the productivity of labour increased by 33 per cent in one year (from September 1924 to September 1925). "This heroism displayed in economic matters in no way differs from the heroism the workers and peasants displayed in the war," said Felix Dzerzhinsky, Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR, in 1925.

The heroic efforts of the working class and the able state leadership displayed made it possible to rehabilitate industry in the briefest possible period—five years. What very few people in the West believed would happen did in fact take place. Back in 1923, Hughes, then US State Secretary, declared that there was no hope, and no grounds to think that Russia will regain its strength once more. Despite the bourgeois pessimists, however, Russia did rise from the ruins and did it far more quickly than many other countries which had also been involved in World War I and had suffered immeasurably smaller losses. France, for example, whose industrial production in

1920 stood at 62 per cent of the 1913 level (it was about 14 per cent in Russia), took six years to reach the pre-war level; Germany took nine years, and so on.

V. THE CREATION OF A MULTI-NATIONAL STATE— THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SOVIET POWER—BASIS OF THE UNIFICATION OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA

In the history of mankind there have been quite a few states that have been conglomerations of different nations: Napoleon's French Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, etc. As a rule, such states have come into existence by the conquest and enslavement of other peoples by the ruling circles of some particular nation. For instance, on the eve of World War I the British Empire consisted of territories inhabited by 25 per cent of the whole of mankind. The British bourgeoisie dominated all the nations of that huge Empire, draining infinite wealth from its colonies.

Because of the forcible nature of "unification" such multi-national empires were always prisons for the enslaved peoples. To preserve its own domination, the ruling clique in the metropolitan country, which constituted an insignificant minority of the empire's population, conducted the policy proclaimed by the Roman conquerors:

"Divide and rule!" It set nation against nation, disunited them, and hindered the rallying of their forces for united struggle against the oppressed. The situation was the same in the bourgeois-landlord Russian Empire. Tsarism set the Russian people against the non-Russian nations; Armenians against Turks; Russians against Jews, etc. This made it possible for tsarism to tighten its grip both on the Russian workers and peasants and on the numerous non-Russian nationalities.

Soviet power—the power of the workers and peasants—is in essence profoundly internationalist. It is vitally interested in the unification of all peoples, of no matter what race or nationality. A united, indivisible multi-national state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—came into being under the banner of Soviet power. It was formed as a voluntary association of equal and sovereign fraternal Republics, each one of which retained all its rights as an independent state, including the right of secession. None of the Republics has up to now taken advantage of this right because membership of the Union is in the supreme interests of every Republic.

UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLICS BEGAN

The Soviet Union was formed at the end of 1922, after a period during which the Soviet republics existed independently. But the vital interests of the Soviet Republics had shown them the necessity of merging into a unified state. This is how it happened.

The historic *Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, promulgated by the Soviet Government on November 2 (15), 1917, proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination, including the right of secession from the state. This Declaration corresponded to the natural aspi-

rations of the nations previously oppressed by tsarism to national freedom and independence. After the October Revolution they proclaimed their independence, and founded the national Soviet Republics—Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Azerbaijan, Armenian, and Georgian, and their sovereignty was officially recognized by the Government of the Russian Soviet Republic. In January 1918 the Russian Republic proclaimed itself a Federation incorporating several Autonomous Republics and Regions: Tataria, Bashkirie, Turkestan, Karelia, and others. The Autonomous Republics had their own legislative and executive bodies of power.

With the beginning of foreign intervention and the Civil War, the independence and the very existence of the national Soviet Republics were in mortal danger, and a close military alliance was their only salvation. Such an alliance was formed in the summer of 1919 and it played the decisive role in the preservation of the national independence of the majority of Soviet Republics, with the exception of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, in which the forces of internal counter-revolution, with the aid of the interventionists, overthrew Soviet power in the first half of 1919. The experience gained by the Soviet Republics in the Civil War showed the Soviet Republics the effectiveness of their military alliance as a reliable guarantee against the restoration of the power of the exploiters.

With the transition to peaceful construction the economic ties and mutual economic help of the Republics were developing more and more. The Republics which were economically backward or had suffered the greatest losses from the intervention and the Civil War were in the greatest need of such help, and they received it from the Russian Soviet Republic—the largest and most economi-

cally developed Republic. In 1920-21 all the Soviet Republics concluded treaties of military and economic alliance with the Russian Republic.

During the Civil War, the Soviet Republics had acted jointly in diplomatic matters. After the Civil War, when the governments of the imperialist states concentrated their struggle against Soviet power in the diplomatic and economic spheres, it became necessary to have even closer cooperation in this field.

Soviet Russia was invited to take part in the European Financial-Economic Conference which was held in Genoa (Italy) in 1922. Mikhail Kalinin, Chairman of All-Russia Central Executive Committee, sent the following telegram to all Soviet Republics: "The present situation demands the setting up of a single front for the diplomatic struggle against the capitalist governments at the European conference. The Russian Government considers it impossible to take part in the conference unless the union Soviet Republics and the Far-Eastern People's Republic also participate." At the meeting of representatives of the nine Republics in Moscow a Protocol was signed giving the RSFSR the right to defend the interests of all the Republics. The Republics authorized the RSFSR to conclude and sign all the agreements and treaties at the Genoa Conference on their behalf.

This diplomatic alliance also operated at the Lausanne Conference (1922-23), where the Russian delegation represented all the Soviet Republics.

FORMATION OF THE USSR

Thus a military, economic and diplomatic alliance was formed between the Soviet Republics, on a contractual basis. However, that was not enough, because it did not

cover all aspects of relations between the Republics. There was no precise formulation of the relations between the supreme bodies of state power in the national Republics. There was also insufficient clarity about their financial relations, and there was no coordination between the planning bodies, which to a certain degree held back economic construction in the Republics. All the Republics felt the need to establish still closer relations and to clarify the nature of these relations.

It was not easy to find immediately a form for the union which would cover the interests of all the Republics to the fullest extent. Some proposed the incorporation of all the independent Soviet Republics in the Russian Federation as Autonomous Republics. But this proposal was clearly erroneous, because unification on the basis of autonomy would have infringed on the sovereign rights of the national Republics. Lenin was of a different opinion. He recommended the foundation of a new allied state on an absolutely voluntary and equal basis: all the Republics entering the Union would forfeit in equal measure part of their sovereign rights in favour of the united state, mainly in the spheres of foreign policy and trade, defence, economic planning, and finance. In education, health protection, social security, internal affairs, etc., all the Republics entering the Union would fully retain their sovereignty on terms of equality with all the others. It was planned to set up all-Union legislative and executive bodies to manage all-Union affairs. Each Republic entering the Union would retain the right to voluntarily secede from the state.

Lenin's proposal had the support of all the Soviet Republics and it was acclaimed by the masses of the working people in all the national Republics. For several months the problem of the structure of the unification of

the Republics was discussed at Congresses of Soviets, Party Congresses and meetings of working people. A special commission composed of representatives of all the Republics worked out the Declaration and Treaty on the Unification of the Soviet Republics into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

On December 30, 1922, a congress of delegations of the Soviets of the four uniting Republics gathered in Moscow. They were the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian Republics, and the Transcaucasian Federation (the Transcaucasian Federation was composed of the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian Republics, which had united in March 1922).

The congress endorses the Declaration and the Treaty on the formation of the USSR, and these documents formed the basis of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, which was worked out by a special commission. After discussion in the Republics, the Constitution was ultimately adopted in January 1924 at the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

A special Chamber of Nationalities was instituted in the supreme legislative body of the Union, in accordance with the Constitution, to look after the special interests of the united Republics. Under the Constitution each of the Republics retained the right of secession; there was also freedom of accession to the USSR for all Soviet Republics, both existing ones or others that might come into being at a later date.

In the autumn of 1924 new national states were formed in Central Asia: the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, which incorporated the Tajik Autonomous Republic, and the Turkmen SSR. The congresses of the Uzbek and the Turkmen SSR adopted decisions of joining the USSR in February 1925. The Third All-Union Congress of Soviets

in May 1925, admitted them.

In 1929, the Tajik ASSR, which by that time had achieved major successes in its economic and cultural development, seceded from the Uzbek SSR, declared itself an independent Soviet Socialist Republic, and joined the USSR.

In 1936, the USSR was joined by the Kazakh and the Kirghiz Republics which were up to that time incorporated in the RSFSR as Autonomous Republics, and also by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which had hitherto constituted the Transcaucasian Federation.

In 1940, the Moldavian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics joined the USSR.

That is how the voluntary Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—the USSR—was formed.

VI. LENIN'S POLITICAL TESTAMENT

INDUSTRIALIZATION, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF SOCIALISM

At the end of 1922 and the beginning of 1923—not long before his death—Lenin wrote a number of works in which he generalized the experience of the Socialist Revolution in the USSR and defined ways for carrying the building of socialism further. It was the political testament left by Lenin to the Party and the people.

Lenin considered a major condition for the building of socialism to be the transformation of the country into a mighty industrial power which would be able to ensure the constant growth of the people's well-being and culture, the economic independence of the country and its defences. Lenin stressed the especial importance of developing heavy industry, which produces the means of production, and also the necessity for the country's electrification.

It was no easy task. History shows the industrialization of the capitalist countries to be based first of all on such things as the exploitation of hired workers and the impoverishment of the peasantry within their own coun-

tries, the plunder of colonies, wars, enslaving loans, and concessions. The Soviet state had none of these at its disposal, and all of them were in principle alien to the socialist state. It goes without saying that the Soviet state would not have refused to borrow from the capitalist countries on reasonable terms or to lease concessions to foreign capitalists. The imperialists, however, did not give Russia loans, and the foreign capitalists did not want to help to strengthen the economic positions of Soviet power by purchasing concessions from it.

Lenin pointed out that a country should develop its heavy industry from its internal accumulations. It was necessary to save on everything but to find in the state budget the means for developing heavy industry. "If we are not able to provide them," Lenin stressed, "we shall be doomed as a civilized state—let alone as a socialist state."

Lenin pointed out the sources of socialist industrialization: revenue from nationalized industry, foreign and internal state trade, the banking system, and also the partial drawing in of the accumulation of the peasants. Because these sources were in the hands of a socialist state they were a sure guarantee that the problem of industrializing the country in the briefest possible time would be successfully resolved.

LENIN'S COOPERATION PLAN

Lenin considered the second most important condition for the building of socialism to be the transition of the peasants to large-scale, collective farming. This, he said, had to be accomplished by the means that were the simplest, easiest, and most acceptable to the peasant, i.e., through cooperatives. A beginning had to be made by de-

veloping the simplest forms of cooperatives: consumer cooperatives, which would sell manufactured goods to the peasants at lower prices than private traders; supply cooperatives, with the peasants uniting for the joint purchase of tractors and agricultural machinery; marketing cooperatives organized by the peasants for the joint marketing of the produce from their individual plots of land; credit cooperatives set up by the peasants to grant loans to those in need of them; and producer associations—for land improvement, seed-farming, stud-farming, etc. These forms of cooperatives gave to the farmers definite material advantages and vividly demonstrated the advantages of joint farming to the peasants. The cooperatives accustomed the peasants to conducting their economic affairs collectively and so gradually brought them to a realization of the need to unite voluntarily into major production cooperatives (*kolkhozes*), based on the use of advanced agricultural machinery.

Lenin especially stressed that "the proletarian state must effect the passage to collective farming with extreme caution and only very gradually, by the force of example, without any coercion of the middle peasant." He went on to say that there would be value only in such associations as were organized by the peasants themselves and of their own free will and demonstrated their advantages in practice. Under Lenin's guidance the Party did everything to support the efforts of the peasants to merge into cooperatives and gave them all possible assistance in this matter.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND SOCIALISM

Lenin considered one of the most important prerequisites for the victory of socialism in the USSR to be the

carrying through of the cultural revolution: the transformation of the USSR into a country of one hundred per cent literacy; the introduction of universal education in the national languages of the USSR; the fostering of a real people's intelligentsia; the education of the people in a genuinely socialist spirit, and the flourishing of science, literature, and the arts. In the cultural revolution Lenin saw the main means for drawing the working people as a whole into conscious work to build the new socialist life.

SOVIET STATE—THE MAIN TOOL FOR BUILDING SOCIALISM

Lenin taught that the existence of the Soviet state, the main foundation of which was the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, was the decisive political prerequisite for the building of socialism and communism. Lenin said it was necessary to constantly strengthen this alliance, and to cherish it like the apple of one's eye. He considered that an alliance of the working class and peasantry would guarantee the complete victory of socialism in Russia.

The strength and stability of the Soviet state are also based on friendship and trust between the nations and on their unity. Lenin taught that the preservation and strengthening of this friendship was one of the most important conditions for the successful building of socialism. He said that no effort must be spared to safeguard and consolidate the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—a voluntary union of equal nations.

Lenin attributed great importance to improving the work of the governmental apparatus and cutting the cost of maintaining this apparatus, to strengthening its ties with the people, and to drawing the broad masses into

the management of the state. To do all this a correctly organized Party and government control body was necessary. Lenin proposed the merger of Party and government control organs into a single body and the involvement of the broad masses in the work of these bodies.

Lenin held that the Soviet state would fulfil its task as the main tool in the building of socialism, if it were led by the Communist Party, the vanguard of the working class. In order to cope with the task of being the leading and the guiding force of the Soviet state, the Communist Party had to reinforce the unity of its ranks, it had to work indefatigably to strengthen its ties with the masses, to teach the masses and learn from the masses.

These are the most important of Lenin's instructions on the ways of building socialism in the USSR. The experience gained during the early years of socialist construction showed that the USSR had everything it needed, and in sufficient quantities, to build a fully socialist society. Lenin was firmly convinced of the fact that "...we shall all—not in a day, but in a few years—all of us together fulfil it whatever the cost, so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia."

VII. THE USSR BECOMES AN INDUSTRIAL POWER

THE LINE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Along the road of the Soviet people to socialism there have been some real historical points. One of them was the 14th Congress of the Communist Party (1925). That Congress, following Lenin's behests, proclaimed the line of industrializing the country as being the Party's general line and the people's main task.

The time was ripe for tackling the problem of industrialization. The country had reached its pre-war level of industrial development. But what was that? The country continued to be an agrarian one: agricultural produce still accounted for almost two-thirds of the total output of the national economy. Consumer goods production prevailed in industry and the production of the means of production was poorly developed. The country did not have any of the major branches of modern industry, such as the manufacture of cars and tractors, the chemical, light and heavy engineering industries, etc. The machinery at most of the industrial enterprises was obsolete and worn out.

The Soviet Union was the foremost country in the world as regards its political system, a country of genuine democracy—the power of the people—but it was a long way behind the developed capitalist countries as regards level of economic development. This lagging behind was dangerous for the Soviet system, for the independence of the country.

Lenin had pointed out that without the creation of a highly developed industry, and above all of heavy industry, based on the electrification, not only would Russia be unable to build socialism, she would certainly cease to exist as an independent country.

Following Lenin's directives, the Party put forward the main task: to transform the Soviet Union from the agrarian country it was—a country importing machines and equipment—into an industrial country which would itself produce machines and equipment.

This was no easy task. Firstly, the necessary capital had to be found. The USSR could not count on borrowing abroad, because the capitalist countries had refused to give her loans. Neither could the Soviet Union use such means of accumulating capital as plunder of the colonies. The USSR did not have colonies and categorically rejected and condemned such practice.

The difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the problem of industrialization had to be solved in the briefest possible time, because the imperialists could bring the peaceful respite to an end at any moment. Consequently, it was necessary to do everything to accelerate the development of industry. The USSR was behind the advanced countries by some 50-100 years, and had to bridge that gap in 10-15 years.

Industrialization was hampered by the scarcity of skilled workers, engineers and technicians. Some of the old

experts were anti-Soviet and far from promoting the cause of industrialization, were, on the contrary, trying to harm it and were engaging in sabotage. A large organization of saboteurs—the “Industrial Party”—was formed at the end of the twenties. It was composed of old bourgeois specialists closely connected with the former owners of industrial enterprises who had fled abroad after the revolution. Subversives were active in all branches of industry and transport.

And lastly, there were the anti-Party groupings of Trotskyites and Bukharinites, who again opposed the Party’s general line and were preventing the Party from concentrating all its efforts on the problem of industrialization.

In the mid-twenties, Trotsky and his adherents again began a bitter fight against the entire policy of the Party—both its internal and its foreign policy. Rejecting the possibility of building socialism in one country, they said that the Party’s directive on building socialism in the USSR was narrow nationalism and a betrayal of the interests of world revolution. They called for the world revolution to be hastened by the launching of a “revolutionary war” against the capitalist countries and the organization of armed uprisings. They were trying to force upon the party an adventurist policy of exporting revolution to other countries.

Blinding themselves to the real possibilities, Trotsky and his adherents demanded that industrialization be achieved at a super-high rate, at the cost of ruining the peasantry. They proposed to obtain the capital needed for industrialization from the peasants by sharply increasing the prices of manufactured goods and increasing taxes.

The Trotskyites slandered the Soviet state, accusing it of bourgeois degeneration, and of “serving the imperial-

ists." They wanted to overthrow the Soviet Government and to seize power.

The adventurist policy of the Trotskyites did not win the Party's support. In the course of the all-Party discussion held in the second half of 1927, less than one per cent of the Communists voted for the Trotskyite line. In December 1927 the 15th Congress of the Communist Party condemned the Trotskyite opposition, considering its views to be incompatible with membership of the Party, and expelled the opposition leaders from Party membership. Trotsky was exiled from the USSR in 1929 because he persisted in his anti-state activities.

In its struggle to put into effect the Leninist line of industrializing the country, at the end of the twenties the Communist Party had to overcome the resistance of yet another opposition group, led by N. Bukharin. This group opposed the rapid rates of industrialization, opposed the priority and accelerated development of heavy industry, and demanded the priority development of light industry. Had the Party taken that road, the country could not have safeguarded its technical and economic independence from the capitalist states, or secured its defences. It would have been impossible to carry out the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy and ensure a constant growth in the productivity of social labour in all branches of the national economy without the priority and accelerated development of heavy industry which was producing the means of production. The priority development of heavy industry is a decisive condition for a constant increase in consumer goods production.

That was why the Communist Party firmly rejected the proposals made by Bukharin's group and considered the views of that group to be contradictory to the general Party line and to the Leninist doctrine on the industriali-

zation of the USSR.

The industrialization of the Soviet Union was carried out on the basis of carefully worked-out long-term and annual economic development plans. In 1929, the Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets endorsed the First Five-Year Plan for the economic development of the USSR. This plan provided for an increase in capital investments in the national economy as a whole in 1929-33 to two and a half times the figure for the preceding five years, and into the industry to four times that figure. Capital investments for the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37) were set at 133,400 million roubles as against 50,500 million roubles in the First Five-Year Plan. The Third Five-Year Plan (1938-42) was to be bigger than the first two five-year plans put together as regards total capital investments envisaged.

THE COUNTRY FOUND THE MEANS NEEDED FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION

The advantages of a planned economy gave the Soviet state broad opportunities to find the necessary means for implementing its policy of industrialization. The state-owned economy had become the main source of capital—this consisted of revenue from nationalized industry, transport and trade. In the years of the First Five-Year Plan 90,000 million roubles (of the total 120,000 million roubles of state revenue) came from the social sector, including 43,400 million roubles from industry.

The Soviet peasantry had made a sizeable contribution to the accumulation of capital for the development of industry. The peasants had been relieved of the need to pay for the land or to pay rent, so they were in a position to pass on part of their accumulated capital to the state. That

was done by means of a slight increase in prices of manufactured goods in comparison with those of agricultural produce, and in the form of taxes.

Another important way of accumulating capital was by utilizing the savings of the population through the savings banks, state loans, state insurance, etc. First Industrialization Loan which was issued in 1927 to the tune of 200 million roubles was fully subscribed to in a fortnight. The Second Industrialization Loan, to the tune of 500 million roubles, which was floated in 1928, was even more successful. Altogether the state floated 5,000 million roubles' worth of internal loans in the course of the First Five-Year Plan. The sums obtained from the population through loans accounted for 18 per cent of the state budget revenue.

The state monopoly of foreign trade played an important role in industrialization. Revenue from foreign trade constituted a considerable part of the state accumulation funds. The whole of the country's exports and imports were subordinated to the needs of industrialization. The state imported machine-tools, machines and equipment in great quantities. In the course of the First Five-Year Plan, more than 7,000 million roubles' worth of equipment was imported.

In order to pay for equipment purchased abroad, the Soviet Union increased its exports of Soviet goods—timber, manganese ore, oil, and agricultural produce. For the sake of industrialization the Soviet state was compelled to limit to some degree the consumption of such foodstuffs as bread, butter, sugar, canned goods, etc., within the country and to export them.

The country was short of food, and rationing was in force. But the Soviet people were well aware that they had no alternative. They consciously limited their own con-

sumption in order to purchase more equipment abroad and to accelerate the industrialization of the country.

This is how one worker described the thoughts and the mood of the Soviet people in those days: "How's life, you ask? It's hard... But ask any woman if it's an easy job to give birth to a child. Imagine how much they suffer before they give life to a baby. And after that just think of all the cares and anxiety she's got to go through before she's brought the child up and made a real man out of him. Just imagine how many years and how much effort are needed to do all that. And we Russian workers have decided to give birth to a whole new world and not only for ourselves but for all people like you and me. And you want it to grow up all at once, without any pain and sufferings?"

"Just look at it. It's young in years, but it's already standing firmly on its feet. Just look how this baby is running and catching up with the old world, how it is refashioning the world according to its own wishes with its tractorbuilding plants and iron-and-steel works."

INDUSTRIALIZATION BEGINS

The industrialization of the country started in the second half of the twenties. New industrial enterprises were built and old ones reconstructed. Industrialization was going on particularly rapidly in the thirties.

Industrial construction work got under way on a really broad scale in the very first year of the First Five-Year Plan (1929). Among the enterprises under construction were tractor-building plants in Stalingrad, Kharkov, and Chelyabinsk, plants for building grain combine-harvesters in Saratov and Zaporozhye, an agricultural machine-building plant in Rostov-on-Don, the biggest in the world, motor

works in Moscow and Gorky, the giant iron-and-steel plants near the Magnitnaya Mountain (in the Urals), and in Kuznetsk (in Siberia), heavy machine-building plants in Gorlovka, Kramatorsk and Sverdlovsk, chemical plants in Berezники, Solikamsk and near Moscow, hydropower stations on the Dnieper, the biggest in Europe, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, nearly 1,500 km. long, etc., etc.

History had never seen capital construction on such a gigantic scale in any country. The Soviet country had become a huge construction site, where modern industrial enterprises were being built right around-the-clock and round the year, whatever the season. There were very few construction machines in Russia at that time: the spade and the wheelbarrow were the construction workers' main implements. But the workers did miracles even with those primitive tools.

The builders of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant took a resolution to build the plant a year ahead of the time set. They were as good as their word, and it started operating in June, 1930. The Turkestan-Siberian Railway was also completed a year ahead of schedule, as was the Lenin Hydropower Station on the Dnieper (Dneproges).

The construction workers laboured heroically to build the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk Iron-and-Steel Plants. Working in summer and winter, in the severe Siberian frosts, they were creating a new coal-mining and iron-and-steel base of the country in the East.

I. Bardin, Chief Engineer on the construction site of the Kuznetsk Iron-and-Steel Plant, recalls: "People flocked to us from all corners of the country. Kazakhs and others worked with Russians and Ukrainians. It's incredible to think what miracles were accomplished by the labour of these formerly illiterate people who had never seen a real industrial enterprise in their lives... Concrete mixers pro-

duced 408 batches of concrete instead of the 150 set them. Riveters placed 266 rivets in place per shift instead of the 105 they had to. Navvies sometimes fulfilled 10 one-day quotas in one shift. Komsomols were placing rivets at a great height and in 50 degrees of frost. Bricklayers laid 15 tons of bricks per shift per man. Nothing could stop the construction workers in their working enthusiasm—neither storms, blizzards, nor rain! 'There must be pig iron!' was the construction site's motto. The construction work on the blast furnace was led by Communists and Komsomols, and that guaranteed success." The first blast furnace of the Magnitogorsk plant yielded its first pig iron in February 1932, and the Kuznetsk plant in April.

Altogether 1,500 new major industrial enterprises started operating during the First Five-Year Plan. At the same time many of the old ones were reconstructed.

Industrial construction work continued to increase in the course of the Second Five-Year Plan—4,500 industrial enterprises were built in 1933-37, i.e. three times as many as during the period of the First Five-Year Plan. And about 3,500 enterprises were built in three and a half years of the Third Five-Year Plan (1938-41).

So about 9,000 big modern industrial enterprises were put in operation in the 13 years preceding the war (1928-40). There arose branches of industry and production new to Russia, such as car and tractor-building, chemical, heavy machine-building, machine-tool building industries, the production of ball-bearings, combine-harvesters, etc.

MASTERING PRODUCTION AT NEW ENTERPRISES

The building of such a tremendous number of industrial enterprises in a short time was indeed a feat.

However, they not only had to be built, they had to

be put into operation. Work had to be organized properly, new machines and equipment mastered, and the plants used to full rated capacity.

This problem could not be solved at one go, because there was a shortage of skilled workers, engineers and technicians. The country could not put off the construction of new plants until the necessary people were trained. So the two problems were tackled simultaneously. Yesterday's construction workers took their place by the machine-tools and mastered the new machines right on the job.

The Soviet state took measures to speed up the training of personnel. Many apprenticeship schools were opened at factories and plants to train teenagers as skilled workers. Six-month courses were organized at enterprises to train workers in the most needed trades without their leaving their jobs, and also nine-month courses to train semi-skilled and skilled workers. An extensive network of courses for improving the technical knowledge and understanding of the workers, and consequently for raising their qualifications was set up. The Government made it compulsory for workers who were servicing complex machine-tools and mechanisms to pass examinations in technical know-how. That was how the problem of securing qualified workers for industry was tackled.

The problem of training engineers and technicians was also dealt with successfully. Many higher and special technical schools were organized in the country in the years of industrialization. The network of day and evening workers' faculties was expanded—these prepared workers for admission to higher schools.

The scarcity of engineers, technicians and qualified workers in the early years of industrialization compelled the Soviet state to invite foreign specialists to work in the country. By the beginning of the thirties about 6,000

foreign specialists were working at industrial enterprises and construction sites. The overwhelming majority of them honestly fulfilled the responsibilities they had assumed under contract and were a great help in designing and building new enterprises and getting them into production. Many of them were awarded orders and medals of the USSR for their work. For example, Mr. Cooper, an American engineer, who was an adviser on the construction site of the Dnieper Hydropower Station, was awarded the Order of Lenin. But among the foreign specialists there were also some who had come here for subversive purposes. For example, some of the staff of the Moscow branch of the British Metropolitan-Vickers Co. were exposed as the sponsors of a subversive organization active at major power stations in the Soviet Union.

Before long, as a result of the great efforts made to train its own specialists, the country did not need to invite foreign specialists to come here to work.

THE GREAT FEAT OF THE WORKING CLASS

The working class performed a historic service in carrying out the industrialization of the USSR. The working class regarded industrialization as the main way to overcome the country's economic backwardness, to strengthen its defence capacity, liquidate unemployment, and raise the people's living standards as rapidly as possible. It regarded industrialization as being the main means of building a socialist society in the USSR.

Great ideas give birth to great creative energy. The idea of industrialization engendered in the people, and above all in the working class, great enthusiasm for labour. It was expressed in the emulation drive—a mass campaign for the fulfilment and overfulfilment of production

plans—which was launched in 1929, the first year of the First Five-Year Plan. An article calling on the working people to launch a socialist emulation drive, written by Lenin in 1917, was published on January 20, 1929. Lenin wrote that socialism had for the first time created a real possibility “for actually drawing the majority of toilers into an arena of such labour in which they can display their abilities, develop their capacities, reveal the talents that are so abundant among the people, and that capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled in thousands and millions.

“Now, when a Socialist Government is in power our task is to organize emulation.”

Millions of working people responded to Lenin’s appeal. Individual workers, teams, collectives of shops and whole enterprises concluded socialist emulation agreements among themselves.

What is socialist emulation? Emulation and rivalry are not one and the same thing. Rivals strive to do away with each other. The participants in emulation undertake to overfulfil production plans, to raise labour productivity, and to reduce the cost of production more than envisaged by the plan. Each on his own job, and each one with his own means and in his own way strove to achieve the common goal: an increase in production. The front-rank workers, who had distinguished themselves in emulation, were awarded the honorary title of *Udarnik* (Shock worker). The *Udarniks* received cash bonuses and prizes, and their portraits were put up on “Boards of Honour.”

The socialist emulation conducted on a mass scale had a favourable effect on labour productivity: in 1929 labour productivity in industry increased by nearly 20 per cent. The motto *The Five-Year-Plan in Four Years* was advanced at the All-Union Congress of Shock-Workers’ Teams

which took place in 1929, and it became the watchword of the struggle for industrialization.

The creative initiative displayed by the workers knew no bounds. New forms of socialist emulation sprang up. The "towing" movement originated in the Donbass, the essence of which was that the advanced teams helped the lagging ones, passed on their know-how to them and helped them to overcome difficulties. The "counter-plan" movement originated at the industrial plants of Leningrad. These "counter-plans" were worked out by the workers on the basis of better use of the machines and equipment, savings of raw materials, higher labour productivity, etc.

Socialist emulation helped to fulfil and overfulfil the plans for developing industry. By 1931 a number of branches of industry—oil, electrical engineering, engineering, confectionary, and tinned fish—had already fulfilled the plan, in a period of two and a half to three years. Industry as a whole fulfilled the First Five-Year Plan in four years and three months.

In the course of the Second Five-Year Plan, socialist emulation rose to a new level. The emergence of new machines and the fact that the workers mastered them successfully made it possible for the planned labour productivity figure to be exceeded many times over. The Donbass miners were the initiators of a new movement called the *Stakhanovite movement* after one of them—Alexei Stakhanov. Stakhanovites managed to achieve high labour productivity not by brawn and muscle, but by the able utilization of new machines and the correct organization of labour.

On August 31, 1935, Alexei Stakhanov, a miner, in 6 hours had mined 102 tons of coal with his pneumatic pick, having overfulfilled his quota 14.5 times. How did he manage to do it? Usually, the hewer not only worked at

the coal-face but himself did the propping operations. He would spend half his time on that unqualified labour and all the while his pick would lie idle. Stakhanov divided the processes: he did only the hewing, and two auxiliary workers propped up the roof of the mine in his wake. In this way the pneumatic pick was used productively throughout the shift.

Workers in other industries followed Stakhanov's example. Alexander Busygin, a smith at the Gorky Automobile Works, forged 1,050 driving-shafts in a shift instead of the 675 set him by the plan. Weavers Evdokia and Maria Vinogradova began to look after 70-100 looms, and later after 144 looms instead of their quota of 16-24. Locomotive driver Pyotr Krivonos (Donbass) started to drive goods trains at twice the speed set by the quota.

The Communist Party supported the Stakhanovite movement and an All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites was organized in Moscow in November 1935. More than 3,000 leading men and women workers discussed what should be done to bring all the workers up to the level of productivity achieved by the most advanced. A special Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was held in December 1935 on the Stakhanovite movement, and was attended by about 3,000 front-rank workers, engineers and administrative personnel. The Plenary Meeting stressed that in order to develop the Stakhanovite movement further, it was necessary constantly to raise the cultural and technical standards of the workers, and to learn how to manage new machinery. The Meeting had decided that a study of a set minimum of technical know-how was to be universal and compulsory for all workers. The Stakhanovite movement developed on a mass scale thanks to the support of the Party, the trade unions, and the Komsomol.

What did the Stakhanovite movement yield? Its results can clearly be seen from the example of the mine where Stakhanov worked. Whereas in the first three quarters of 1935 the mine delivered over 2,000 tons less coal than it was supposed to, in the fourth quarter the mine not only met its debts but even fulfilled its increased annual plan ahead of time. Throughout the Donbass coal extraction increased by almost 30 per cent in August-December 1935.

The development of the Stakhanovite movement helped to overcome the lag in the oil industry, which had the most favourable effect on rail transport. The railways had not previously been able to cope with the plan for freight transport, but in 1935 the position was remedied.

Labour productivity in industry began to grow steadily, thanks to the wide development of socialist emulation and the Stakhanovite movement. Overall it grew 82 per cent during the Second Five-Year Plan instead of the 63 per cent envisaged by the plan, and this made it possible to fulfil the plan for industry 9 months ahead of the time set. This was one more outstanding achievement to the credit of the Soviet working class.

A movement like that of the Stakhanovites is unthinkable in capitalist countries, because it would only serve to enrich individual capitalists and not society as a whole. It would turn against the workers themselves. This idea was expressed very well in a letter sent to Stakhanov by a group of Belgian miners. Having asked him to tell them his experiences in work, they wrote: "We don't intend to use your know-how here. There are quite a few unemployed at the Royal Mines. If any of us were to double his productivity, he'd be jeopardizing his comrades' security."

Romain Rolland, the French writer, gave a vivid description of the Stakhanovite movement: "It is clearly a

colossal awakening of the human mind in the sphere of labour. It is possible only in a genuine socialist society where a worker feels himself the master, and not an exploited being, in a society where he is not working to enrich a class hostile to him—and whose only concern is how to get the most profit out of the worker—but for the whole of society, where the worker occupies first place. This feeling of dignity and pride is indeed overwhelming."

SOVIET UNION BECOMES A MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POWER

Within a short time the USSR leaped from a state of backwardness to economic progress. In 1940 large-scale industry produced 12 times as much as in 1913, and took the leading place in the national economy. Industry was responsible for over three-quarters of the gross output of the national economy, and more than two-thirds of the industrial output fell to production of the means of production.

Especially great advances were made in the sphere of engineering. In 1940 output was 35 times the 1913 level. The tremendous growth of this industry made it possible to retool all branches of the national economy—transport, communications, agriculture.

A mighty power engineering base came into being: in 1940 more than 48,300 million kwh of electricity were generated, as against less than 2,000 million kwh in 1913.

Having ensured the priority development of heavy industry, the country started to advance the consumer goods industries, which in 1940 produced 4.9 times as much as in 1913.

The geographical distribution of industry changed radically. There were only 4-5 industrial areas in pre-revolutionary Russia. The rest of its territory was actually

devoid of industry. In the course of the pre-war five-year plans industrial enterprises, mines and power stations appeared all over the country, and large-scale industry was developed in all the Soviet Republics.

Old Russia had only one iron-and-steel area—in the Ukraine. Under the first five-year plans a second iron-and-steel area of the USSR was created—in the East (the Magnitogorsk and the Kuznetsk plants). Instead of a single coal-mining area (Donbass), the country had as many as eight coal-mining areas by the end of the thirties. A new centre of oil industry—a “second Baku”—sprang up between the Volga and the Urals.

Having built up its own developed industry, the USSR won complete economic independence for itself. Before the revolution Russia had imported about half of all its machines and equipment. In the course of the First Five-Year Plan the Soviet Union imported many machines and machine-tools. However, as Soviet factories were opened, imports of foreign equipment were cut. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan the USSR was no longer importing locomotives, automobiles, tractors, agricultural machines, blast-furnace equipment, turbines, electric furnaces, measuring instruments, and so on.

Whereas during the First Five-Year Plan 75 per cent of all the new machine-tools were imported from abroad, in the Second Five-Year Plan, Soviet industry satisfied 90 per cent of all the needs in machine-tools. In 1933 two out of every three turbines were imported, while in 1936 all the turbines installed at the power stations of the USSR were Soviet-made.

In the Second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union not only stopped importing, but started to export tractors and other agricultural machines, automobiles, sewing machines and other manufactured goods. In 1937 the USSR im-

ported only one per cent of all the machines it needed.

From a country importing machines the USSR had become a country manufacturing machines and equipment and exporting them.

The share of the Soviet Union in the world economy had also grown. In 1913 Russia occupied fifth place in the world for overall volume of production after the USA, Germany, Great Britain, and France. Russia's share in total world industrial output was slightly over 4 per cent.

In 1937 the USSR already held first place in Europe and second in the world for overall production. The share of the USSR in total world industrial output was 14 per cent. The country had emerged to first place in the world in the production of locomotives, combine-harvesters and other agricultural machines, and synthetic rubber.

Thanks to the advantages of the socialist system of economy (public ownership of the means of production, planned management of the economy, labour heroism of the workers, etc.) the rates of development of socialist industry were far higher than those in capitalist countries. From 1930 to 1940 the average annual rate of growth of production in large-scale industry was 18 per cent, whereas in the USA it was 1.2 per cent, in Britain 2.1 per cent, etc. Rates of growth of labour productivity in the USSR were 3-4 times as high as in the capitalist countries.

The Soviet Union swiftly progressed industrially.

VIII. SOCIALIST CHANGES IN THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE

POLICY OF COLLECTIVIZING PEASANTS' HOLDINGS

The most difficult and at the same time most important achievement of socialism on the historical and the social plane was the voluntary transition of the Soviet peasants from individual small-commodity production to large-scale collective socialist farming. This changeover took place during the first two five-year plans.

A whole series of agrarian measures undertaken by the Soviet Government in the countryside paved the way for socialist forms of farming. As has already been stated earlier, on the very first day of its existence Soviet government satisfied the age-old aspirations of peasants. Land was confiscated from the big landowners, the monasteries and the capitalists, and placed at the disposal of the peasants. It was shared out among the peasants on the principle of equalization. The number of small peasant holdings rose sharply, and towards the end of the twenties there were 24-25 million of them.

On receiving land, implements and livestock, the poor peasants and farmhands came up to the level of the middle peasants. The peasants' standard of living rose, although as a whole it was not very high.

Agriculture developed slowly because of the low productivity of the small backward peasant farmsteads and primitive farming methods, based in the main on manual labour, primitive implements and horse traction. The small-scale peasantry could not use large machines. Millions of small individual farmsteads not only could not buy tractors or good ploughs, they could not have made effective use of them on their small plots of land. No wonder, that in 1927 there were still more than 5 million wooden ploughs, and about one-third on the peasantry had no ploughing implements whatever. In 1928 about 10 per cent of the spring ploughing was done with wooden plough, three-quarters of the crop area was sown by hand, about half the grain crop was harvested with scythe and sickle, and threshed with flails and other primitive implements which had been used by peasants a thousand years before.

Labour productivity on the peasants' plots in the second half of the twenties was only about one-twelfth of that of the workers in industry, and this was why most of the peasants had a low standard of living. The countryside was overpopulated. Every year millions of peasants went to the towns in search of work, and they made up the bulk of the unemployed.

Soviet power had delivered the peasants from enslavement by the landowners, but there still remained *kulak* exploitation. Poor peasants were obliged to hire horses and implements from *kulaks*, to rent part of their own land to the *kulaks* because they were unable to use it for lack of implements and draught power. The poor peasants had to

work as farmhands for the *kulaks* because they could not feed their families on the produce of their own land.

Experience proved the correctness of the words spoken by Lenin in 1917: "If we continue as before isolated on our tiny farms even as free citizens on free soil, we are still menaced with inevitable collapse."

What was the way out? It was large-scale farming. A large farm could use a tractor and other complex machinery, and mineral fertilizer, could engage in many-field crop rotation and take advantage of the achievements of science. With such farms it was possible to raise agricultural labour productivity considerably, to increase its commodity production and improve the peasants' standard of living substantially.

This was of vital concern to the peasants, something that answered the interests of the state and society. Small-scale farming could not satisfy the country's growing needs for grain and other farm produce, or the increasing requirements of industry for agricultural raw materials. In a period of ten years commodity production had dropped by half as a result of the emergence of so many tiny farmsteads and the growth of the peasants' consumption. Food shortage compelled the Soviet Government to introduce rationing.

Consequently it became an exigency to put agriculture on a large-scale basis, as the only way to raise productivity and the level of commodity production. Backward agriculture began to hinder industrialization of the country and the growth of living standards.

So how was the changeover to be carried out?

The Soviet state could not take the line of supporting and developing large private *kulak* estates in the countryside. This would have ruined the mass of the working peasantry, and the *kulaks* would have grown rich at their

expense. Such a line would have been unacceptable to the majority of peasants. Nor would the working class have tolerated it since it would have meant strengthening capitalism in the countryside and this would have jeopardized the building of socialism.

Lenin's cooperation plan showed the peasants another way of establishing big farms—the voluntary association of the peasants in collective production cooperatives. This was the only way that was advantageous and acceptable to the peasants, since it did not mean the ruin of the vast masses of peasantry, but, on the contrary, opened up wide prospects of a better life.

The 15th Congress of the Communist Party which was held in December 1927 set the country the priority task of carrying out collectivization of the peasant farms and the technical reorganization of agriculture.

PREPARING THE CONDITIONS FOR MASS COLLECTIVIZATION

The Party and the Soviet Government started work to prepare the conditions for the mass collectivization of agriculture.

The state increased supplies of agricultural machinery and tractors to the countryside. The use of these machines was incompatible with strip farming and required large tracts of land, which stimulated the peasants to unite their farmsteads.

In 1928 the state began to set up large grain-growing state farms. These were not only grain factories, but schools for the organization of large mechanized farms and on the basis of their experience the peasants were convinced of the advantages of large farms. Thousands of peasants visited state farms to learn how to farm on a large scale.

The state farms, mechanized as they were, proved to be of great assistance in the collectivization of agriculture. Here is an example: The poor peasants in the Berezovsky District, Odessa *Okrug*, had not cultivated their land for five years, because they had no horses or implements. Instead they rented the land out to *kulaks*. In 1927 a representative of the association of Ukrainian state farms approached them and offered to till their land with tractors. At first the peasants were dubious. The *kulaks* were worried and tried to intimidate the poor peasants: "Fools," they said. "You're putting yourselves in chains. It's the return of serfdom. The boundaries of our plots will go, and we'll have no land."

But the efforts of the *kulaks* did not have the desired effect, and the poor peasants made an agreement with the state farm. It meant that the land would be tilled and sown at 30-40 per cent less cost. When they gathered a harvest half as big as that of the rest of the peasants in the *okrug*, the poor peasants were really convinced of the benefits of uniting their farmsteads and using machinery. "After what we saw the tractors do," they wrote in a letter to *Izvestia*, "we do not want to go on farming in a small way, but have decided to set up a tractorized collective farm, eliminating scraps of land belonging to individual peasants. The Taras Shevchenko State Farm has undertaken to organize the tractorized farm for us, and we have concluded an agreement on the matter."

Benefiting from this experience the state began to open machine-and-tractor stations (MTS), which concluded contracts to serve whole villages. The first MTS was set up at the Taras Shevchenko Farm in the Ukraine in November 1928. The next year 159 were built. The machine-and-tractor stations became strongholds of collectivization in the countryside.

The state supported the young collective farms by giving them credits, selling them machines and mineral fertilizer on advantageous terms, allowing them big reliefs on agricultural taxes, and organizing a network of training courses for collective farm leaders and organizers. Thousands of teams of workers went to the countryside to help the peasants set up new collective farms (*kolkhozes*). Industrial centres took charge of collective farms and sent workers to the villages as organizers. At the end of 1929 more than 25,000 leading workers went to the countryside at the call of the Communist Party to help the peasants to build a new life. "The twenty-five thousands," as they were generally known among the people, made a big contribution to the development of collective farms.

Among the measures on collectivization were those to restrict *kulak* farming. The Soviet Government had limited the exploitation of farmhands and poor peasants by the *kulaks*, and now the *kulaks* had to pay higher taxes. They were also deprived of the right to vote, and the sale of tractors and other agricultural machinery to them was stopped.

In retaliation the *kulaks* intensified their fight against the Soviet system, and the class struggle in the countryside was sharply aggravated. The *kulaks* began to sabotage grain deliveries to the state with the idea of causing famine and so disrupting the economic policy of the Soviet Union. In the effort to discredit and undermine the *kolkhoz* movement, *kulaks* set fire to the houses of collective farmers and *kolkhoz* buildings, and killed *kolkhoz* livestock. They also killed collective farm organizers and other people politically active in the countryside, representatives of Soviet power and Communists.

The Soviet Government was obliged to take firm measures to put a stop to the criminal activities of the *ku-*

laks. People who concealed grain were prosecuted as speculators, and terrorists and incendiaries were shown no mercy. The poor and middle peasants actively supported the measures taken by the state against *kulak* sabotage.

TURNING POINT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

The great efforts made by the Communist Party and the Soviet state to prepare the conditions for going over to collective farming brought results. After the 15th Party Congress the number of *kolkhozes* began to grow rapidly: in two years there was an almost four-fold increase in the number of collective farms and a more than five-fold increase in the number of peasant households in *kolkhozes*.

But the real turning point in the countryside came in the latter part of 1929, when the middle peasants—the central and predominant figures in the countryside started joining collective farms on a mass scale. At first it had been mainly the farmhands and poor peasants who joined the collective farms, but in summer 1929 the middle peasants began to flock in. They did not come individually—whole villages and even districts joined together.

The middle peasants joined because they had seen many collective farms getting good harvests and paying out good incomes to their members, and so they were becoming more and more convinced of the advantages of collective farming. Moreover, the intensification of Government measures to restrict and squeeze out *kulak* farming showed the middle peasants that their hopes of gradually becoming *kulaks* themselves were unfounded.

The following figures bear witness to the scale of collectivization in the second half of 1929: in July 1929 there

were one million peasant households in collective farms, whereas on October 1, 1929, there were already two million. This meant that in 2-3 months as many families joined the *kolkhozes* as had done throughout the previous twelve years. Then another 2.4 million peasant families joined in the last three months of 1929.

This was a great turning point in the countryside. Millions of peasants took the new, socialist road. The time foreseen by Lenin had come. The majority of the peasants had voluntarily gone over to collective farming. The mass influx into the collective farms meant that it was possible to replace the *kulak* capitalist production of grain with socialist production on state and collective farms. In other words, the time had come to fully collectivize agriculture and on this basis to do away with *kulak* farming, that is to liquidate the *kulaks* as a class.

FULL COLLECTIVIZATION

On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a resolution *On the Tempo of Collectivization and State Measures to Assist the Development of the Collective Farms*. It was intended to complete collectivization in the main by the end of the First Five-Year Plan (in 1933). The chief grain-growing areas (North Caucasus, the Central and Lower Volga Regions), where there were already a large number of *kolkhozes*, were to complete collectivization in the main by spring 1931, and the remaining grain areas by spring 1932. The Central Committee of the Party warned that it was impermissible to violate the principle of voluntary entry into the collective farms.

The Party recommended that the peasants set up agricultural *artels*, that is to pool their land, their draught

power and their principal implements and farm on a communal basis. The *artel* was to be managed by a board elected by its members. In addition to the communally-run farm, which was to be the main source of livelihood for the peasant, each member of the *artel* could have a plot of his own to grow vegetables and fruit. He could also have minor farming implements to cultivate his piece of land, and also livestock and poultry.

In completely collectivized areas the Local Soviets were given the right by the decision of the Soviet Government to confiscate the *kulaks*' land, implements and livestock and to send them to live elsewhere giving them an opportunity to earn their living by honest work. This meant the liquidation of the *kulaks* as a class, that is the liquidation of *kulak* production.

Measures were taken by the Party and the Government to speed up the construction of factories to produce tractors, combines and other agricultural machinery so that the *kolkhozes* could be adequately supplied with new machinery and the work of their members made easier. In 1935 the Soviet Government appropriated 500 million roubles for *kolkhoz* construction.

All over the country the peasants were getting together to decide the vital question—discussion was raging around the problem of whether to unite in collective farms or to go on living in the old way. At these gatherings members of existing *kolkhozes* spoke and on the basis of their own experience demonstrated the benefits of the collective farm system. The *kulaks* agitated for individual farming, and there were waverers among the peasants.

Representatives of the working class—"the twenty-five thousands" —went to the villages at the beginning of 1930. The workers persuaded the peasants to set up collective

farms and promised their help and cooperation. The peasants remembered that it had been possible to triumph in the revolution and in the years of Civil War and intervention due to the close alliance between the workers and peasants. They believed that this alliance would be a real guarantee of success in the reorganization of the countryside on a socialist basis. The efforts of the workers bore fruit—every day new *kolkhozes* came into being.

But the organization of collective farms did not go smoothly and without difficulties everywhere. In some districts Lenin's principle of voluntary entry was flouted when collective farms were established. The authorities in the Central Asia and Transcaucasian Republics, the central industrialized regions of Russia and some other areas were so carried away with the idea of organizing collective farms that they violated the instructions of the Central Committee on the rate of collectivization and the time laid down for its completion.

In view of the national features and the survival of strong individualist feeling in these parts of the country, they had been recommended to complete collectivization in 1933. But the local leaders decided to do it by spring 1931, although this was premature.

Instead of persuading the peasants and relying on the voluntary principle, in many places the local leaders forced the peasants to join the *kolkhoz* under the threat of having their land confiscated and of being deprived of electoral rights.

There were other violations of the Leninist principles of developing collective farming. In some areas intense efforts were made to impose communes, in which not only the basic means of production—the land, horses, and implements—were held in common, but also houses, mi-

nor livestock and poultry. In certain areas the local authorities started to close markets and churches, and all this caused serious discontent among the peasants.

The *kulaks* exploited this dissatisfaction and their anti-*kolkhoz* and anti-Soviet propaganda became still more frenzied. In particular districts *kulaks* even managed to incite the peasants to anti-Soviet actions.

Urgent measures were taken by the Party and the Government to put an end to the violations of Leninist principles. All collective farms organized against the wishes of the peasants and all communes imposed upon them were disbanded. The Party once again emphasized that it was impermissible to flout the principle of voluntary entry into a collective farm and of freedom to choose the form of collective farming (*kolkhoz* or commune). In some regions and areas the leaders of Party and Soviet organizations who had tolerated crude errors in the development of collective farms were removed and new elections held.

In order to help the collective farms during the initial stages the state again extended a number of privileges to them: they were relieved of the tax on livestock for two years, needy farms were given loans of seed, financial assistance to the *kolkhozes* was increased and the construction of machine-and-tractor stations was speeded up.

All these measures gave rise to profound satisfaction among the peasants and their restless mood was dispelled. The collectivization movement continued to develop.

During the First Five-Year Plan about 15 million peasant farmsteads (61.5 per cent of the total) united in 210,000 collective farms. In the principal agricultural areas there was complete collectivization.

STRENGTHENING THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

The fantastic growth of the collective farm movement, with an average of 200 farms being formed daily, created certain difficulties. The young *kolkhozes* were clearly not being strengthened organizationally and economically fast enough. There were many shortcomings in the organization of labour, the use of machinery and the distribution of income. In many farms discipline was very poor. Collective farm organizers did not have enough experience for running large enterprises. Hostile elements, former *kulaks*, succeeded in infiltrating into many collective farms, particularly in the North Caucasus and the Ukraine. They undermined the farms from within. They stole the collective farm property, killed livestock and ruined implements, machinery, and so on. They undermined discipline, sabotaged deliveries of grain to the state, etc.

The collective farms had to be reinforced organizationally and economically. This meant the correct organization of labour and the use of machinery in them; the distribution of income in such a way as to give the *kolkhoz* members an interest in raising collective farm production; the training of a core of able *kolkhoz* organizers. Only if these things were done would it be possible to display the great strength of the socialist collective farming.

The collective farms themselves discovered the best forms of labour organization and the distribution of income. They established production teams with a permanent membership. Each team had its own land, its own cattle and equipment, which made it easier to keep an account of the labour put in, and of production. Income was distributed according to work done, that is, according to the number of workday units to the credit of the collective farmer.

The distribution of income according to labour put in gave the collective farmers added incentive to earn more workday units and to help the farm secure good harvests, which would mean more produce for each workday unit.

In order to put a stop to the plunder of state and cooperative, collective farm property the Soviet Government adopted a special law in August 1932 which proclaimed the sanctity of socialist property. Those guilty of offences against it were subject to court proceedings.

In the winter of 1933 the Communist Party set up political departments at the machine-and-tractor stations and state farms with a view to strengthening the collective and state farms organizationally.

It sent 25,000 of its best workers to staff them. The political departments carried out political and educational work among the collective farmers, fostering in them a socialist attitude to labour, and to socialist property, and helped to organize socialist competition in *kolkhozes*.

There developed in the countryside a movement for the best use of tractors, combines and other machinery, the best harvests of grain, sugar beet and cotton. Such a movement became possible because the collective farms were now stronger and were well supplied with machinery and trained people who knew how to handle it and had a growing socialist consciousness.

A pioneer of the Stakhanovite movement among the tractor drivers was Praskovya Angelina, of the Ukraine. In 1930, she was the first woman tractor driver. In 1933 she organized the first women's tractor team in the USSR, and in 1935 her team cultivated 3,075 acres per tractor instead of the scheduled 750. Their example was followed by other tractor drivers. In 1935 leading combine operator Konstantin Borin harvested 1,950 acres instead of the scheduled 400, and his lead was also followed by other opera-

tors, so that in the year the average amount of work done per combine was twice as much as in the previous year.

The collective farmers also developed a movement for obtaining good harvests. In 1935 Maria Demchenko's team at the Comintern Collective Farm in the Kiev Region raised 208 centners of sugar beet per acre. Similar high yields were obtained by M. Shvydko, A. Koshevaya and other women collective farmers who laid the basis for that wonderful movement of "the five hundreders."

The socialist agriculture of the *kolkhozes* was surely gaining strength. The farmers' incomes were increasing and their standard of living was rising.

By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the collective farm system had definitively triumphed in the Soviet Union. In 1937, 18.5 million (93 per cent) peasant households were in collective farms, and the *kolkhozes* owned 93 per cent of all the crop area. This meant that the collectivization of peasant farming was completed.

In the course of two Five-Year Plans agriculture had in the main been re-equipped. In 1937 there were 5,818 MTS with modern machinery at the disposal of the farms. There were 456,000 tractors, nearly 129,000 combines and 146,000 lorries at work on the farms.

The USSR had become a country of large-scale socialist agriculture.

IX. THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE USSR

SOVIET POWER OPENED THE ROAD TO CULTURE FOR THE PEOPLE

Russia produced a number of great scientists, writers, poets, composers, artists, actors who contributed substantially to world culture.

The people of Russia, however, were extremely backward culturally. The great majority of the population in Russia before the revolution were illiterate. According to the general 1897 census illiteracy among the population over nine years of age was 76 per cent, and among women it was 88 per cent. Among the non-Russian peoples, such as those in Central Asia, hardly anyone could read or write. More than 40 nationalities in Russia had no written language. Practically four-fifths of the children of working people were unable to attend school and only a small number had a higher education and then only as a result of tremendous sacrifice. With great sorrow and anguish Lenin wrote in 1913: "There is no other country so barbarous and in which the masses of the people are robbed to such an ex-

tent of education, and knowledge,—no other such country has remained in Europe; Russia is the exception."

The Great October Socialist Revolution opened up prospects for Russia's cultural advancement. It abolished the antipopular regime, which had not only been oppressing the working people economically and politically, but had shut the doors to education, knowledge and culture before them. The October Revolution put an end to national oppression, which hindered the advancement of national cultures; it abolished hierarchy and the unequal status of women, and separated the church from the state and the school from the church. Soviet power pulled down all barriers—political and national—in the peoples' way to culture and knowledge. For the first time in the history of mankind state power set itself the aim of making education, science, culture the property of the entire nation.

"In the old days, human genius, the brain of man," Lenin said in January 1918, "created only to give some the benefits of technology and culture, and to deprive others of the bare necessities, education and development. From now on all the marvels of science and the gains of culture belong to the nation as a whole..." The Soviet state made all cultural establishments public property: schools, clubs, libraries, theatres, museums and picture galleries. All cultural treasures were taken stock of and protected by law. Estates of outstanding figures of the past were turned into preserves and museums; for instance, Yasnaya Polyana—the estate of Leo Tolstoi, the great Russian writer.

In December 1917, a state publishing house began to function, printing the works of Russian and foreign writers in millions of copies. The works of the classics of Russian literature were proclaimed the property of the state.

In the course of cultural development the Soviet people had to encounter the Leftist tendencies of some intellectuals, belonging to the *Proletcult* (Proletarian Culture) organization, which appeared in September 1917. The members of this organization denied the value of the old culture; they did not see its progressive features, calling upon the people to discard the works of Pushkin and Tolstoi, the great Russian painters, Repin and Surikov. They wanted to build a special proletarian culture on a "clear place," without using all the treasures of the old bourgeois culture.

The Communist Party and Lenin resolutely came out against these illusions and mistakes of the *Proletcult*. "Unless we clearly understand that only by an exact knowledge of the culture created by the whole development of mankind and only by reshaping this culture can we build proletarian culture—unless we understand that, we shall not be able to solve this problem. Proletarian culture is not something that has sprung nobody knows whence, it is not an invention of people who call themselves experts in proletarian culture. That is all nonsense. Proletarian culture must be the result of the natural development of the stores of knowledge which mankind has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist society, landowner society, bureaucratic society."

That is why the Communist Party and the Soviet Government took such great care of the preservation of all the cultural heritage from pre-revolutionary Russia and of its discriminate assimilation, and took all necessary measures so that the broad masses could master everything progressive in that heritage. Lenin called upon the people, and especially the youth, to master all the knowledge accumulated by mankind. But he warned the youth against senseless mechanical learning of things that had become ob-

solete and were useless. Lenin said: "This does not mean that we can confine ourselves to communist conclusions and learn only communist slogans. You will not create communism that way. You can become a Communist only when you enrich your mind with the knowledge of all the treasures created by mankind."

The revolution served as a stimulus to the development of the diverse abilities and talents of the people. From the first months of Soviet power a great thirst of millions of people for knowledge and culture was evident. Various centres of culture began to appear as a result of local initiative in town and countryside. There were councils of people's education, people's houses, houses of culture, clubs, libraries, village reading rooms, the so-called red corners (recreation rooms), etc. The educated part of the population took an active part in the eradication of illiteracy. In April 1918 Lenin noted with gratification that education and culture were advancing at a great pace, that the Soviet system of society had produced an unheard-of attraction for knowledge and education. The Soviet Government did everything to encourage public thirst for culture. The cultural development of the people was a major objective of the Soviet state.

There were difficulties on the people's road to knowledge. The country was confronted with serious economic problems as a result of the foreign intervention, Civil War and economic ruin. A considerable part of the old intelligentsia closely associated with the bourgeoisie had maintained either a hostile stand or one of indecision towards Soviet power. It is true that the best part of the old intelligentsia, including distinguished scientists like K. A. Timiryazev, I. V. Michurin, I. P. Pavlov, N. E. Zhukovsky, sided with the revolution from the very beginning. Large numbers of rank and file intellectuals—teachers, agrono-

mists and rural physicians—took the side of the people.

The Communist Party put its finest men in charge of public education. The first People's Commissar (Minister) of Education was Anatoly Lunacharsky—an Academician, a man of extremely high standards of culture and education, an excellent journalist and speaker. In this post he was followed by A.S. Bubnov—a veteran Bolshevik and prominent scholar of history. Since the advent of Soviet power Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, friend and comrade-in-arms, was active in public education. Proletarian writer Maxim Gorky did a great deal to help draw the old scientists to the side of Soviet power.

DRIVE FOR GENERAL LITERACY

The priority objective in public education was eradication of illiteracy. Lenin said it was impossible to build communist society in an illiterate country, and the Soviet Government regarded eradication of illiteracy as a matter of supreme state importance. A network of groups for eradication of illiteracy was launched in the country back at the time of the Civil War. Those who attended literacy classes had their working time reduced by two hours, but retained their full pay. From 1917 to 1920 some seven million, including four million women, learnt to read and write.

The campaign for elimination of illiteracy and semiliteracy spread wider in the years of civil construction. A voluntary association called "Down with Illiteracy" was founded in 1923, and by 1932 it had more than five million members, who took an active part in teaching the illiterate. The Komsomol launched a cultural campaign in order to teach the illiterate in the countryside. The trade

unions sent there hundreds of thousands of their members for the same purpose. Through the joint efforts of the Government and the public, illiteracy in the USSR was eradicated: between 1929 and 1939 more than 87 million people learned to read and write. The introduction of general compulsory elementary education in the national languages in the early thirties meant that the ranks of the illiterate were no longer being swelled by young people. All this helped to make the USSR a country of total literacy by the end of the thirties.

The Soviet Government continued to pay just as much attention to the development of school education even in the crucial years of the Civil War. During the Civil War the overall number of schools increased by 50 per cent, while the number of secondary schools trebled. As the economic position of the country improved, the state built new school buildings, particularly in the national Republics, and trained more teachers. All this enabled the Soviet Government to introduce subsequently general compulsory seven-year education. In the 1940-41 school year there were about 1,238,000 teachers as against 280,000 in 1914.

DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE'S INTELLIGENTSIA

One of the main results of the cultural revolution in the USSR was the development of the people's intelligentsia: highly qualified specialists for all branches of the country's economy, culture, public health and administration.

Before the revolution there were 91 institutions of higher learning in Russia with a total enrolment of 112,000,

almost entirely from the propertied classes. Soviet power put higher education on a democratic basis. It opened up the doors of universities and institutes to the children of the working people, abolished education fees and introduced allowances for students. In the 1920-21 school year, there were 244 institutions of higher learning in the USSR, and the student enrolment was double the 1914 figure.

Higher education developed particularly intensively in the years of industrialization and collectivization, when the demand for specialists rose sharply. In the 1940-41 school year the USSR had 817 higher educational institutions with an enrolment of 812,000. The fact that Soviet power guaranteed real equality for women was clearly seen in higher education—women comprised 58 per cent of the total student enrolment.

Shortly before World War II the number of students in Soviet universities and institutes was bigger than the total student body in all European states. The Soviet Union advanced to first place in the world as regards the number of trained specialists: in 1940 the Soviet economy had 290,000 diploma'd engineers whereas the figure for the United States of America was 156,000.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET SCIENCE

The Socialist Revolution opened up bright prospects for the development of science. The Soviet Government allocated considerable funds for the advancement of science and paid great attention to the needs of the scientists.

As the economy developed, a network of research ins-

titutions was set up throughout the country: by 1941 there were 1,821 of them, i.e. more than six times the pre-revolution number. There were more than 98,000 scientific workers, i.e. almost ten times as many as in 1914. Scientific institutions were established in all Union and Autonomous Republics.

During the twenties and the thirties, Soviet scientists achieved major successes in the development of the basic branches of science. The famous physiologist, Academician I. P. Pavlov, enriched world science with valuable research into the higher nervous activity of man and animals which forms the basis of modern medicine. The great Russian scientist K. E. Tsiolkovsky developed the theory of jet propulsion—the basis for modern jet aviation and space flights. The work of outstanding scientists N. E. Zhukovsky and S. A. Chaplygin, who discovered a number of the laws of aerodynamics, were a major contribution to the development of modern aviation. As a result of Academician S. V. Lebedev's scientific discoveries the Soviet Union was the first country in the world to organize the commercial production of synthetic rubber. The discoveries of Soviet physicists, L. I. Mandelshtam, N. D. Papalexi and others, made it possible to develop the first instruments based on the principles of radiolocation as far back as in the thirties. The work of Academician A. F. Ioffe laid the foundation of the modern physics of semi-conductors. Soviet scientists D. V. Skobeltsin, I. V. Kurchatov and others made a major contribution to the study of the atomic nucleus and cosmic rays. In the early twenties Soviet scientist V. G. Khlopin succeeded in obtaining radioactive preparations. Even before World War II Soviet science, thanks to the constant solicitude of the Party and Government, led the world in a number of fields.

EDUCATING SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS BUILDERS OF SOCIALISM

A clear understanding by the people of the ideas and aims of socialism, and also of the ways in which they can be carried out is of decisive importance for the victory of socialism. This is why Soviet power attributes great importance to the cultural and political enlightenment of the masses, to their political education. For this purpose wide use is made of cultural and educational institutions and mass media of information—clubs, libraries, museums, theatres, cinemas, the radio, newspapers, books, etc. The Soviet state has placed all institutions of culture and enlightenment at the disposal of the people. Many such institutions have been built in the years of Soviet power. In 1940 there were 118,000 clubs in the Soviet Union, 500 times as many as before the revolution. In 1940, 8,800 newspapers were published in the USSR, ten times as many as in 1914.

Literature and the arts play a prominent part in the ideological education of the people. The creation of striking images of courageous fighters for the revolution, for socialism, by writers, artists, sculptors or at a stage performance by a good actor exerts a powerful educational influence on the masses.

The arts in the Soviet Union put forward profound humane ideas. They develop love for homeland, work and peace, intolerance of any form of oppression and enslavement, of exploitation of man by man, of parasitism, etc. The main hero is the people—the makers of history, the builders of the new society. This is why the works of Soviet writers, sculptors, artists are appreciated by the people.

Many works written in the twenties and the thirties—such as Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don*, Serafimo-

vich's *The Iron Stream*, N. Ostrovsky's *How the Steel Was Tempered*, Furmanov's *Chapayev*, Fadeyev's *The Rout*, and many other books which depicted the heroism of Soviet people, the immortal images of fighters for the revolution, became greatly popular with the Soviet people.

The finest Soviet films—for example *The Battleship Potemkin*, *We Are From Kronstadt*, and *Baltic Deputy*—have become part of the world's treasury of films.

The cultural revolution, which meant a quantitative and qualitative rise in the standard of knowledge and culture of the people, based on the development of education, science and culture, had been carried through in Russia by the end of the thirties. It had transformed the Soviet Union into a country of total literacy, with the most democratic system of public education in the world, to a country of advanced science and culture.

X. THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

For centuries the oppressed people had been dreaming of a system devoid of oppressors and oppressed, of rulers and enslaved, of satiation on the one hand and famine on the other. The Soviet people are the first in history to have realized this dream. As a result of magnificent developments in all the fields of political, economic and cultural life, socialism had in the main been built in the Soviet Union before the war. This could be seen primarily in the radical change in the social, economic and class structure of society.

In the twenty years of Soviet power a modern social economy had been built with a first-class state-owned industry and large-scale mechanized agriculture, on a planned principle. The economic foundation of a socialist society had thus been created. Capitalist economy, which is based on private ownership of the means of production and exploitation of hired labour, had been finished with once and for all. State and cooperative trade had taken the place of private trade. The small-scale production of

the peasants and artisans had been reorganized into co-operative, collective, socialist production. Socialist relations of production based on social ownership of the means of production and the abolition of exploitation of man by man had been established and strengthened.

These decisive socio-economic changes entailed radical changes in the class structure of society. In the very first years of Soviet power the landowners and the big bourgeoisie had left the historic arena as a result of the confiscation of the landowners' land and the nationalization of industry. Most of them emigrated to other countries when during the Civil War the people crushed their hopes of restoring capitalism.

However, there were certain hangovers of the bourgeoisie in the country. With the transition of the New Economic Policy, when certain opportunities were opened up for the growth of capitalist elements, the number of urban and rural bourgeoisie increased somewhat. However, their total share remained small. For instance, the rural bourgeoisie (the *kulaks*) accounted for 4-5 per cent of the peasantry. The urban bourgeoisie accounted for an even smaller proportion of the total urban population.

At the beginning of the thirties the state sector ousted private capitalist industry and trade from the economy. During the First Five-Year Plan the *kulaks*—the remaining exploiters—were liquidated. The exploiting elements were pushed out of Soviet society once and for all.

The following table gives an idea of the changes in the class structure of the Soviet society over a period of 20 years (in per cent).

Great historic changes had taken place in the destinies of the working classes of Soviet society. The working class ceased to be proletarian, i.e., a class that did not own the means of production, an exploited and oppressed

	1913	1937
Factory and office workers	16.7	34.7
Collective farm peasantry and craftsmen and artisans in cooperatives	—	55.5
Private farmers (without <i>kulaks</i>) and craftsmen and artisans not in cooperatives	65.1	5.6
Exploiting elements: landowners, bourgeoisie, merchants, <i>kulaks</i>	15.9	—
Other population (students, pensioners, servicemen, etc.)	2.3	4.2
Total:	100	100

class. It developed into a new class, with collective ownership of the means of production, free from capitalist exploitation and oppression. Thanks to industrialization the working class grew numerically: in 1939 the workers (together with the members of their families) accounted for almost one-third of the country's population. The cultural and technical standards of the working class rose radically. Whereas in 1918, 36 per cent of all the workers were illiterate, and illiteracy among working women was as high as 56 per cent, by the mid-thirties there were no illiterate workers.

The degree of organization and of political awareness of the workers grew. The membership of trade unions, the biggest organization of the working class, was over 21 million in 1936.

Liberation from exploitation, the development of the working class into the master of the country and of its own destiny involved far-reaching changes in the psychology and consciousness of the working class, in its attitude to work. Work, which once had been a drudgery,

a source of enrichment for a handful of exploiters, became free creative work for the good of society. Work became a matter of honour for a worker, and the factory or the plant was as dear as his own home to him. Working for oneself, for society, developed a vital interest in increasing production—and this led to the organization of a nation-wide socialist emulation movement.

The Soviet peasantry changed too. It had likewise ceased to be oppressed and enslaved. Before the revolution the peasantry was plundered by everybody: the land-owner, the *kulak*, the merchant, the moneylender, the banker, and the tsarist government. The revolution liberated the peasants from most of their oppressors, and they were liberated from their remaining exploiters—the *kulaks*—when they took the road of collectivization. The collective farm system put an end to social stratification in the countryside: the poor peasants, the middle peasants, the farm hands and the *kulaks* all disappeared. There emerged a collective farm peasantry—a single social class in the countryside.

In a brief period modern farming machinery supplanted the wooden plough and manual labour, it made farm work easier and sharply increased its productivity. The eradication of social differentiation in the countryside changed the nature of the relations among the peasants. Before the establishment of the collective farm system the peasant had toiled on his own patch of land, looking with envy and malice at his prospering *kulak* neighbour and with sympathy at the poor peasant. Fences and boundary lines in the fields erected social barriers within rural society. Collectivization not only united land and people's efforts, it rallied the stratified peasantry into a united class. The former alienation among the peasants gave place to relations of comradely cooperation and

mutual assistance.

The material and cultural standards of peasants rose. In tsarist Russia the overwhelming majority of working peasantry had been illiterate. According to the 1939 census, 76.8 per cent of the rural population were literate, including 66.6 per cent of the women.

The political freedoms gained as a result of the revolution ensured the right of the peasants to administer their affairs within the collective farm and to take part in the work of local and central organs of Soviet power.

The social make-up of the intelligentsia also changed. Before the revolution the Russian intelligentsia consisted of representatives of the propertied, ruling classes—the bourgeoisie and the landowners. With rare exceptions, the intelligentsia loyally served the classes from which it had sprung. The working people justly regarded the intelligentsia of those times as an “elite,” as a caste alien and inimical to the people, as partisans of the exploiters.

After the October Revolution there was a split in the intelligentsia. The advanced, progressive minority sided with the revolution. The reactionary intellectuals, closely bound up with the bourgeoisie, were hostile to Soviet power. Many emigrated and spent their last days away from their homes. Some remained in Russia and engaged in overt and covert struggle against socialism. The greater part of the old intelligentsia, after a long period of indecision, gradually and cautiously came over to the side of Soviet power.

In the years of socialist construction a new intelligentsia developed from among the workers and peasants. It was part of the people, the interests of the people were its interests, and it served the people.

The profound changes in the class structure of Soviet society brought about the socio-political and ideolo-

gical cohesion of Soviet people. This is one of the chief sources of the strength and power of the socialist system.

TO SOCIALISM, BY-PASSING CAPITALISM

One of the most important accomplishments of Soviet society in the twenty years after the October Revolution was the swift political, economic and cultural progress of the formerly backward peoples of Russia. In twenty years the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Far East who at the time of the Socialist Revolution in Russia were at the stage of feudalism, made a leap to socialism, bypassing the painful stage of capitalism. Together with the other peoples of the USSR and with their help they built a socialist society.

The transition to socialism, without going through the capitalist stage, was possible thanks to the consistent implementation of Lenin's policy on the national question. The non-Russian peoples were given an opportunity to establish their own national states—the main instrument for organizing and rallying the working masses for the struggle against the vestiges of feudalism and capitalist relations and for socialist construction. The national states and the Communist Parties in the Republics solved the problems of democratic and socialist construction with due account of the traditional and specific national peculiarities. Their attitude to the leftovers of tribal and other traditional institutions was one of understanding and these institutions were replaced gradually by organs of Soviet power. In a number of national areas, the courts of the *Sharya* or the court of *Cadi*, governed by religious principles, or the traditional law, were preserved for some time alongside the Soviet courts. The economic re-

forms in the Republics were also carried out more slowly. Consequently, landlord ownership of land in Central Russia was abolished in the first year of Soviet power but in the case of Central Asia, it was completed only in the second half of the twenties.

With all the variety of national forms and methods of Soviet administration, the basic and the decisive features were the same: industrialization, collectivization of peasant households and the cultural revolution.

The planned development of the economy, the necessity for balancing levels of economic advancement in Central Russia with those in the national provinces meant that industrialization had to be carried out faster in the national Republics.

The Union Government allocated proportionately more funds for the industrialization of the formerly backward Republics, and the pace of industrialization was therefore much higher in them than in the old industrial parts of the USSR.

Thanks to this policy and to the fraternal and generous help of the Russian people, the national Republics developed into advanced industrial areas within brief periods of time. In the course of the first two five-year plans, 380 factories, plants and power stations were built in the Uzbek SSR.

The Turkmen SSR which, before the revolution had no industry of any consequence, became an industrial Republic within two five-year plan periods and its industrial output began to account for more than two-thirds of overall output.

The collectivization of peasant households in the national Republics was also conducted at a pace and by methods which were carefully adapted to the local pe-

culiarities. While the prevailing form of collective farms in the central areas was the farming cooperative in which all the main means of production were socialized (the land, farming machines and implements and draught cattle) leaving in private ownership less important implements for the cultivation of individual plots of land, simpler forms of collective farms with a lower standard of socialization were, on the whole, established in the national areas. These were associations for the joint cultivation of land. It was only gradually, with the growing awareness of the peasants of the advantages of higher standards of cooperation, that the transition to farming cooperatives was effected.

By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan (1937) collectivization had been completed. Large-scale socialist agriculture supplied with modern machines had developed in all the Republics.

The cultural revolution in the Republics was also conducted at a faster rate because the population was more backward.

Before the revolution many of the nationalities inhabiting the outlying areas of the country were almost totally illiterate.

Illiteracy among the Kirghiz and Turkmens was more than 99 per cent, among the Uzbeks it was 98.5 per cent, among the Kazakhs 98, etc. Some forty nationalities had no written language at all. According to the 1939 census literacy among the population from nine years of age up amounted to 70 per cent, and even more, in the national Republics. All nationalities gained their own written languages, which facilitated their cultural advancement.

Before the revolution the number of schools in the Republics was extremely low as was the number of students.

In Turkmenia, for example, there were only 7,000 pupils in the 1914-15 school year. Many schools have been built in the Republic in the years of Soviet power and in 1940 they had an attendance of 252,000 (an increase of 36 times). In the Uzbek SSR the school enrolment in 1940 was almost 75 times as great as in 1914, and in the Tajik SSR it was almost 760 times as great.

With the exception of the Ukraine, the national Republics had no institutions of higher learning before the revolution. National academies of sciences have been instituted in all Republics.

National literature and the arts have advanced tremendously. Before the revolution, there were only two theatres and 20 film projecting installations in the Kazakh SSR, whereas the respective figures for 1940 were 40 and 1,268. Turkmenia and Armenia had no national theatre. By 1940 Turkmenia had 14 national theatres and Armenia 27.

Before the revolution neither Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, nor Armenia had maternity homes, nursery schools or mother and child welfare centres. By 1940 all Republics had a wide network of these and other medical institutions. Medical attention became accessible and was free of charge.

In 1914, there were only 291 physicians in Azerbaijan, but by 1940 there were 3,083 physicians there; the respective figures for the Uzbek SSR were 128 and 2,818, for the Tajik SSR—13 and 589, etc. The development of the medical services radically reduced mortality among children and adults and increased the lifespan of the population.

Socialism brought freedom, equality, prosperity and good health to the formerly oppressed nationalities.

IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING STANDARDS

The principal aim of Socialist Revolution could be summed up as follows: to render the working man free, well-off, educated and happy. *Everything for the working man*—was the slogan of the revolution.

As a result of the revolution and the building of socialism, the working people of Russia gained not only genuine political freedom; they also got material and cultural benefits which improved their living conditions in many ways.

On the fourth day after the Socialist Revolution the eight-hour working day (6 hours for adolescents under 18 of age) was instituted, annual paid holidays were introduced, and sickness and unemployment insurance at state expense and at the expense of the employers. Soviet power prohibited the employment of young people under 16 years of age and introduced equal pay for men and women.

Hundreds of thousands of families of workers living in crowded slums, in basements and barracks before the revolution were moved to comfortable homes which had belonged to the bourgeoisie. The Soviet state nationalized medical institutions, dispensaries, clinics and health resorts and ensured the entire population free and efficient medical service.

The revolution brought particularly big material benefits to the peasantry. Lenin noted in 1919 that "those who were the first to gain, to gain most, and gain immediately from the dictatorship of the proletariat, were the peasantry as a whole. The peasant in Russia starved under the landowners and capitalists. Throughout the long cen-

turies of our history, the peasant never had an opportunity to work for himself: he starved while handing over hundreds of millions of pounds of grain to the capitalists, for the cities and for export. The peasant *for the first time*, has been working for himself and *feeding better than the city dweller* under the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the first time the peasant has seen real freedom—freedom to eat his bread, freedom from starvation."

Industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture ensured a considerable improvement in the living standards of the people.

A major sign of the radical improvement in the position of the working people was the full and ultimate abolition of exploitation of man by man. The working people of the USSR became free, they began to work for themselves, and for society as a whole, not for individual exploiters.

The second remarkable achievement of the Soviet people was the full and final eradication of unemployment. In April 1929, there were still 1.7 million unemployed in the USSR, but the vast scale of industrial construction led to the disappearance of unemployment by 1931. Since then the Soviet Union has had no unemployed.

The constant growth of the national income became the main source of improvement of the material well-being of the Soviet people. In 1940 the national income surpassed the 1913 level more than six-fold. Since there are no exploiting elements in the USSR, the entire national income is shared in the interests of the working people: approximately 75 per cent of the national income goes to the working people in the form of wages and salaries, and 25 per cent is assigned for capital investment,

education, public health, social maintenance, housing, defence, etc.

Alongside the growth of the national income, the real income of the working people, which comprises many things, has also grown: these are wages, social insurance payments, various bonuses, pensions, grants, paid holidays, free education, free health services, free or reduced-rate accommodation at sanatoriums and holiday homes, low rent and low payment for communal services.

Before the revolution, rent and the communal services took up 20, and at times 30 per cent of the budget of a worker's family. Under Soviet power this share has dropped to one-fifth or one-sixth. Every year payments to working people over and above their wages or salaries at the expense of the state, i.e. social insurance and social maintenance benefits, pensions, bonuses, grants to mothers of many children and unmarried mothers, etc., increase. While in 1928 the state spent two thousand million roubles on these purposes, the amount spent in 1940 was 41 thousand million roubles.

An important gain of socialism is free medical attention. In 1940 the Soviet people had the services of almost 142,000 physicians (not counting dentists) at their disposal, as against only 23,000 in 1913. In tsarist Russia there was one physician per ten thousand of population, whereas in 1940 the figure was 7 per ten thousand. The number of hospital beds in 1940 was almost 791,000 (not counting military hospitals) while in 1913 it was 207,000. In the event of illness factory and office workers receive not only free medical assistance at home, not only free treatment and food at hospital, but temporary disablement benefit of up to 90 per cent of wages or salary. In the event of

temporary disability caused by an occupational injury or disease, the benefit is 100 per cent of salary.

Soviet power shows great solicitude for the mother and child. A network of maternity homes and consultation centres for women has been developed in the country and women are given free medical assistance before and after the birth of a child. All women are granted paid maternity leave of up to 4 months, with an extension on the doctor's recommendation if there is a multiple birth or if the delivery is attended by complications. Mothers of many children—three or more, receive a monthly state grant for the fourth and every subsequent child. On the birth of the third and every subsequent child, mothers also receive a maternity grant from the state. There is a wide network of state-owned nursery schools and crèches for working women.

Socialism has created a secure life for the working people.

THE NEW, SOVIET MAN

A new type of man has developed in the course of socialist construction. For this man, service to society has become the purpose and meaning of life. The Soviet system has produced people with a new mentality. The characteristic features of the new Soviet man include loyalty to the ideas of socialism, devotion to the people, love for the homeland, a desire for peace, courage, daring, staunchness, the spirit of collectivism, and a cultured outlook.

A moving illustration of the remarkable features of the Soviet man is provided by the heroic saga of the

Chelyuskin. On July 12, 1933, an expedition led by the outstanding scientist Otto Schmidt sailed from Leningrad on board the *Chelyuskin*, a large freighter fitted out for sailing in the ice. The aim of the expedition was to traverse the entire Northern Sea Route—from Murmansk to the Bering Strait—in one navigation.

Conditions in the Arctic, however, proved to be bad, and in September the *Chelyuskin* was locked in the ice. On February 13, 1934, the ship sank, having been crushed by ice floes. Without panic or undue haste, the 103 members of the expedition, including women and children, landed on an ice floe in an orderly manner. With them they took a store of food, fuel, tents, etc.

So deep in the Arctic, at the time of the Arctic night, there appeared an ice camp—"Schmidt Camp," where Soviet people lived and worked for two months. Although conditions were extremely difficult, they did not lose heart. "Don't give in!" became their motto and this was the name of a wall newspaper they issued at the camp.

The Chelyuskinites displayed exceptional courage, a high degree of organization, discipline and collectivism. Research work did not stop for a single day at the camp.

The rescue operations were supervised by a special Government commission. Aircraft, ice-breakers and sledge transport were used. In six days, overcoming tremendous difficulties, seven Soviet pilots—M. Vodopyanov, I. Doronin, N. Kamanin, S. Levanevsky, A. Lyapidevsky, M. Molokov and M. Slepnev—took out by air all the inhabitants of "Schmidt Camp." V. V. Kuibyshev, Chairman of the Special Commission of the Government, said on this occasion: "The rescue of the Chelyuskinites is the most heroic feat of our Soviet fliers."

The Soviet state highly appreciated the heroism of

the pilots who rescued the Chelyuskinites, and they were awarded the honoured title of Hero of the Soviet Union. They were the first seven Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The family of Heroes of the Soviet Union grew. In 1937 this coveted title was conferred on outstanding Soviet pilots V. Chkalov, A. Belyakov and A. Baidukov, who made a 62-hour non-stop flight on an ANT-25 aircraft from Moscow to the United States of America.

In 1938 four well-known Arctic explorers: I. Papanin, E. Krenkel, E. Fyodorov, P. Shirshov, were awarded the title. For 274 days they conducted scientific observations on a drifting ice floe in the North Pole area.

In September 1938 three Soviet women, Valentina Grizodubova, Polina Osipenko and Marina Raskova made a heroic non-stop flight over a distance of 5,908 kilometres. Our homeland bestowed on them the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Soviet people's sentiments of profound love for the motherland and their readiness to perform heroic feats for the good of the people were expressed by poet V. I. Lebedev-Kumach:

"We shall achieve every aim and desire,
Explore the seas and the vast frozen North,
And if it's heroes our people require,
Each Soviet citizen a hero will go forth!"

DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE USSR

The victory of socialism made it possible to carry out further democratization of the socio-political system of the USSR, to remove the temporary restrictions of neces-

sity placed on democracy at a time of acute class struggle when leftovers of the exploiting classes still remained in the country.

Socialist democracy was given legal shape in the supreme law of the state—the 1936 Constitution. The drafting of the Constitution was conducted in a truly democratic way. The draft was prepared by a special board and published for a nation-wide discussion, which lasted for about half a year and in which more than 50 million people took part. There is no precedent in history of the people participating in the preparation of the Constitution of a state on such a scale.

The Soviet people gave their complete approval of the draft Constitution. Numerous amendments, addenda, and other drafting changes were put forward in the course of the nation-wide discussion, and many of them were incorporated in the final text. The Congress of Soviets of the USSR adopted the Constitution on December 5, 1936.

The new Constitution set the legal seal on the basic principles of socialism. Article I of the Constitution reads: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants. The political foundation of the USSR is formed by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies: from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—the highest organ of power—to the Local Soviets. The economic foundation of the USSR comprises the socialist system of economy, socialist ownership of the means of production, planned management."

The Constitution of 1936 proclaimed that work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen and laid down the main principle of socialism: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." The Constitution guarantees the citizens of the USSR the right to work, to education, to rest and to leisure, the right to main-

tenance in old age, and also in case of sickness or loss of working capacity. Women were granted equal rights with men in all spheres of life. The equality of citizens irrespective of their nationality or race was established as law. Citizens of the USSR were guaranteed inviolability of person, and homes, and privacy of correspondence, democratic freedoms, freedom of speech, of the press, freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings, street processions and demonstrations, and the right to unite in public organizations.

The Constitution imposed certain duties on the citizens of the USSR: to abide by the Constitution, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, to respect the rules of socialist society, to safeguard and strengthen socialist property. "To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR," the Constitution proclaims.

The 1936 Constitution established as law the democratic nature of the Soviet electoral system. Elections to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, from the rural and town Soviet to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, are conducted on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and he is liable to be recalled by the electors if he does not justify the confidence of the electors. The Constitution abolished the restrictions on electoral rights for the non-working people, and the existing privileges of urban electors over rural electors.

On December 12, 1937, the Soviet people elected the first Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the basis of the new electoral system. The Communist Party formed a bloc with the non-Party people and with them nominated jointly approved candidates in all electoral areas. Al-

most 97 per cent of the electors participated in the elections and 98.7 per cent cast their votes for the deputies of the electoral block of Communists and non-Party members. A total of 1,143 deputies representing 62 nationalities of the USSR were elected to the Soviet Parliament. They included 42 per cent of workers, 29.5 per cent of peasants, and 28.5 per cent of representatives of intelligentsia. There were 187 women among the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In 1938 elections were held to the Supreme Soviets in the Union and Autonomous Republics, and in 1939—to the local Soviets of Working People's Deputies. This completed the reorganization of the organs of state power on the basis of the new Constitution—the Constitution of triumphant socialism.

XI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE DEFEAT OF FASCISM

MORTAL DANGER

By the beginning of the forties socialism had in the main been built in the Soviet Union. Material and cultural standards were rising rapidly, and the people were enjoying the fruits of their labour. The prospects of economic expansion spurred them on to fresh big achievements, and there was general enthusiasm at the announcement that the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government on February 22, 1941, instructed the State Planning Commission to draw up an overall economic development plan for a fifteen-year period.

The fulfilment of this plan would have greatly facilitated creating the material and technical basis for communism to go over at some future date to the communist principle of sharing out the material and cultural wealth of society according to need. But in exactly four months—on June 22 that year—the peaceful endeavours of the Soviet people were disrupted by the treacherous attack by nazi Germany.

German imperialism had nurtured the idea of world domination for many years. By the time it attacked the USSR, Germany, then under the control of the extremely reactionary and bellicose Nazi Party headed by Hitler, had made use of the military and industrial potential built up in the twenties and thirties by foreign capital, primarily American and British, to take over almost the whole of Europe and secure for itself Europe's entire economic and manpower resources for the furtherance of its aggressive aims.

The Soviet Union was blocking Germany's path to world dominion. "If we are to create our great German Empire," Hitler openly declared, "we must oust and exterminate the Slav nations—the Russians, the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovenes, the Bulgarians, the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians..."

In July 1940, Hitler requested the High Command of the German infantry to work out a plan for war against the Soviet Union, and on December 18 that year he approved the plan, which was given the code name *Barbarossa*. It envisaged a sudden crushing blow against the USSR, the encirclement and annihilation of Soviet troops on the western border, the rapid advance of nazi armies into the heart of the USSR and the seizure of major economic and political centres such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. The war was to end victoriously in 6-8 weeks—a blitzkrieg was planned.

Altogether 190 divisions, more than 3,500 tanks, 5,000 military planes and 50,000 guns and mortars were concentrated on the Soviet frontier. The Non-Aggression Pact concluded in 1939 between the Soviet Union and Germany was violated and at dawn on June 22, 1941, the fascist armies crossed the Soviet border on an extensive front from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.

But Hitler seriously miscalculated, and in starting the war against the Soviet Union he signed his own death warrant. The very first battles fought by Soviet troops on the border went down in the annals of the Second World War as unfading chapters of heroism. On the land, in the air and on the sea our people engaged in mortal combat with an experienced and cunning enemy.

The border troops bore the brunt of the first blows, the Brest garrison winning immortal fame. A handful of men defended the beleaguered fortress for more than a month, wearing down two enemy divisions.

"I am dying, but I shall not surrender. Farewell, my native land. 20.7.41." This inscription was written by an unknown hero, one of the last of the defenders of the Brest Fortress.

On June 26, 1941, pilot Nikolai Gastello and his crew also revealed true heroism. As their plane was returning from a bombing raid on the German rear it was hit by enemy flak, and burst into flames. The airmen could have saved themselves by baling out, but they would have ended up as nazi prisoners. Instead they rammed their blazing aircraft into a column of German army lorries, fuel containers and a number of tanks. The fascists paid dearly for their deaths.

But despite the heroism of the Soviet troops the initial battles did not go in their favour. They suffered great losses of men and materiel and were forced to retreat in the course of bitter fighting. On occupied territory the nazis began to commit monstrous crimes. They murdered civilians—women, children and old folk. Train-loads of young people of both sexes were taken off for slave labour in Germany. The wealth created by the hands of the Soviet people was plundered and despatched

to Germany, too. The first socialist state in the world was in mortal danger.

How did this come about?

The chief reason was that the war began in conditions favourable to Germany. When the Soviet Union was attacked Germany had been waging war in Europe for two years, its armed forces were fully mobilized and were experienced in conducting large-scale military operations. Germany's economy had been on a war footing for a long while, and was entirely geared to the war effort. She had access to the resources of almost all Europe, and apart from that she had satellite allies—Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland—who were fighting on her side against the USSR. The Soviet Army not only had to fight alone against the fascist bloc in the west, but also had to maintain huge forces in the Far East and the Transcaucasus for fear of attacks by Japan and Turkey.

When the Soviet Union was plunged into the war its armed forces were not mobilized, and this had to be done while the war was in progress. The Red Army had no experience of major operations, and had to get it in action. Furthermore, the repressive measures unjustifiably undertaken in the latter half of the thirties—first on the initiative of the careerist Yezhov and then under the guidance of Beria, a political adventurer and provocateur—had robbed the Red Army of many of its best military and political leaders, people who had got their baptism of fire in the Civil War and had studied in Soviet military academies. The young officers who took their place lacked sufficient military experience and training.

Steps were not taken in time to reorganize the powerful Soviet economy to provide the army with weapons, ammunition, although it was in a position to do so. Mass

production of the new, highly effective types of tanks, planes, artillery, mortars and tommy guns designed by Soviet scientists and engineers had hardly begun, and the economy was only militarized after the war had started.

The element of surprise also gave Germany a big military advantage.

But however important all these advantages were they could not have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war against so great a power as the Soviet Union. In the very first days of war it became clear that the Soviet rear stood firm and unshakeable. The terrible setbacks at the front in the early period did not weaken the alliance between the peasants and workers, did not undermine the friendship between the nationalities of the Soviet Union; on the contrary they were strengthened. The morale of the Soviet Army was always far better than that of the nazis. The Soviet troops were fighting a just, patriotic war for the defence of their socialist homeland, and for that they spared neither their blood nor their lives.

With its powerful planned socialist economy the Soviet Union was capable of producing everything needed to rout the enemy. What had to be done was to neutralize the temporary enemy's advantages and utilize the advantages of the Soviet socialist system. This was the main aim of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government during the initial period of the war.

THE PEOPLE RISE TO DEFEND THEIR STATE

The people as a whole were deeply aware of the grave threat hanging over the country, and at the call of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government they rose to defend the freedom, honour and independence of the state of the working people.

The planned Soviet economy based on public ownership of factories and plants permitted the Soviet Union to switch the overwhelming majority of industrial enterprises to supplying the front. In 1941 more than 1,560 big factories were evacuated from near-frontline areas to the East, and workers and engineering staff went with them—an operation that required nearly one and a half million railway trucks. The evacuated workers and engineers put in heroic work to get the factories running and supplying arms to the front.

Millions of women took over from the men who had left their factories and offices for the front, and they quickly mastered the jobs of their husbands, fathers and brothers. Pensioners returned to the factories, and the grim reality of war compelled teen-agers to man lathes and machines.

The movement of *Two-Hundred Per Centers* and *Three Hundred Per Centers* spread fast, as more and more workers undertook to fulfil not only their own daily quota but that of one, two or more of their comrades who had gone to the front. Millions of people learnt additional trades and became all-rounders. "Frontline" teams were formed in the factories, which substantially overfulfilled their output quotas, and the movement spread to all industries and agriculture as workers vied for the right to such a title. It became the ambition and the duty of every one to work in a "frontline" way, to help supply the front with everything required for the defeat of a cruel, ruthless enemy. People put everything into the job—they worked 12-14 hours a day, sometimes without leaving the shop for days on end. Many slept right there in the factory, bringing camp-beds with them from home.

Soviet farmers also did their bit for the country.

Thanks to the collective farm system, to collective labour, the farmers of the Soviet Union succeeded in carrying out all the agricultural work in 1941 despite the fact that a good part of the manpower and machinery had been taken from the farms for the front. They gathered in the harvest and sowed considerably larger areas of grain in the East of the country, and great numbers of cattle were driven eastwards from danger zones.

Soviet patriotism showed itself in a variety of ways. One way was the creation of the defence fund. Town and country dwellers gave up part of their wages to the fund, presented their loan certificates to the state, handed in valuables, etc. In autumn 1941, when it began to get cold, the public collected a mass of warm clothing and sent it off to the front. From the rear people sent parcels and letters, encouraging the troops to hit mercilessly at the enemy and bring victory nearer.

The Communist Party sent hundreds of thousands of Communists and Komsomol members to the most dangerous sectors of the front, and by the end of 1941 there were 1,300,000 Communists and more than two million Komsomol members fighting in the Red Army.

"Ours is a just cause. We shall be victorious." This was the thought of every Soviet person. And each one did what he could for victory.

Increasing numbers of reinforcements went to the front, better armed and equipped each time. In areas near the front people's volunteer detachments were formed on a town and regional basis. On occupied territory an extensive partisan movement developed under the leadership of underground Communist organizations. "The People's Avengers," as the partisans became known, undermined the fascist rear, disrupted German commun-

cations and helped the Soviet Army to defeat the hated enemy. The word "partisan" made the nazis' blood run cold.

EVERYONE IN THE WAR EFFORT

Month by month the troops of the Soviet Army became more battle-hardened, powerful and efficient. They dealt the enemy blows of increasing force. This was largely due to the fact that the rear was constantly growing stronger and was improving supplies to the Soviet Army of all that it required to conduct the war and defeat the enemy.

The war was a stern test for the Soviet economic system, but it stood up well to it, showing that it not only had unlimited potential for development in peace time but was capable of rapidly regearing for war and extending the production of the goods needed for defence while already engaged in a terrible war.

The first year of the war was one of great difficulties and severe ordeals for the Soviet state and its economic system. The enemy succeeded in temporarily capturing an immense territory where before the war 88 million people had lived, which had accounted for 46 per cent of the country's industrial output and 47 per cent of its crop area, and in which about half the country's cattle was concentrated.

The most critical period was the end of 1941. The occupation of a number of important industrial areas and the evacuation of many factories to the East meant that hundreds of large plants producing machines, metal, arms, ammunition and so on were out of commission. In November 1941, industrial production was only half what it had been in June that year; the smelting of pig iron

dropped to 30 per cent of the previous figure and of steel to 40 per cent; rolled steel output was less than a third of what it was previously.

Nevertheless the Soviet Union stood firm. The superiority of the socialist economic system revealed itself to the full, and the working class, collective farmers, everyone working in the rear displayed unprecedented patriotism and heroism in their work.

The Soviet economy was quickly put on a war footing. In a matter of weeks factories were evacuated to the East and started up again. By December 1941, production had ceased to decline and in March the following year a swift increase set in. By March 1942, the Soviet Union was producing more planes, tanks and guns than Germany.

From the first half of 1942 the new industrial development in the East took on tremendous scope. Between 1942 and 1944, 2,250 factories, power stations, mines and other major industrial enterprises were constructed and put into operation. Building went on at a fantastic rate—two to three times faster than in peacetime. Some construction jobs became a really national undertaking. For example, nearly 70,000 collective farmers went to Central Asia in the winter of 1943 to build the Farkhad Hydro-power Station. When the Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Station was being built, the entire able-bodied population of the town took part.

While many new plants were being built, old ones were being reconstructed, enlarged and adapted for new types of production. Take the acute problem which arose of keeping defence industry supplied with high-grade metal—special types of pig iron, armour plating, quality and compound steel, hard alloys, etc. The main producer of high-grade metal—the Ukraine—was temporarily oc-

cupied by the nazis, which put Soviet defence industry in a very tight corner.

Thanks to the efforts of Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians and workers at iron and steel plants in the Urals and Siberia the manufacture of special types of steel was soon begun. Soviet rolling mills started to turn out armour plating of the required thickness and configuration. For the first time in the history of the iron and steel industry ferro-chromium and other ferrous alloys began to be smelted in blast furnaces, and also nickel and other types of compound pig iron. Consequently the iron and steel industry in the eastern areas of the country was able to satisfy to the full the constantly growing demand of the defence industry for high-grade metal.

The enthusiasm of the designers, technologists, engineers and workers very much hastened the process of designing new types of arms and putting them into production. One example was a new model of a heavy tank, which took 51 days from the beginning of the designing work to the moment it was put into quantity production.

Heroic efforts of workers in industry boosted labour productivity. Between 1942 and 1944 it increased by 40 per cent, growing at a rate almost three times that of peacetime.

The achievements in the Soviet socialist economy provided the material basis for military victory. During the war years Soviet industry supplied the front with 446,000 guns, 136,000 planes and more than 102,000 tanks and self-propelled cannon.

Some people who want to belittle the role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism deliberately distort the facts, asserting that the bulk of the military equipment for the Soviet Army was supplied by Bri-

tain and the USA. This, of course, is not true. During the war the USA and Britain supplied the Soviet Union with 9,600 guns (less than 2 per cent of the number produced by Soviet industry), 18,700 planes (about 12 per cent) and 10,800 tanks (10 per cent). We by no means want to underrate the significance of that aid—it was extremely useful to us, especially in the early part of the war. But important as it was, the amount supplied by the Allies bore no comparison with what was provided by the Soviet rear.

The collective farmers spared no effort for victory. Despite the fact that the farms had far fewer people and machines and that major agricultural areas had been occupied, the collective farms adequately supplied the army and the country as a whole with grain, vegetables, meat, and other produce.

An invaluable contribution to the defeat of the enemy was made by non-manual workers—scientists, designers and engineers—who saw to it that the army had first-class types of armaments. The optical experts, for example, devised new high quality optical instruments. Chemists found new ways of making transparent plastics for armouring, and worked out methods of producing new explosives. Geologists discovered deposits of coal, oil, gas, iron ore, manganese and non-ferrous metals. Doctors worked tirelessly to perfect methods of treating wounds and produced many new, highly effective medicines. As a result nearly 70 per cent of our wounded soldiers returned to active service after treatment. Every Soviet patriot, wherever he might be, did as much as he could for the cause of victory.

The Soviet Army was backed by an extremely powerful and reliable rear, and this was the basis of its victories on the battlefield.

The Great Patriotic War fought by the Soviet Union against nazi Germany ended in complete victory for the Soviet people.

WHY WAS THE SOVIET UNION VICTORIOUS?

The USSR won a great victory in the fight against nazi Germany and her accomplices, and saved its own people and those of the entire world from fascist enslavement.

What were the reasons for this great victory?

The main reason for the economic, political and military might of the Soviet Union was the socialist system. The victory of socialism enabled the Soviet people to overcome Russia's economic, cultural and military backwardness. In the course of the pre-war five-year plans the Soviet Union was transformed into a great industrial and agricultural power. Socialist ownership of the means of production and the planned character of economy enabled the working people's state to militarize its economy rapidly and to produce the goods needed for victory and on the required scale. Planning meant close coordination of economy and efficient administration, so that it was possible to remove whole factories, on an unprecedented scale, from threatened areas in the West to the East and to get them running at full capacity on their new sites, and at the same time to engage in new industrial building on a vast scale.

The socialist system was the chief reason for the economic and military victory of the USSR in its mortal combat with nazi Germany.

The collective farm system demonstrated its strength and stability in those years, supplying the army and the urban population with foodstuffs.

The socialist system educated Soviet people in the spirit of patriotism, which inspired workers, peasants and intellectuals to heroic feats of labour in the rear and soldiers and officers to magnificent deeds of valour in battle.

The socialist system established equality of all races and nations and engendered a feeling of friendship of all the peoples of the USSR, in contrast to the Nazis' appalling nationalism and race hatred. The war was a stern test for the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet peoples, the viability of the multi-national state of workers and peasants. The peoples of the Soviet Union rose as one in defence of their socialist country, rightly considering it a life-and-death cause for each one of them. Sons and daughters of all the Soviet peoples fought shoulder to shoulder in the army and navy. Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Uzbeks, people of all nationalities worked hard in the rear to produce supplies for the front. And in the common struggle against the fascist invaders the friendship between those nationalities consolidated, and the socialist state gained in strength.

The Soviet people won victory because they were able to build up a first-class army and equip it with the most modern weapons. The army of workers and peasants, inspired with the awareness of their great mission of liberation, they displayed the most wonderful heroism and self-sacrifice. More than seven million soldiers, sailors, officers, generals and admirals were decorated with Soviet orders and medals, and 11,520 performed outstanding feats for which they received the supreme award of the USSR—the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union won victory because the Communist Party was its leading and guiding force both in the years of peaceful construction and in time of war. About 60 per cent of all the Communists were in the army or navy,

and by personal example inspired and united the ranks of those who did not belong to the Party. The Communists were assigned the most responsible tasks of all, and they carried them out with honour.

The Soviet people believed fervently in their Party and followed it without hesitation. No wonder that in the grim days of war, when the very existence of the Soviet state was threatened, about nine million people became candidate members and members of the Party.

After achieving victory in the Second World War the Soviet people resumed peaceful construction.

XII. THE COUNTRY RISES AGAIN FROM THE ASHES

THE WOUNDS OF WAR

The Soviet Union emerged from the war with severe wounds. A vast territory—from Murmansk in the north to Odessa and the Caucasus in the south, from the western border to the approaches to Moscow and the Volga—had been devastated. The nazi occupation troops had laid waste 1,710 towns and townships, burnt and plundered 70,000 villages, reduced about 32,000 industrial enterprises to heaps of rubble, including 750 engineering works and 61 power stations. Ruins were all that was left of such major iron and steel works in the south as Zaporozhstal, Azovstal, and the Kirov Factory at Makeyevka, which before the war had accounted for more than 70 per cent of all Soviet steel output. The enemy had destroyed or flooded thousands of pits from which about 60 per cent of the country's coal had come. In their retreat under the blows of the Soviet Army, the nazis had destroyed 65,000 kilometres of

railway track, ruined 4,100 railway stations and made more than 90,000 kilometres of highway unusable.

Agriculture suffered frightful losses: the nazis laid waste and plundered 1,876 state farms, 2,890 state machine-and-tractor stations, and 98,000 collective farms, and slaughtered or drove off to Germany 71 million head of livestock. There was also terrible destruction of buildings used for cultural and medical purposes, and of housing.

Estimates put the direct damage suffered as a result of the plunder and destruction of property belonging to state enterprises and institutions, collective farms, mass organizations and individuals in the region of 679,000 million roubles (calculated in pre-war prices). If to this we add the direct military expenditure of the Soviet state and the loss of revenue to the national economy during the war, we find that the total material loss suffered by the Soviet Union at the hands of nazi Germany amounted to the staggering figure of 2,600,000,000,000 roubles—the equivalent of twelve times the Soviet Union's budget revenue for 1941. The war unleashed by the nazis held the Soviet Union back at least by 10-12 years.

It is possible to calculate the material losses sustained and make up those losses by the efforts of the people. But there is no way of measuring the people's grief. There was not a family in the Soviet Union that did not weep for a father, a brother, a daughter or a mother killed at the front, tortured, hanged, buried alive by the fascist monsters on occupied territory or annihilated in the death camps of Auschwitz, Maidanek or one of the many others. Twenty million Soviet citizens were killed. Millions of men and women were driven off into slavery to Germany and separated from their families, and were awaiting return to their Motherland.

BACK TO PEACEFUL ENDEAVOURS

The Soviet people had a hard time of it in the immediate post-war years. Millions of people in towns and villages in the liberated areas took refuge in dugouts, and the houses left intact were filled to overflowing. There were food shortages and people had only worn-out shoes and clothing. Food and consumer goods were strictly rationed. But having stood up to the ordeals of war, the people bore these difficulties with fortitude and were quite determined to overcome them as quickly as possible and make their country stronger and more prosperous than before.

In June 1945, demobilization started, and trainloads of demobilized soldiers kept arriving from Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Prague and other European towns. The people of the liberated countries gratefully bade their liberators farewell.

The state displayed great concern for the demobilized soldiers and officers. Each one received a substantial gratuity and was provided with a job either where he had worked before the war or in a new place, and for a wage or salary at least equal to his pre-war earnings. In areas which had been under nazi occupation they were provided with free timber to build houses and given an interest-free loan.

Post-war demobilization was complete by March 1948, the army being reduced to the minimum necessary to defend the country.

With the end of the war the state of emergency was lifted in the Soviet Union. Industrial enterprises which had been on war production gradually went over to the manufacture of goods needed for peace. The eight-hour working day was proclaimed, and overtime working,

introduced during the war banned. Industrial and office workers began to get paid holidays again—these had been suspended during the war years, and people had received monetary compensation instead.

On February 10, 1946, the first post-war elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held, and they aroused great political enthusiasm. Almost all the electors voted (99.7 per cent), and unanimously cast their votes for the candidates of the communist and non-communist bloc.

In March 1946, the first session of the Supreme Soviet (Second Convocation) took place, and it examined and endorsed the Five-Year Plan for the rehabilitation and development of the economy in the period 1946-50. The fourth in the line of Soviet five-year plans, it had as its main task the restoration of devastated parts of the country, attainment of the pre-war level of industrial and agricultural production and subsequently an almost 50 per cent increase on that level.

It also contained major provisions for improving the material welfare and cultural standards of the people. It envisaged the abolition of rationing of foodstuffs and manufactured goods and a changeover to extensive trading free of restrictions. The pre-war standard of living was not merely to be restored but significantly bettered.

POST-WAR REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY

Twice the Soviet Union has had to reconstruct its industry. The first time was in the twenties, after the First World War, foreign intervention and Civil War. The second was after the Second World War.

We spoke earlier about industrial rehabilitation in the

twenties. What was characteristic of the second rehabilitation period?

First of all the eastern areas of the country had been industrialized before the war and had made tremendous advances in this respect during the war years. By 1945 the industrial output of the East was twice that in 1940. Trainloads of building materials, machinery and equipment, fuel and raw materials flowed in a rising torrent from the Urals, the Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia to the factories in the West. The eastern areas took the ravaged western parts of the country under their wing, and helped related enterprises in the West.

Second, reconstruction work began while the war was still on; as occupied territory was liberated a start was made to get power stations, factories, coal and ore mines going. By the end of the war more than 7,500 industrial enterprises in formerly occupied areas were back in action. The Stalingrad Tractor Works was already producing tractors synthetic rubber was being manufactured at the Efremov Plant, the Kharkov Machine-Tool Building Factory was turning out grinding tools. The factories that had been brought back to life did a good job in helping the resurgence of industry and the economy in general throughout the liberated territory.

Third, despite immense losses of skilled workers and qualified engineers and technicians, many more had been trained during the war. Besides, military victory gave rise to tremendous enthusiasm among workers.

Finally, economic reconstruction took place at a time when the socialist system of economy prevailed absolutely in all spheres. It proceeded in accordance with the overall plan, which meant the most efficient use of material, money and manpower. The plan laid down priorities and

the starting and finishing dates of rehabilitation work in the interests of the economy as a whole.

Thanks to these features, resulting from the triumph of socialism in the USSR, post-war industrial reconstruction was speedily completed. For example, by the end of 1946 all the Leningrad plants producing machines and machine tools were back in operation, and most of them at full capacity.

Work went on at full blast to reconstruct the Dnieper Dam and Power Station, with many of those who had helped build the scheme in the thirties in charge. So much ingenuity and invention went into this undertaking, so many original technical methods were introduced by engineers and workers to get the hydropower station going as rapidly as possible! In March 1947, the first turbo-generator started up, and by the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan the Dnieper scheme was producing 95,000 kw more than before the war. The most powerful station in Europe, it breathed life into hundreds of rehabilitated factories.

The Donbass, the country's main coal field, was very quickly put in running order. There the miners pumped 650 million cubic metres of water from the flooded pits—enough to fill a 10-metre-deep lake with a surface area of 70 square kilometres.

Thanks to the heroic efforts of the workers, industry, which had been so heavily damaged during the war, was in the main restored by the end of the forties. Thousands of factories, pits and power stations were operating again, on a modern technical basis.

Nazi general Stülpnagel reported callously in a despatch to Hitler in 1943: "Russia will require 25 years to restore what we have ruined."

This rabid nazi miscalculated, as did the ruling cir-

cles in the imperialist states, which based their policy on the assumption that the Soviet Union would take a long time to heal the wounds inflicted on her economy by the nazi occupation.

The Soviet people did more than get back rapidly to the pre-war level of industrial output. In the course of the first postwar five years they accomplished a great deal of new industrial building and increased production at existing plants.

In all coal fields new mines were constructed and old ones re-equipped. In 1948 Soviet designers and workers produced a coal combine which mechanized cutting and also loading on to the conveyor. Oil fields in the area known as the "Second Baku"—between the Urals and the Volga—were intensively developed. In April 1949, the first oil well sunk by Azerbaijan oilmen in the bed of the Caspian Sea gave oil. Power engineering construction went fast ahead, and under the Five-Year Plan power stations with a total capacity of 8,400,000 kw were put into operation. That was equal to the capacity of all Soviet power stations in 1937.

Among the industrial enterprises that went into operation during the same period were four tractor works, two motor plants and a number of engineering, iron and steel, and chemical factories. Altogether more than 6,000 major industrial enterprises were reconstructed or built, apart from a whole host of smaller ones.

Industrial output growth rates in the USSR were extremely high, due to speedy reconstruction and the commissioning of new enterprises. In 1946 the increase was 20 per cent, in 1947, 22 per cent, and in 1948, 27 per cent. In October 1947—ahead of the time laid down in

the plan—average monthly industrial output was up to the pre-war 1940 figure, and in 1948 the pre-war annual output figure was surpassed. In 1950, the last year of the plan, industrial production was 70 per cent up of the pre-war level, as against the 48 per cent envisaged by the plan.

REVIVAL OF AGRICULTURE

Agriculture was confronted with great difficulties after the war. The crop area had been reduced and yields had fallen. In 1945 agricultural output amounted to only 60 per cent of the 1940 figure. There were only two-thirds the number of agricultural machines and tractors, and those that were left were worn out, for scarcely any new ones had been supplied to agriculture during the war. There were only about half as many horses as there had been, and on many farms in formerly occupied territory cows had to be harnessed so that the fields could be ploughed and sown in spring 1946. Numbers of able-bodied people on the farms had dropped drastically for millions of them had been killed in battle. It is clear, therefore, why Soviet agriculture was in difficulties at the end of the war and then came the drought of 1946 to make matters far worse.

Despite everything, all the collective and state farms on liberated territory were restored, as were almost all the machine-and-tractor stations. Tractors and other vehicles and agricultural machines were despatched to the ravaged areas, along with pedigree cattle, seed and fodder.

By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan agriculture had more machinery than before the war; in 1951 there were nearly 600,000 tractors, 10 per cent more than before

the war, and 211,000 grain combines—16 per cent more.

Gradually the crop area was extended, fodder supplies were put on a sounder basis, and the head of livestock increased. Cattle sheds, stores and mechanized threshing floors were constructed, as well as clubs, libraries, houses of culture, residential quarters, schools, hospitals, etc.

At the Communist Beacon Collective Farm, in the Stavropol Territory, a chronicle was kept of the outstanding events of each year. Here are some typical entries:

“1946. Began reconstruction work in Buruni. Built six houses, a school, a club, two storehouses and an office.

“A Chukhno, Chairman of the farm, elected deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

“1947. Stud farm set up. Planted out a vineyard in no. 3 sector, covering an area of 21.5 acres, and another of 12.5 acres in Buruni. A poultry farm constructed. Radio and telephone services laid on to sectors 2 and 3.

“1948. Old people's home opened.

“Planted out 31 acres of orchard. Built a new poultry farm. Planted avenue of poplars.

“1949. A mill, a poultry farm and a sheepfold built at Buruni. Collective farm brass band formed.

“1950. Acquired a saw frame, built a creamery.”

This, of course, is one of the better farms. But to a greater or lesser degree similar restoration work was going on everywhere. By 1950 all the Soviet Union's collective and state farms and machine-and-tractor stations were on the whole reconstructed and equipped with material and equipment. There were by this time more buildings in the villages for cultural and educational purposes—schools, libraries, clubs—than in 1940.

Nevertheless, the consequences of the war were still telling adversely upon the whole of our agriculture.

COUNTRY IN CONSTRUCTION

The successful restoration and further development of the economy created the necessary conditions for improving the material welfare and cultural level of the people.

In December 1947, wartime rationing was abolished. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan prices of foodstuffs and mass consumer goods were three times reduced, which was of great material benefit to the public.

Growth of national income is the basis for raising living standards. In addition to the price cuts, which meant a rapid increase in real earnings, state allocations for social and cultural undertaking rose considerably.

Throughout the country, houses, schools, clubs, nurseries and nursery schools, hospitals and so on were being constructed. Between 1946 and 1950 a total of 100 million square metres of housing—roughly equivalent to two and a half million three-room flats—were built or reconstructed. In the same period 2,700,000 homes were built or reconstructed in the countryside. Overall, then, 25-30 million people were rehoused in town and country, but despite that there was still an acute housing shortage. The nazis, after all, had made 25 million homeless.

Altogether the nazi invaders ransacked and destroyed 82,000 schools, about 2,000 higher and specialized secondary educational institutions, 605 research institutes, 44,000 clubs, palaces of culture, theatres, reading rooms, and 427 museums, among other things. Even before the war was over a start was made to rebuild such cultural institutions on liberated territory, but reconstruction work got going on a particularly large scale after the war, the whole country taking a hand. The state provided the funds, and the number of schools was brought up to its pre-war level.

A major achievement in the educational sphere was the introduction of compulsory seven-year schooling in town and country. The number of schools at which young people working in industry and agriculture could study increased greatly (these are known as schools for working and rural youth), and this meant that youngsters who had left school for front, factory or farm during the war had a chance to complete their general education.

All the higher educational institutions wrecked by the nazis were built and 112 new ones opened. The old scientific establishments were restored and others added to their number, so that in 1950 there were a thousand more than in 1940, with nearly twice the personnel. New research institutes were set up to study nuclear physics, radio engineering and electronics, precise mechanics and computing techniques, applied geophysics, physico-chemistry, high-molecular compounds, and other problems. New scientific centres came into existence—Republican Academies of Sciences in Lithuania, Estonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Kirghizia.

Tremendous advances were made by Soviet science after the war, and in 1947 Soviet scientists discovered the secret of atomic energy.¹ This was the work of a large team of physicists headed by the late Academician Igor Kurchatov. At the same time extensive work was being done to investigate the possibilities of making practical

¹ In August 1949, an atomic test was carried out in the USSR, and in August 1953, the Soviet Union tested the world's first hydrogen bomb, having outstripped the USA in this sphere. The fact that the Soviet Union has the atomic and hydrogen bombs has from the very outset helped maintain world peace, for it has prevented the US imperialists from blackmailing other countries, above all the Soviet Union, with the monopoly it once had of atomic weapons.

use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, in physics, chemistry, engineering, geology, biology, medicine, etc. At the Academy of Sciences' Institute for Atomic Problems a synchrotron and a phasotron, the largest accelerators of charged particles in the world, were built in 1949 with a view to penetrating the mysteries of atomic structure. Soviet science has made great discoveries in the study of cosmic rays, the structure of protein, and in research of electronic processes, which are of major importance to the development of radio-physics, radio-engineering and electronics.

The terrible havoc wrought by the war was made good in a very short time in all fields—economics, engineering, science, culture and the everyday life of the Soviet people, and the country went on to gather fresh strength for a more rapid advance.

XIII. DEVELOPING SOCIALIST SOCIETY

FUNDAMENTAL TASK

Once they were out of the post-war mire the Soviet people were able to concentrate on the fundamental task of strengthening and developing the socialist society they had built and so ensure victory for socialism once and for all in the USSR.

It was therefore necessary to reinforce the material and technical basis of socialism, which meant speeding up electrification and making use of electricity in all branches of production; increasing supplies of fuel and power and extending steel-producing capacity; ensuring further advances in the engineering and chemical industries; giving priority to key heavy industries governing rates of technical progress and the growth of labour productivity. It was vitally important to accelerate the development of industry in all Republics, and especially in the East and to see that the productive forces were distributed geographically in the most rational manner. Before the war concentration was on the development of the means of production. This was essential for the speediest attainment of economic self-sufficiency and for strengthening

the country's defences. Once this was done it became possible to speed up the production of consumer goods.

The creation of a more highly developed socialist society meant further improving socialist social relations, consolidating state and collective farm socialist ownership, perfecting the socialist principle of distribution of wealth according to work done, raising living standards, ensuring the utmost development of the socialist peoples of the USSR and still closer ties between them, extending Soviet democracy and drawing the working people into the government of the country on a more extensive scale.

These were complex and difficult tasks, and the Soviet people had begun to tackle them before the war. But when the Second World War broke out at the end of the thirties the Soviet Union was forced to expend a great deal of effort and resources on defence, and this naturally held back social and economic development. Then came the bloody holocaust of war against nazi Germany with all its grim consequences, and it took the first post-war five-year plan for the Soviet people to overcome them. It was only in the fifties, therefore, that they were able to go right ahead in building a highly developed socialist society.

20th CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

A milestone along this road was the 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in Moscow in February 1956, which adopteded an extensive programme for further economic and cultural development and for raising living standards. It also laid down ways of further perfecting the Soviet state and developing socialist democracy.

The Congress documents contain a scientific analysis of the contemporary world, pointing out that the main fea-

ture of our epoch was the fact that socialism had emerged from within the borders of one country and had become a world system. Lenin's teaching on the diversity of forms of the contemporary world, pointing out that the main feature of transition by various countries to socialism was further developed. The Congress also made an important conclusion that world wars could be prevented in present conditions and emphasized the tremendous significance of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social and economic systems.

The main aims of the USSR's foreign policy were defined: to develop and strengthen friendly ties between the Soviet people and the working people of all countries, and to follow a persistent policy of peace, exposing imperialist aggression and waging uncompromising struggle against it.

RESTORATION OF LENIN'S PRINCIPLES

The restoration of Lenin's principles for the norms of Party life and state affairs was of the utmost significance for the country's advancement. These principles began to be flouted in the latter years of the life of Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1922, and head of the Soviet Government from 1940 (he died on March 5, 1953). The harmful phenomenon which appeared in social and political life in the thirties and subsequently became known as the "Stalin personality cult," led to these violations.

Stalin was a contradictory figure, and the role he played in the development of Soviet society was equally contradictory. On the one hand, he was one of the most prominent figures in the Communist Party of the Soviet Uni-

on, an educated Marxist, an outstanding organizer, and an energetic, forceful Party and state leader. On the other hand he was a power-seeking, arrogant, capricious and mistrustful person, intolerant of criticism. Stalin firmly and ably upheld Leninism, which brought him popularity within the Party.

With other Party leaders in the twenties he resolutely kept to Lenin's general line of building socialism in the USSR, and proved a mature Marxist-Leninist in the fight against the anti-Party grouping of Trotsky and Bukharin. Under the Communist Party's leadership the people successfully tackled the difficult task of socialist construction, and in this Stalin, as General Secretary of the Central Committee, deserves considerable credit; he thus earned great prestige inside the Party and among the people at large.

But from the beginning of the thirties a halo of "greatness" and of "genius" began to be created around Stalin's name. It became the practice to ascribe to him all the successes and achievements of the Soviet people in the building of socialism, which meant the belittlement of the leading role of the Party and the decisive role of the working people in the creation of the new society. Stalin began to abuse his position as General Secretary of the Central Committee, to act contrary to the principle of collective leadership, to decide major problems of Party and state policy on his own and trample underfoot the Party Rules and the laws of the state.

The personality cult was something alien to Soviet society and the state system, it was alien and inimical to Marxist-Leninist ideology, according to which the working people are the chief makers of history, the creators of all the material and cultural wealth, the builders of the new world. Socialism in the USSR was built by the working

class, the working peasantry and the intellectuals under the leadership of the Leninist Communist Party.

Despite its harmful consequences however, the personality cult could not stop the Soviet Union's advance to communism. But it did hold back that advance, affected the activity of the people, both in work and in the political sphere, and weakened the Party's links with the people. So it was an urgent task, a condition for hastening the country's development, to overcome the cult and all its consequences.

After the death of Stalin in 1953 the Central Committee of the Communist Party started upon the restoration of Leninist principles in Party life and state affairs and took measures to ensure collective leadership in these spheres.

Party congresses and plenary meetings of the Central Committee began to be held regularly, and at them were decided the main questions of the life of the country. The legislative scope of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviets of the national Republics was extended. Important draft laws affecting the interests of the people began to be put before the public for preliminary nation-wide discussion. The Local Soviets were also given broader possibilities for action. The trade unions came to play a greater role and were given more extensive rights in the administration of state affairs and production.

The Soviet people appreciated the exposure and removal of the consequences of the personality cult. These measures strengthened their confidence in the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and stimulated political and labour enthusiasm for they showed with fresh force that the interests and welfare of the people were supreme law for the Party.

SOVIET INDUSTRY—NEW TASKS AND THEIR FULFILMENT

It is the constant development of industry, at an increasing tempo, that provides the basis for the country's economic might, for the continual growth of all branches of the economy and a steady rise in living standards. This is why industrial development has been the crux of all the economic plans of the Soviet state in the fifties and sixties, with emphasis on industries determining technical advance of the entire economy.

Here is a figure to give an idea of the scope of industrial development in these years: from 1951 to 1965 a total of 12,390 large industrial enterprises and a vast number of medium-sized and small ones were constructed in the USSR.

Particular attention has been given to the development of the power industry—the rapid advancement of which is a prime condition for technical progress. In the fifties work started to build mighty hydropower stations on the Volga, Kama, and Dnieper and on the rivers of Siberia. In the scale and technical level of hydropower engineering the Soviet Union has advanced to leading positions.

In our country such gigantic hydropower stations have been constructed as the 2,100,000 kw one in Kuibyshev and the 2,300,000 kw station in Volgograd. On the Angara, in Eastern Siberia, Soviet people have erected the 4,500,000 kw hydropower station near Bratsk, the biggest in the world, and on the Yenisei they are constructing the still mightier Krasnoyarsk Station.

Hydropower stations are superior to the thermal ones in that the power they produce is cheaper. But they take longer to build and cost more. So in the period from 1959 to 1965, while hydropower construction continued, the main stress was laid on large thermal stations. Both types

are equipped with power units rated at 100,000—300,000 kw or even more. The generation of electricity is gradually being concentrated in large district power stations, and stations all over the USSR are being linked up into one nation-wide grid.

Big strides have been made in the electrification of the country: in 1966 the capacity of Soviet power stations amounted to 125 million kw, and a total of 545,000 million kwh was generated (equal to a fifth of all the electricity produced in the world in 1964). This is over eleven times as much as in 1940, a tremendous stride that made it possible to raise the level of electrification of labour substantially: the 1950 level was 8 times as much as in 1940, whereas the 1966 level was 33 times as high.

The construction of the world's first atomic power station, which went into operation in 1954, was a major feat of Soviet science and engineering. And in the mid-sixties the Soviet Union built an atomic station rated at one million kw—a third of the capacity of the world's atomic power stations.

The pattern of fuel consumption in the country has changed, priority being given to such economically advantageous fuels as oil and gas. New vast deposits of oil and natural gas have been discovered, and the many years' search for oil in Siberia has been successful. In March 1962, the first gusher of Siberian oil spurted forth on the bank of the Lena, near the taiga village of Markovo, and today the entire oil world knows of the oil wells of the Tyumen Region. New methods were increasingly introduced—drilling with smaller-diameter bits, hydrolic breaking into the oil stratum, and so on. By 1965 almost half the functioning oil and gas wells had been mechanized.

All this has meant a rapid growth in gas and oil out-

put. In 1966 a total of 265 million tons of oil was extracted—nearly nine times as much as in 1940, and around 145,000 million cubic metres of gas—nearly 46 times as much as in the pre-war year. This resulted in a drastic improvement in the fuel pattern: whereas in the forties about 80 per cent of the fuel used was hard fuel, the least efficient of all, and only 20 per cent was oil and gas, in 1966 the share of the latter two was more than 52 per cent.

There has also been a sharp increase in the mechanization of the coal industry. Coal combines are firmly established in the pits, and have freed thousands of miners from heavy manual labour. There are large numbers of drifting combines and coal and rock loaders. There are more electric pit trains and other modern equipment. Almost all the coalface work is mechanized, as is the delivery of the coal to be sorted, the haulage of coal and rock and the loading of the coal into railway trucks.

The iron and steel industry is developing. New big capacities have been put into operation—the Cherepovets Factory in the North-West, the Orsk-Khalilovo Iron and Steel Combine in Kazakhstan, the Transcaucasus Iron and Steel Plant in Georgia, the Tube-Rolling Mills in Azerbaijan.

The world's biggest blast furnaces have been built in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

Total output of the chemical industry was 15.5 times as great in 1965 as it was in 1940, the production of chemical fibre almost 37 times as high and of synthetic resin and plastics 79 times.

General engineering is the backbone of industry, for it determines the technical level of the whole economy, and ensures the economic independence and defence capacity of the country. This is why the Soviet state displays

constant concern for the development of its engineering industry and technical progress. In 1965 the engineering industry produced nearly 22 times as much as in 1940, and 439 times as much as in 1913.

The Soviet engineering industry turns out many modern types of machines, mechanisms, apparatus, and various kinds of equipment for all spheres of the economy. Our turbine plants have put into production the most powerful turbines in the world—rated at 300,000 and 500,000 kw, and our scientists have designed power units of even greater capacity—800,000 and 1,000,000 kw. Our machine-tool building works are producing unique automatic and semi-automatic metal-working lathes with hydraulic transmission, copying devices and programme control, automatic and semi-automatic lines for machine-building and metal-processing, powerful forging and punching presses, horizontal punching machines and automatic forging and pressing machines. In 1957 we stopped building steam engines and have since been turning out large numbers of diesel and electric locomotives. Highly efficient earth-digging machines are now being produced including giant walking excavators. The aircraft industry is making first-class, high-speed jet and turboscrew passenger aircraft—the TU-104, TU-114, the IL-18, and the world's biggest plane, the *Antei*, which can carry more than 700 passengers thousands of miles. On October 27, 1966, Soviet fliers took a payload of more than 88 tons to a height of 6,500 metres in this plane, sending 12 world records crashing at once.

The Soviet Union has a topnotch ship-building industry which turns out large cargo ships. At the end of 1967 the first atomic icebreaker in the world, the *Lenin*, was built.

Highly efficient machinery and methods have been introduced into all industries. Automatic lines and conveyer

systems have been installed, along with all kinds of automation and electronic inspection devices. New types of radio and television equipment have been produced.

Rapid technical progress and labour enthusiasm led to a steady rise in labour productivity. In 1965, there was a 270 per cent increase on the 1940 level and a 1,270 per cent increase on the 1913 level.

The technical level of all forms of transport has been raised tremendously. In 1965 the exploitation length of our railways amounted to 131,400 kilometres. The Soviet Union has the longest electrified railways in the world—Moscow-Baikal (more than 5,000 kilometres) and the 3,500 km Leningrad-Leninakan (Armenia) line. By the end of 1965 a total of 80,000 kilometres of line had been converted to electric or diesel traction, and nearly 85 per cent of the freight carried was pulled by electric or diesel locomotives. Automation, telecontrol and automatic block systems permit the trains to travel at up to 160 kilometres an hour.

The changes which have taken place in industry and transport since the war have reinforced and consolidated the material and technical basis of socialism and have made possible further technical progress in all spheres of the economy, higher living standards and the advancement of the social relations of socialist society.

OVERCOMING AGRICULTURAL BACKWARDNESS

At the beginning of the fifties agriculture was the most backward sphere of socialist production. Farm output was not growing fast enough to satisfy the country's increasing need for foodstuffs and raw materials for industry, and there was an obvious disparity here.

There were both objective and subjective reasons for the backward state of agriculture. In the preceding period the main efforts and resources of the country had had to be channelled into the development of heavy industry, the foundation of the entire economy. In consequence capital investment into agriculture was low. Then there was the great damage inflicted on agriculture by the war, which held back its development for many years, and to make matters worse, there was a severe drought in 1946.

Apart from these objective factors, agricultural development was held in check by shortcomings and errors on the part of those in charge of farm production and by the economic relations between the state and the collective farms. The main trouble was that there was not sufficient material incentive for collective farms and their members to increase output of farm produce. The prices at which the state procured many products from the farms did not cover the cost of their production.

Supplies of machinery and technical equipment lagged behind demand, and what machines were available were not always used to the best advantage. The agronomical service to collective and state farms was not satisfactory, for large numbers of agricultural scientists were installed in various institutions and there was an acute lack of them on the job in the fields and farmyards. Then again, the collective farmers and state farm workers often found themselves hamstrung by over-rigid planning from above when they felt like using their initiative. At plenary meetings between 1953 and 1955 the Central Committee of the Communist Party brought to light these and other reasons for the unsatisfactory position in agriculture and worked out a programme for improving matters.

Particular attention was paid to consolidating the material and technical basis of agriculture. There was a big

increase in deliveries of tractors, lorries, and various kinds of cultivating, harvesting and other machines. In 1958 there was thrice as much electric power per capita in agriculture than in 1940. Between 1954 and 1958 the state invested two and a half times as much in agricultural mechanization as in the preceding five years, and in 1954 collective farms were able to get electricity from state power stations, which meant a noticeable improvement in the electrification of farm work.

The towns have not confined their assistance to supplies of machinery. More than 120,000 people having an agricultural education left the towns for the farms, many becoming heads of collective farms or filling other responsible positions and making a substantial contribution to the advancement of agriculture.

With a view to giving collective farms and collective farmers greater material incentive to increase output, the purchase prices paid by the state for farm produce were raised, the amounts of compulsory deliveries of grain, potatoes and other vegetables were cut, and so on. The state also, reduced the percentage of produce from collective farmers' private plots that had to be sold to the state, and in 1958 abolished such compulsory deliveries altogether. Collective farms began to employ a better system of sharing out income and introduced monthly or quarterly payment for work.

All these and a number of other measures had a favourable effect, and from 1954 to 1958 total output from crop-farming and livestock-rearing increased by more than half. Collective farmers' incomes increased, and their living standards and cultural level rose.

All the same the increases in the output of farm produce were not on a par with those in industry.

In March 1965 a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, after thorough discussion, adopted a programme of economic measures to speed matters up. There was a radical increase in state capital investment in agriculture, and the sum of 41,000 million roubles was allocated for the construction of farm buildings and supplies of machinery in the period 1966-70, about twice as much as in the previous five years. Investments by the collective farms themselves brought the figure up to 71,000 million, almost as much as the total capital investments in agriculture over the whole of the nineteen years which had gone by since the war. A substantial increase was envisaged in the production of agricultural machinery, along with extensive electrification, irrigation and land improvement works. Stable plans covering a number of years were drawn up for the purchase of animal products and state prices for these were raised.

Major measures were taken down to improve management in collective and state farms, and broadening collective farm democracy. Collective and state farms were given a great deal more independence in agricultural matters, in planning production, distributing income, etc. Giving priority to social production on the farms (that is collective production), the Party and the Government took the line of encouraging private production on the individual plots of collective farmers, and factory and office workers.

The decisions taken by this meeting and their practical implementation aroused considerable satisfaction among those working in agriculture, and in 1965 farm work was carried out in a more organized way and more successfully than in previous years. Despite the severe drought that hit many of the country's grain areas, cutting

the grain harvest, total farm output that year was higher than in any other. Striking results were achieved in cotton and beet-growing, the crops being higher than in any previous year. Things also went extremely well in stock-farming, and total collective farm incomes and payments for work done by collective farmers showed a 16-per-cent increase.

That one year showed that the measures laid down in the decisions of the March Plenary Meeting for raising farm production and keeping it on the upgrade were realistic and had a scientific basis.

Extremely good results were obtained on the farms in 1966, which brought the biggest ever harvests of grain, cotton, sugar beet and other crops. In that one year agricultural output showed a 10-per-cent increase, the biggest in the country's history. The state purchased more than 74 million tons of grain, also an all-time peak. State purchases of animal products also rose. Favourable weather played its part, of course, but the decisive factor was the measures carried out in pursuance of the decisions of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Party in 1965.

THE PEOPLE'S WELL-BEING—THE MAIN THING

After the war living standards in the Soviet Union rose considerably, for in our country economic development is inevitably accompanied by improvements in the life of the people, as the people's welfare is the principal concern of the Communist Party. In the late fifties all factory and office workers went over to a sevenhour day, while underground workers and people working in other trades consi-

dered harmful to health, to a sixhour day. There were no cuts in pay—in fact wages increased substantially. For example, in the chemical industry they went up by 12 per cent, while iron and steel workers had an 11-per-cent rise. The minimum for low-paid workers was raised, and much was done to close the gap between the lowest and the highest paid. In the early part of the sixties there were considerable wage rises in education, the health service, housing and municipal services, trade, public catering, and other branches of the economy providing direct services to the public. A quarter of all wage and salary earners had increases of varying amounts, the average being 25 per cent.

In June 1966, guaranteed monthly pay was introduced for collective farmers on the basis of the scale laid down for the appropriate categories of workers on state farms. Taxes were gradually reduced, and in October 1, 1961, the tax-free minimum was raised to 60 roubles.

After the war there were radical improvements in the pensions situation. Under a law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1965 most state pensions were almost doubled, and wage and salary earners now get pensions amounting to 50-100 per cent of their pay.

The widespread introduction of state pensions for collective farmers was of tremendous social significance, and this category of the population now receives pensions on a par with industrial and office workers, from a fund made up of appropriations from the state budget of the USSR and allocations from collective farm income.

Another factor of great importance is the further growth of public consumption funds, which in 1966 amounted to a vast sum—over 42,000 million roubles, nine times as much as in 1940. From these funds the public gets such things as free medical attention, free education and vocational training, pensions and various other benefits,

paid holidays, student allowances, free or reduced cost vouchers for holidays at sanatoriums and rest homes, etc. In 1965, for example, 32 million people received pensions at state, and partly at collective farm, expense (as against approximately 4 million in 1940), including about 8 million collective farmers. Five million mothers of big families and single mothers received monthly grants, and more than five million students at specialized educational establishments got allowances and hostel accommodation. About 7,700,000 children attended nurseries and nursery schools for a very small payment, and on top of this 3,900,000 children went to special summer nurseries and play centres. More than 15 million working people and their children spent holidays, and received treatment, at sanatoriums, rest homes, guest houses, pioneer camps in the country, and resort clinics, the cost being borne, either in whole or in part, by funds allocated by the state for social security or collective farm funds. In addition more than two million people spent vacations at open-air holiday or mountaineering centres.

Counting various benefits and payments from public funds, real incomes per head of population were three times as high in 1965 as in 1940. It is interesting to note that more than 18,700 million roubles was deposited in savings bank accounts in 1965, as against a mere 1,800 million roubles in 1950.

House-building went ahead on a vast scale, especially under the Seven-Year Plan. Between 1959 and 1965 a total of 11,200,000 flats (with 558 million square metres of living space) were constructed, almost as many as in all the previous years of Soviet power.

Improvements in material conditions and in the health service have led to a further decrease in the death rate,

and today average life expectancy in the USSR is over 70. The high birth rate is also growing making for a considerable natural population increase. In 1965 the population of the USSR was over 232 million, exceeding the 1950 figure by more than 56 million.

TO THE SUMMITS OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE

The victory of socialism in the USSR opened up great vistas for educational, scientific and cultural development. Compare the census returns for 1939 and 1959. In 1939 there were less than 16 million people with a higher, or secondary education, complete or incomplete, whereas in 1959 the figure was nearly 59 million. Before the October 1917 Revolution the children of workers and peasants did not get secondary schooling, to say nothing of higher education. In 1939 only 4.3 per cent of those engaged in manual labour had a secondary education, whereas in 1959, 39 per cent of the workers and 21 per cent of the collective farmers had a secondary or higher education.

In the cultural sphere the country made a great step forward in the Seven-Year Plan period, for during this time the transition to compulsory, universal eight-year education was accomplished. Secondary and higher education became more widespread, and there was a steady increase in the number of specialists trained in higher or specialized secondary educational establishments. The number of specialists with diplomas working in various spheres of the economy in 1966 was more than 13 million, including about 5,500,000 with a higher education. There were 700,000 scientific workers, seven times the 1940 figure.

Brilliant results have been achieved by Soviet scientists in important spheres of science and engineering, the most striking of them in space exploration. On October 4, 1957,

the Soviet Union sent the world's first artificial Earth satellite into orbit. In September 1959, the Soviet Union sent up the first cosmic rocket to land on the Moon, and it delivered a pennant with the emblem of the USSR upon it to the lunar surface. In October of the same year a Soviet automatic interplanetary station took the first photographs of the hidden side of the Moon and transmitted them to the Earth.

The storming of the cosmos culminated in the historic flight of man into space. On April 12, 1961, pilot-cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, Communist and citizen of the Soviet Union, made the first 108-minute space flight around the Earth, and landed safe and sound back on Earth in the area scheduled, a fantastic event that paved the way for a whole series of sensational flights by Soviet and American cosmonauts.

February 1966, saw another landmark in cosmic research when a Soviet automatic station—the *Luna 9*—made the first-ever soft landing on the Moon. This station sent back radio and television transmissions of exceptional scientific value—people were able to see the Moon's surface. This was a major step to the solution of the problem of manned space flight to another planet.

Scientific research to gain further mastery over atomic energy continued. Soviet scientists built the atomic installation *Romashka*, converting the thermal energy of an atomic reactor into electricity without the intervention of any moving parts or mechanisms. Another development was the construction of a mobile atomic power station on caterpillar tracks.

Soviet scientists are working hard on the complex problems of controlled thermo-nuclear reaction and a study of the properties of plasma. These problems solved, man will have access to a virtually inexhaustible source of ener-

gy—the waters of seas and oceans.

Quantum electronics was another sphere in which Soviet scientists did splendid work. Physicists N. Basov and A. Prokhorov carried out fundamental work which led to the construction of quantum generators and radio and light wave amplifiers, making possible the solution of many problems hitherto considered insoluble. Quantum generators are capable of vaporizing the most refractory substances, can heat substances to temperatures of millions of degrees and in thousandths of a second can "burn" holes in any solids.

Big advances were also made in solid physics. A method of making artificial diamonds was developed at the Soviet Academy of Sciences on the basis of which the production of synthetic diamonds has been organized in the USSR on an industrial scale. A method of making a new material—borazon—which is harder than diamond, has also been discovered.

Each two years, on the anniversary of Lenin's birth, prizes are awarded for the most outstanding work done in Soviet science and engineering, as well as in literature and the arts.

Many Soviet scientists—chemist N. Semyonov, and physicists L. Landau, I. Tamm, I. Frank, P. Cherenkov, N. Basov, and A. Prokhorov—have been awarded Nobel Prizes for their work. Mikhail Sholokhov, the eminent Soviet writer, is also a Nobel Prize Winner.

IMPROVING THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY

The rapid qualitative and quantitative growth of the material and technical basis of socialism and the rise in material and cultural standards have led to big changes in the social structure of Soviet society, in the composition

of classes and the relations between them.

Despite heavy losses during the war, there were 54,600,000 wage and salary earners in 1958, more than double the 1937 figure. Because industry was developing more rapidly in the previously backward national Republics in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the Baltic, the number of workers increased faster in these parts of the country than in the USSR as a whole.

The number of workers in trades requiring highly skilled machine operation and engaged in extremely complex production technology have been growing at an increasing tempo. The work performed in these trades is close in character to that of qualified engineering and technical personnel. At the same time the numbers engaged on manual work, or on jobs where there is a very low degree of mechanization are diminishing, and some such occupations are dying out altogether. On the other hand the amount of complicated equipment serviced by engineers and technicians is on the increase. In 1939, 8.2 per cent of the workers had a higher or secondary education, while in 1959 the figure was 38.6, and for chemical, steel, engineering, clothing and typographical workers over 50 per cent.

The growth of the cultural level of the workers is of a particularly interesting character in the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan. Whereas in the USSR as a whole the increase in the number of workers with a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education amounted to 370 per cent between 1939 and 1959, in Kazakhstan the increment was 500 per cent, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 700 per cent, in Turkmenia 800 per cent and Kirghizia 1,000 per cent.

In the full sense of the term the working class is the decisive force in social progress and economic development

of Soviet society. The workers have come to play an increasing part in production management and the organization of labour, both through the trade unions and the standing commissions of workers at the factories, whose recommendations are binding on the management of the enterprise concerned. The working class is more active politically in the Communist Party, the trade unions and other mass organizations.

The position of the Soviet peasantry has also changed radically. First of all it should be noted that it now accounts for a lower proportion of the total population, the result of part of the peasantry going over to work in industry, transport, construction, etc. Thanks to advances in mechanization and increases in agricultural labour productivity a great part of the former peasantry now has the amenities of town life within reach. The numbers of collective farmers have decreased somewhat because collective farms have become state farms and their former members are now agricultural workers. Farm work is being more and more industrialized hereby bringing the peasants' work more in line in character and content with that of the worker. Furthermore, because collective farmers' incomes increased more rapidly than those of wage and salary earners in the fifties and sixties, the gap between the living standards of workers and peasants has narrowed perceptibly.

Another gap has lessened in the sphere of culture and everyday life. As the 1959 census showed, by that time in the countryside, as in the towns, illiteracy had been completely wiped out, whereas in 1939 there were still nearly 10 million people in the countryside who could neither read nor write. At that time, too, there were just over five million people working in agriculture who had a secondary or higher education, complete or incomplete, as against

more than 21 million—four times as many—in 1959. In 1939, the ratio of people in town and countryside with any kind of secondary education was five to one in favour of the towns, whereas in 1959 it was 1.8 to 1. In 1939 there were ten times as many people in the towns with a higher or secondary education than in the countryside, but by 1959 the figure had dropped to 5.5 times.

When one takes into consideration, also, that in the Soviet countryside there are tens of thousands of clubs, libraries, reading rooms, and film projectors, and that millions of people take part in amateur song, dance and drama groups it will be clear that the process of eliminating the difference between town and country, between the working class and the peasantry is going ahead rapidly. This is primarily due to the technical and cultural advances made in agriculture.

The number of people engaged in intellectual work has risen substantially. In 1959 there were 20 million of them. In twenty years (1939-59) the figure had increased more than 130 per cent, and population increase was 22 per cent. In 1959 the white-collar workers accounted for more than one-fifth of the population. Such an important profession as that of engineer (there was an increase of 230 per cent in the number of engineers in the twenty years) had more specialists to its credit than others. Standards of education and professional training of engineering and technical personnel have risen substantially. Whereas in 1939 half the people engaged in non-manual work had a secondary or higher education the figure was more than 88 per cent in 1959. A growing proportion of these non-manual workers are becoming more highly qualified, genuinely creative workers. Their socialist awareness is developing, they are more active politically, working with

greater enthusiasm, and playing a greater role in the socialist advancement of the country. Year by year they are displaying more initiative in the endeavour to improve socialist production and popularize advanced experience in science and engineering. At the same time creative cooperation between manual and non-manual workers is growing.

As the two friendly classes, the workers and the collective farmers, and also the socialist intelligentsia, develop and come closer together, the basis is being laid for strengthening the social, economic, moral and political unity of Soviet society.

SOCIALIST NATIONS ADVANCE, COME CLOSER TOGETHER

The post-war period saw further development of the socialist nations, a powerful economic and cultural advance of all the peoples of the USSR. At the same time the process of bringing the peoples of the USSR closer together politically, economically and culturally was intensified. This twin process of the nations advancing and getting closer together is the essence of national relations in the USSR during the period of building socialism. Those post-war years were a period of unprecedented industrial development in the national Republics. Altogether Soviet industrial production increased 7.9 times between 1940 and 1965, while in Kirghizia the increment was 10 times, in Armenia and Kazakhstan more than 12 times, in Moldavia 16 times, in Latvia 17.4 times, in Lithuania 18 times and in Estonia 18.4 times. Modern industries have come into being in all the national Republics.

Because the development of formerly backward areas

has been taking place at particularly fast rates the historical task of eliminating economic inequality between the peoples of the USSR has been carried out. The levelling up of economic development in the Soviet national Republics is an inexorable law of socialist society.

As has been pointed out the years in which we have been completing the building of socialism have been marked by a development of culture throughout the country. But the changes have been particularly noticeable in the Eastern Republics and the Baltic Republics which entered the Soviet Union on the eve of the Second World War. They were given an opportunity for the ultimate cultural advancement and finally overcame the inequality that existed in this sphere.

Along with the economic, cultural and political development of the socialist nations, they have been gradually getting closer together, and the multiple ties between them have expanded and diversified. There has been increasing exchange of material and cultural assets between nations on the basis of genuine equality, cooperation and mutual assistance and the principle of socialist internationalism, and this has also contributed to the effacement of historical differences in economic and cultural levels, to the evening up of these levels and to a more even advance of the economy and culture of all the fraternal peoples of the USSR.

The economic levelling up of the socialist nations ensues from the very nature of socialist economy, which develops in a planned way, on the basis of state management expressed in annual, five-year and longer-term plans. The economic plans envisage more efficient division of labour among the Republics, greater specialization and cooperation among them, and the establishment of a definite system of economic links.

Since the war, thanks to the swift growth of the industrial might of each Republic and the planned specialization and cooperation in production, the economic links between them have diversified and extended. Every Republic is linked with the rest by a thousand threads: it sends many of the products of its own industry and agriculture to other Republics, and receives many of theirs. At the end of the fifties, for example, Armenia supplied all Union Republics with mobile power plants, transformers, electric motors, measuring instruments, electric cable, metal-cutting and polishing tools, refined and unrefined copper, molybdenum, synthetic rubber, outer types, etc. From other Republics Armenia got agricultural machinery, vehicles, coal, iron and steel, oil products, radio and electrical engineering goods, among other things.

Further development of economic ties also found its expression in their mutual enrichment with technical and scientific experience, the development of fraternal cooperation, the provision of qualified specialists and many other forms of cooperation.

By the combined efforts of the peoples of the USSR, power stations are being built, new industrial centres constructed, virgin lands brought under the plough and canals cut. The joint efforts of the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Byelorussia resulted in the construction of the power station *Friendship of the Peoples*. Four Central Asian Republics pooled their efforts to build an irrigation system which uses the waters of the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya. By the endeavours of three Caucasian Republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—a gas pipeline has been laid from Baku, capital of Azerbaijan, to Armenia and Georgia. Here, too, it has been given the name of *Friendship Pipe*. Another example. In accordance with the general plan for the development of the steel industry in the Cau-

casus several projects have been begun— the Dashkesan ore mine in Azerbaijan, the steel works at Rustavi, not far from Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, and a tube-rolling mill in the Azerbaijan town of Sumgait. Dashkesan ore is used for smelting in the blast and open-hearth furnaces at Rustavi, and Georgian steel is converted into tubes at the Azerbaijan mill. These tubes lead to the oil wells at Baku and other oil and gas areas, which are equally necessary both to Georgia and Azerbaijan, and to all the Union Republics.

The cultural affinities of the peoples of the USSR continue to grow, and their national cultures are coming closer and closer together. Each nation, developing and perfecting its own national culture is at the same time striving to absorb all that is best in the cultures of the other peoples of the Soviet Union. Here a tremendous role is played by the traditional showing of the cultural achievements of each people to the others. In Moscow and each Republic festivals of literature, art and films of the various Republics are held, there are tours by theatrical companies and musical ensembles, and art exhibitions. Outstanding literary works of one people are translated into the languages of others—this has become a widespread practice. And it all helps to reinforce cooperation between national cultures and their mutual enrichment on the basis of socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism.

The increasing cultural cooperation among the socialist nations and the reciprocal influence and mutual enrichment of their cultures promotes the development of many features in the spiritual make-up of these nations. In the course of building socialism each people develops international features, the archaic specific traits associated with the feudal way of life gradually disappear and new socialist customs, festivals, etc., come into being.

The nations are also growing closer together politically.

Above all, there is greater trust between them. State borders between national Union Republics have acquired a purely conventional, symbolic significance. Territorial questions which in bourgeois conditions were the cause of conflicts and wars, are successfully solved on the basis of friendship, mutual understanding and businesslike cooperation. In 1954, for instance the Russian Federation, of its own volition, handed over the Crimea to the Ukrainian Republic. And another example: in January 1956, the Bostansyk District of the Kazakh Republic, which has economic affinities with Uzbekistan, was transferred to the Uzbek Republic by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR. Kazakhstan gave Uzbekistan nearly 2.5 million acres of the Hungry Steppe, while Uzbekistan handed over part of its Hungry Steppe area to Tajikistan. This all made it possible to organize land cultivation better and facilitated irrigation in these three Republics.

The growing cooperation among the socialist nations is an inexhaustible means for strengthening the might and power of the multinational socialist state, in which the interests of the Union and Autonomous Republics are harmoniously combined with those of the state as a whole. The Communist Party displays every concern to reinforce the unity of the socialist nations fostering in all the Soviet peoples a spirit of intolerance to any manifestation of national dissension or narrow national outlook, and fights against survivals of nationalism and chauvinism, against customs and habits that interfere with the building of communism.

IN THE LEAD OF WORLD PROGRESS

Since the war the Soviet Union has considerably extended the material and technical basis of socialism, has en-

sured the growth of the material and cultural level of the people, improved the social structure of society and made it possible for the socialist nations to advance which come closer together. This has facilitated an all-round strengthening of the position of socialism. Today there is a developed, mature socialist society in the USSR.

Great changes have also taken place in the international situation, and there has been a radical shift in the balance of forces between socialism and capitalism in the world arena. Up to the Second World War the Soviet Union was the only socialist country. Capitalist encirclement presented a serious threat of military attack. For this reason the victory of socialism in the USSR could not be considered definitive.

Since the war the position has been utterly different. Under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the USSR, and as a result of the favourable conditions created by the historic victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany and her allies, the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia led by their Communist Parties, removed the reactionary regimes from power, established a democratic order and started along the path of socialist development. The same way was chosen by the people of the German Democratic Republic. Some peoples in Asia and Latin America (Cuba) have also chosen the road of building socialism. As a result the world socialist system has come into existence.

Whereas before the Second World War socialism accounted for 17 per cent of the Earth's surface, 9 per cent of the world's population and 7 per cent of its total industrial output, today the socialist countries occupy 25 per cent of the area, have 35 per cent of the population and produce 38 per cent of industrial output.

Another blow was dealt to the capitalist system, to the imperialists, by the national-liberation revolution of the oppressed peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, in which the majority of the Earth's population live. The development of the national-liberation struggle in these countries was given a powerful impetus by the Great October Socialist Revolution, the fiftieth anniversary of which is being celebrated this year. But it unfolded on a particularly wide scale after the Second World War, as a result of which imperialism's shock force—German and Italian fascism—was routed and the positions of the major colonial powers seriously weakened. By the beginning of the fifties 1,200 million people had thrown off the yoke of colonialism, and there are now more than sixty new independent states on the political map of the world.

A number of young states in Asia and Africa have proclaimed the building of socialism their state policy. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are giving all-round assistance, without strings, to the liberated peoples to help them maintain and reinforce their political independence, develop their national economy and culture and rapidly overcome the fearful heritage of colonial domination.

The emergence of the world socialist system and the decline of the colonial system have deepened the general crisis of capitalism and radically changed the balance of forces in the international arena in favour of socialism. Now no force in the world can destroy socialism in the USSR or any other socialist country with the mailed fist.

This means that socialism in the USSR has triumphed not only completely, from the point of view of its internal development, but once and for all: the threat of the

restoration of capitalism by force from outside has gone.

Such is the path of development followed by the peoples of the USSR since the victory of the Great October Revolution in 1917. This is how socialism was built in the USSR, how it is being built today.

Having created a highly developed socialist society, the Soviet people paved the way for the transition to the highest stage, communism. In 1918 Lenin said: "As we make a start on socialist transformations we must clearly keep in sight the aim to which these transformations are directed in the long run, that is the aim of building a communist society... to the realization of the principle: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need."

At its 22nd Congress in 1961 the Communist Party adopted a new programme which defined the ways for building communism, the highest phase. One of the prime conditions for this is creation of the material and technical basis for communism. And it is already being built by the Soviet people, who made an important contribution to it by successfully completing the Seven-Year Plan.

The 23rd Congress, which was held at the end of March and the beginning of April 1966, laid down the tasks of the Five-Year Plan of economic development for the period 1966-70. This will be another contribution to the material and technical basis for communism. The Soviet people have some difficult tasks to perform: increase industrial production by 47-50 per cent and agricultural output by 25 per cent, speed up scientific and technical progress, raise labour productivity in industry by a third and in agriculture by even more—40-45 per cent.

The new plan envisages the closing of the gap in rates of growth of the production of the means of production

and the production of consumer goods, and a sharp increase in capital investments in agriculture. This will eliminate the disparity between the development of heavy and light industry, and between industry and agriculture.

Further improvement in the people's well-being is envisaged in the plan, real incomes per head of population are to rise by about 30 per cent. Higher income growth rates are laid down for collective farmers, which will lead to a further evening up of the standard of living for people in town and country. General secondary education is to be introduced.

A great plan, great tasks. But it is within the power of the Soviet people, who have embarked upon its fulfilment.

* * *

Our country is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power. This is a great fifty years in the history of the peoples of the USSR, in the history of all mankind. Where are they now, those luckless prophets who contemptuously foretold that the Soviet state should last for weeks, or at best, months? They have sunk into oblivion. But the first-ever state of workers and peasants stands like a mighty rock in the modern world.

Looked at from the historical point of view, fifty years is an extremely short time. But the Soviet people have scored a great success in that period, having changed the face of their country beyond recognition! They have transformed its political system and socio-economic structure, the character and level of development of the productive forces, the class structure and the character of the classes themselves, the relations between nations and the essence

of those nations, and the material and cultural standards of the people. This means that now the USSR, hand in hand with the other countries in the world system of socialism, determines the main direction of historical development in the present epoch.



1. 1920. V. I. Lenin receiving H. G. Wells




2. In Kremlin grounds on May 1, 1920—nation-wide subbotnik



3. Voluntary overtime work ("subbotnik") at construction of power plant for Kuznetsk mill (1932)

4. Iron and steel works in Magnitogorsk (1933)






5. Lenin at May 1, 1919 demonstration

6. Construction of Turkestan—Siberia railway line





7. Joining a collective farm



8. "Dneproges"—large power station on the Dnieper in construction

9. Turkmen girl, YCL member, teaches women to read and write (1931)





10. Arrival of the Papanin team of Polar explorers



11. Heroes of the Chelyuskin drift

12. Construction of Ferghana canal (1939)




13. Twenty-five ton trucks at Kadjaran molybdenum ore quarry in Soviet Armenia




14. First Soviet motor vehicle made at AMO works



15. Construction of hydropower plant at Bratsk



16. First Soviet tractor




17. Tractor works in Minsk, Byelorussia




18. First wipe-out-illiteracy schools




19. Atomic research centre at Dubna








20. Oil fields in 1900

21. Oil derricks near Bak













27. Back from the front


26. Victory flag over Reichstag



28. After a difficult operation

29. Lecture at medical school in Frunze, Kirghizia






30. Control room of atomic power station

31. Eighteen power units of Bratsk station






32. Sputnik—first man-made Earth satellite

33. Calculations for a flight to the Moon







35. Alexei Leonov—first man to walk in space


34. Construction of Novo-Voronezh atomic power station



36. Moscow University

37. Freshmen








38. Truth is born in argument

39. Academic settlement in Novosibirsk









43. Synthetic fibre plant

42. Unique turbines made in Leningrad





45. Amateur art group in Siberia

44. Athletes on parade





47. At leisure

46. Marina is through with homework

